Rejecting the Touchstone: Complete Preemption and Congressional Intent after Beneficial National Bank v. Anderson by Tarkington, Margaret Christine
South Carolina Law Review 
Volume 59 Issue 2 Article 2 
Winter 2008 
Rejecting the Touchstone: Complete Preemption and 
Congressional Intent after Beneficial National Bank v. Anderson 
Margaret Christine Tarkington 
Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Tarkington, Margaret Christine (2008) "Rejecting the Touchstone: Complete Preemption and 
Congressional Intent after Beneficial National Bank v. Anderson," South Carolina Law Review: Vol. 59 : Iss. 
2 , Article 2. 
Available at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol59/iss2/2 
This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please 
contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu. 
REJECTING THE TOUCHSTONE: COMPLETE PREEMPTION AND
CONGRESSIONAL INTENT AFTER
BENEFICIAL NATIONAL BANK V. ANDERSON
MARGARET TARKINGTON*
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................ 226
II. ORIGINS OF THE WELL-PLEADED COMPLAINT RULE ................. 229
A. Removal Under the 1875 Act and the Well-Pleaded
Pleading Rule .......................................... 230
B. The 1887 and 1888 Amendments and the
Prohibition of Federal Defense Removal ..................... 233
III. THE HISTORY OF THE COMPLETE PREEMPTION DOCTRINE ............ 237
A. Complete Preemption Prior to Anderson ..................... 237
1. Avco and Complete Preemption Under the LMRA .......... 237
2. Taylor and Complete Preemption Under ERISA ............ 239
B. The Anderson Foray ..................................... 240
1. The Anderson Decision ............................... 240
2. The Effect of Anderson in the Lower Courts ............... 245
IV. ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS FOR DETERMINING COMPLETE PREEMPTION . 250
V. SEPARATION OF POWERS, FEDERALISM, AND EFFICIENCY PROBLEMS
WITH THE ANDERSON RULE ................................... 255
A. Separation of Powers Problems ............................ 255
1. Congressional Power to Determine Lower Federal
Court Jurisdiction ................................... 255
a. The Carmack Amendment and Congressional
Intent of Removability ............................. 258
b. Complete Preemption by the Carmack Amendment
Under Anderson ................................. 265
2. Judicial Interpretation as the Basis for Determining
Judicial Power ...................................... 268
*Copyright 2007 by Margaret Tarkington, Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, J. Reuben
Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. I am grateful to C. Douglas Floyd, Richard D. Freer,
Jay Tidmarsh, and James Rasband for their valuable comments and to Research Librarian, Shawn
Nevers, for his incredible research assistance. This Article was presented at the 2007 Texas Junior
Legal Scholars Conference, and I express appreciation to the sponsors and participants for their
helpful comments.
1
Tarkington: Rejecting the Touchstone: Complete Preemption and Congressional I
Published by Scholar Commons, 2008
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
3. Superiority of Congress to Make Jurisdictional Allocations ... 272
B. Federalism Problems .................................... 278
1. Denying State Courts the Ability to Construe the
Reach of State Law .................................. 278
2. Taking Jurisdiction from the States Without
Congressional Authorization ........................... 282
C. Efficiency-An Alleged Benefit of the Anderson Rule ........... 285
VI. RETURNING TO CONGRESSIONAL INTENT .......................... 291
V II. CONCLUSION .............................................. 294
I. INTRODUCTION
The central question in the field of federal courts is the appropriate allocation
of judicial power between the states and the federal government. Cases involving
a federal preemption defense to state law claims raise concerns at the heart of this
inquiry. Notably, where a case turns on substantive preemption of state law claims
by federal law, both the states, whose laws are displaced by the preemption, and the
federal government, which enacted the preempting federal legislation, have vested
interests in asserting jurisdiction, furthering their own policies, and interpreting
their respective laws.
Although 28 U.S.C. § 1331 provides federal courts withj urisdiction over cases
arising under the federal Constitution or federal law,' such statutory "arising
under," or "federal question," jurisdiction is restricted by the well-pleaded
complaint rule. Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, the federal question must
appear as part of the plaintiffs case as set forth in the complaint and cannot be
based on a federal defense, either anticipated by the plaintiff or actually asserted by
the defendant.2 Consequently, the well-pleaded complaint rule allocates to the state
courts, subject to Supreme Court certiorari review, the determination of a federal
preemption defense to a complaint raising only state law claims.' Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court has recognized a corollary, or exception, to the well-pleaded
complaint rule for certain federal preemption defenses. The doctrine of complete
preemption-a rather confusing term of art4-is ajurisdictional doctrine that allows
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000).
2. See, e.g., Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) ("The presence or absence of
federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the 'well-pleaded complaint rule,' which provides that
federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's
properly pleaded complaint.").
3. See id. at 393 ("[A] case may not be removed to federal court on the basis of a federal defense,
including the defense of pre-emption ... ").
4. Complete preemption is distinct from substantive preemption. Substantive federal preemption
occurs when federal law preempts, and thus nullifies, some aspect of state law. Federal law can
substantively preempt state law"by express language in a congressional enactment, by implication from
[Vol. 59: 225
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for removal based on a federal preemption defense, even though the plaintiffs
complaint asserts only state law claims.5
Prior to 2003, the Supreme Court recognized complete preemption for only two
federal preemption defenses and appeared to construe the doctrine very narrowly.6
In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Taylor,7 the Supreme Court explained that the
"touchstone" for finding complete preemption is "the intent of Congress," thereby
placing the allocation ofjurisdiction over preemption questions in the hands of the
legislature.8 In the years following Taylor, the federal circuits created various
complete preemption tests, but "all [the tests] focus[ed] on a similar goal: to
determine whether Congress... intended to grant a defendant the ability to remove
the adjudication of the cause of action to a federal court."9
In 2003, the Supreme Court in Beneficial National Bank v. Anderson'°
undermined its reliance on Congress by changing the test for complete preemption
from examining congressional intent of removability to requiring congressional
intent that a federal cause of action be exclusive." By making the litmus test for
complete preemption depend on whether a federal cause of action nullifies a state
cause of action (and thus is "exclusive"), 12 the Anderson decision effected a change
in the allocation of state and federal jurisdiction over federal preemption defenses.
the depth and breadth of a congressional scheme that occupies the legislative field, or by implication
because of a conflict with a congressional enactment." Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525,
541 (2001) (citations omitted). Thus, a defendant who raises a substantive preemption defense is
asserting that a plaintiffs state law claim is preempted by federal substantive law and should be
dismissed. Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, such a substantive federal preemption defense would
have no effect onjurisdiction because the federal question appears by way of defense even though the
defense is that the state law claim is preempted by federal law. However, where the doctrine of complete
preemption applies, a substantive federal preemption defense gives rise to a jurisdictional result by
allowing removal of the case to federal court. 1d; see also Sullivan v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 424 F.3d 267,
272 n.5 (2d Cir. 2005) ("Because complete preemption operates to create federal subject-matter
jurisdiction, some commentators have argued that the doctrine would be better labeled 'jurisdictional'
preemption."); Lister v. Stark, 890 F.2d 941, 943 n.1 (7th Cir. 1989) ("The use of the term 'complete
preemption' is unfortunate, since the complete preemption doctrine is not a preemption doctrine but
rather a federal jurisdiction doctrine.").
5. See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63-64 (1987) ("One corollary of the well-
pleaded complaint rule developed in the case law, however, is that Congress may so completely pre-
empt a particular area that any civil complaint raising this select group of claims is necessarily federal
in character.").
6. See, e.g., id. at 67 (finding complete preemption for state law claims alleged to be preempted
under section 502(a) of ERISA); Avco Corp. V. Aero Lodge No. 735, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 390
U.S. 557, 560 (1968) (finding complete preemption and allowing removal for preemption defenses
arising under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act).
7. 481 U.S. 58.
8. Id. at 66.
9. Arthur R. Miller, Artful Pleading: A Doctrine in Search of Definition, 76 TEx. L. REV. 1781,
1797 98 (1998) (emphasis added).
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One scholar has claimed thatAnderson isjustified as a rule ofjudicial economy
and efficiency."3 But Anderson creates far more problems than it alleviates as a rule
for allocating jurisdiction between federal and state courts. Indeed, Anderson's
"exclusive cause of action" test gives rise to separation of powers and federalism
concerns. The test creates separation of powers problems because it is Congress that
has the power to determine the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts, and the
Anderson rule results in an allocation of jurisdiction at odds with congressional
intent. The test raises federalism concerns because, in cases raising solely state law
claims, theAnderson test divests state courts ofjurisdiction to legitimately construe
the reach of state law in the face of federal preemption, even where Congress has
made no indications that state courts should be deprived of such jurisdiction.
This Article first explores the separation of powers, federalism, and efficiency
problems created by Anderson, and then offers a new framework for determining
complete preemption that would ameliorate these problems and ground complete
preemption in congressional intent. Part 11 of this Article examines the history of
the well-pleaded complaint rule, which was created as a judicial interpretation of
the 1875 judicial code and amendments thereto. The history of the rule, combined
with repeated congressional rejections of proposals to repeal the rule, illustrate that
the rule can fairly be seen as a congressional limitation on federal question
jurisdiction. Part III reviews the Supreme Court cases that created the complete
preemption exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule and allowed removal on
the basis of certain federal preemption defenses. Both Taylor and Anderson are
examined in Part III, as are changes in the caselaw of the lower federal courts
following Anderson.
Part IV of this Article provides a brief overview of other proposed analyses for
complete preemption, including a framework recently proposed as an alternative to
Anderson that would allow complete preemption based upon the breadth of
substantive federal preemption. 4 Part V examines the Anderson test and other
proposed analyses for complete preemption, and explores separation of powers,
federalism, and efficiency problems raised by such frameworks. Using cases
regarding complete preemption under the Carmack Amendment 5 as a case in point,
Part V reviews pre- and post-Anderson cases. These cases demonstrate that the
Anderson test does not accurately determine congressional desire to transfer
jurisdiction from state to federal courts. These cases also highlight the deficiencies
of Anderson and other proposed complete preemption tests.
Finally, Part VI offers a new framework for complete preemption that is
anchored in congressional intent to create removal jurisdiction. Modeled on
13. See Garrick B. Pursley, Rationahiing Complete Preemption After Beneficial National Bank
v. Anderson: A New Rule, a New Justification, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 371, 376, 432-33 (2006) ("[T]he
Anderson rule is primarily justified as an efficiency generating tool of judicial administration[, and]
[a]pplication of the Anderson rule allows the parties to skip several intermediate procedural steps,...
reducing the length of litigation and conserving judicial and litigant resources.").
14. See Gil Seinfeld, The Pu le of Complete Preemption, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 537, 572-78 (2007).
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concurrent jurisdiction caselaw, this framework generally requires a manifestation
from Congress that it intends to create removal jurisdiction for a specific federal
preemption defense. The framework improves upon the Taylor analysis by clearly
setting out the requirements for complete preemption and by allowing federal
defense removal without congressional manifestations in a narrowly defined area
where removal would be necessary to effectuate congressional purposes. Through
this framework, complete preemption could once again be tied to the touchstone of
congressional intent.
I1. ORIGINS OF THE WELL-PLEADED COMPLAINT RULE
The Supreme Court has upheld the well-pleaded complaint rule as a restriction
on statutory federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and not as a
restriction created or required by Article III of the Constitution. 6 To the extent that
the well-pleaded complaint rule is entirely a creation of thejudiciary, it would seem
the judiciary could reverse or abrogate the rule through judicially-created
exceptions, like complete preemption. On the other hand, to the extent the rule is
imposed by Congress, thejudiciary is obligated to adhere to it. The Supreme Court
has repeatedly recognized congressional power to determine the extent of
jurisdiction to be exercised by the lower federal courts, including withholding
jurisdiction "in the exact degrees and character which to Congress may seem proper
for the public good."'"
The Supreme Court has characterized the well-pleaded complaint rule as a
requirement imposed by Congress rather than a creation of thej udiciary." A review
of the history of the well-pleaded complaint rule reveals that it arose as a judicial
interpretation of the 1875 grant of arising under jurisdiction and congressional
amendments made thereto in 1887 and 1888."9
16. See Am. Nat'l Red Cross v. S.G., 505 U.S. 247, 258 (1992) (explaining that it is erroneous
to "invoke [the well-pleaded complaint rule] outside the realm of statutory 'arising under' jurisdiction,
i.e., jurisdiction based on 28 U.S.C. § 1331," because the '"well-pleaded complaint' rule applies only
to statutory 'arising under' cases" (emphasis added)): Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S.
480, 496 97 (1983) (holding that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act fell within constitutional
arising under power and explaining that the lower court erred in relying heavily on the well-pleaded
complaint rule to find a lack of constitutional power).
17. Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 698 (1992) (quoting Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.)
236, 245 (1845)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also infra Part V.A.1 (discussing the
foundations and extent of congressional power to determine lower federal court jurisdiction).
18. See, e.g., Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., 522 U.S. 470, 472 (1998) ("Congress has provided
for removal of cases from state court to federal court when the plaintiff's complaint alleges a claim
arising under federal law. Congress has not authorized removal based on a defense or anticipated
defense federal in character." (emphasis added)): Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 399 (1987)
("Congress has long since decided that federal defenses do not provide a basis for removal.").
19. In Caterpillar, the Court alluded to the role that both Congress and the Court played in the
creation of the well-pleaded complaint rule when it stated,
Before 1887, a federal defense such as pre-emption could provide a basis for
removal, but, in that year, Congress amended the removal statute. We interpret
that amendment to authorize removal only where original federal jurisdiction
2008]
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A. Removal Under the 1875 Act and the Well-Pleaded Pleading Rule
In 1875, Congress bestowed federal question jurisdiction on the federal
courts.20 It has been recognized that the language used in the statutory grant of
federal question jurisdiction, currently found at 28 U.S.C. § 1331, tracks the
language of Article 111, and that, therefore, the 1875 Congress may have intended
to bestow jurisdiction on the lower federal courts to the full extent of the
Constitution's arising under power.2' While the precise scope of the arising under
power of Article III continues to be debated and has not been satisfactorily
determined by the Supreme Court, the leading case on the matter defines it
exceptionally broadly and indicates that Article III power exists as long as there is
even the possibility that a federal issue could arise in the case.2 2 In addition to using
the language of Article III, the 1875 jurisdictional grant allowed for removal by
either a plaintiff or a defendant.23 The Supreme Court construed these provisions
of the 1875 Act as allowing removal on the basis of a federal defense.24
However, in construing the 1875 statutory grant of power, the Supreme Court
required that the federal question be asserted by the party relying on it and could
not be anticipated by the opposing party.25 This requirement may be seen as
exists. Thus, it is now settled law that a case may not be removed to federal court
on the basis of a federal defense ....
482 U.S. at 392-93 (citations omitted) (first emphasis added).
20. See Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470. Federal question jurisdiction was briefly
enacted in 1801 and repealed in 1802. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 5.2, at 266
n.5 (4th ed. 2003).
21. See, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 8 n.8
(1983) ("[The] limited legislative history [of the 1875 Act] suggests that the 44th Congress may have
meant to 'confer the whole power which the Constitution conferred.... ') (quoting 2 Cong. Rec. 4986
(1894) (statement of Sen. Carpenter))); Ray Forrester, Federal Question Jurisdiction andSection 5, 18
TUL. L. REV. 263, 265 (1943) ("[B]y repeating the words ofthe Constitution the Congress intended that
the statutory words should have the same... meaning as the words in the Constitution.").
22. See Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 822 (1824) (explaining that arising
under power exists where "the title or right set up by the party[] may be defeated by one construction
ofthe [C]onstitution or law ofthe United States, and sustained by the opposite construction" (emphasis
added)); see also VerlindenB.V. v. Cent. BankofNig., 461 U.S. 480, 492 (1983) ("Osborn thus reflects
a broad conception of 'arising under' jurisdiction, according to which Congress may confer on the
federal courts jurisdiction over any case or controversy that might call for the application of federal
law." (emphasis added)). But see Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Article III and the Cause ofAction, 89 IOWA L.
REV. 777, 811 (2004) (arguing from a historical perspective that Osborn is not as broad as it has
generally been construed and that "[t]he fact that it was possible that a federal question would arise in
a case was not what made the case one arising under federal law" (emphasis added)).
23. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 2, 18 Stat. 470, 470-71.
24. See, e.g., R.R. Co. v. Mississippi, 102 U.S. 135, 141 (1880) (holdingthatthe case shouldhave
been removed to federal court under the 1875 Act "whether we look to the Federal question raised by
the State in its original petition, or to the Federal question raised by the company in its answer"
(emphasis added)).
25. See, e.g., Cent. R.R. Co. of N.J. v. Mills, 113 U.S. 249, 257 (1885) ("The question whether
a party claims a right under the Constitution or laws ofthe United States is to be ascertained by the legal
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directed by Congress itself,26 which required in section 5 of the 1875 Act that if it
appeared that a case "does not really and substantially involve a dispute or
controversy properly within the [federal court's] jurisdiction," the court "shall
proceed no further therein, but shall dismiss the suit or remand it" to state court.2
Indeed, in 1877, the Supreme Court in Gold-Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes
28
construed Section 5, whether correctly or incorrectly,29 as requiring for federal
question jurisdiction that it must "appear upon the record,... in good pleading,
that the suit is one which really and substantially involves a dispute or controversy
as to a right which depends upon the construction or effect of the Constitution, or
some law or treaty of the United States."3 Subsequently, in Central Railroad Co.
of New Jersey v. Mills,3 the Court, relying on Keyes and paraphrasing Section 5,
26. While scholars have disagreed as to Congress's intended purpose in section 5 of the 1875 Act,
they have not contended, as I do here, that contemporary Supreme Court caselaw denotes that section
5 provided a statutory basis for the creation of the well-pleaded complaint rule. See infra notes 29, 33.
27. Act of March 3, 1875, § 5, 18 Stat. at 472.
28. 96 U.S. 199 (1877).
29. Scholars have disagreed as to whether Congress intended Section 5 to affect the scope of
statutory arising underjurisdiction. Professor Forrester argued that Section 5, which was still part of the
judicial code at the time of his article, was not intended "to limit federal question jurisdiction" or the
scope of the statutory arising under clause but was merely intended to require "the courts to investigate,
sua sponte,... to be certain federal jurisdiction does exist in fact." Forrester, supra note 21, at 269.
Professors Chadboum and Levin argued that section I of the 1875 Act adopted the arising under
language of the Constitution and was intended to confer the entire constitutional power as interpreted
in Osborn but that Section 5 was then intended to limit the exercise of that jurisdiction to cases where
the court was satisfied "at every stage of the proceedings, that there actually was a controversy between
the parties in regard to the operation and effect of the Constitution or laws upon the facts involved."
James H. Chadbourn & A. Leo Levin, Original Jurisdiction of Federal Questions, 90 U. PA. L. REv.
639, 650 (1942).
Congress appears to have adopted Professor Forrester's position with its enactment of the 1948
Judicial Code, which repealed the descendant of Section 5, replaced it with 28 U.S.C. § 1359, and only
prohibited fraudulent joinder of parties in diversity cases. See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1359,
62 Star. 869 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (2000)). The historical and revision notes to 28 U.S.C. § 1359
explain the change to the judicial code:
Provisions of section 80 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., for dismissal of an action not
really and substantially involving a dispute or controversy within the jurisdiction
of a district court, were omitted as unnecessary. Any court will dismiss a case not
within its jurisdiction when its attention is drawn to the fact, or even on its own
motion.
28 U.S.C. § 1359 note (2000). Despite winning the battle, Professor Forrester did not win the
war-Congress has not partaken of his vision of statutory federal question jurisdiction to the full extent
of constitutional power.
Finally, Donald Doemberg posits that Section 5 "may represent Congress' rejection,for statutory
purposes, of Chief Justice Marshall's argument in Osborn v. Bank of the United States that an
underlying federal issue, even if not disputed by the parties, was sufficient to confer jurisdiction under
the constitutional provision." DonaldL. Doernberg, There'sNo Reasonforlt; It's Just Our Policy: Why
the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule Sabotages the Purposes of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 38
HASTINGs L.J. 597, 602 03 (1987) (first emphasis added) (citing Osbom v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat.) 738, 823-24 (1824)).
30. Keyes, 96 U.S. at 203 04 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis added).
31. 113 U.S. 249 (1885).
2008]
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held that a party could not base federal jurisdiction on the anticipated allegations
of the other side and indicated that the existence of the federal question had to
appear on the record at the time the federal court asserted jurisdiction over a
controversy. 2 Thus, for original jurisdiction, a plaintiff was not allowed to obtain
federal jurisdiction by anticipating a federal defense that the defendant might
raise.3" Indeed, the Supreme Court so held inMetcalfv. Watertown.4 Although not
citing Keyes, Mills, or Section 5, the Supreme Court in Metcalf refused to allow
original jurisdiction, as opposed to removal jurisdiction, whenthe plaintiff had not
raised the federal question at issue.35 The Court explained that for a federal court
to exercise original jurisdiction, "it must appear, at the outset, from the declaration
or the bill of the party suing, that the suit" arises under federal law.36 The Court
went on to explain that even if the defendant subsequently raised a federal defense,
"the want of jurisdiction, at the commencement of the suit, is not cured by an
answer or plea which may suggest a question of that kind." 7
The Metcalf and Mills holdings, which may have been understood as a
condition imposed by Congress through section 5 ofthe 1875 Act, combine to make
what could be called the well-pleaded pleading rule. While the 1875 Act was
construed to allow removal on the basis of a federal defense or reply, a federal court
could not obtain federal question jurisdiction over an original or removed case
32. Id. at 257.
33. Professor Collins argues that "the Court first articulated its well-pleaded complaint rule in the
unheralded and little-noted opinion of Metcalfv. Watertown." Michael G. Collins, The Unhappy History
of Federal Question Removal, 71 IOWAL. REV. 717, 730 31 (1986) (citing Metcalf v. Watertown, 128
U.S. 586 (1888)). However, as shown above, see supra text accompanying notes 31-32, the Court had
already laid the foundations for Metcalf in Mills by holding that a party could not obtain federal
jurisdiction through anticipation of the other side's pleadings and indicating that jurisdiction had to be
clear from the pleadings at the time federaljurisdiction was invoked. See Mills, 113 U.S. at 257. Further,
the Mills Court relied on the requirements found in Keyes, which interpreted section 5 of the 1875 Act.
See id. (citing Smith v. Greenhow, 109 U.S. 669 (1884); Keyes, 96 U.S. 199). Professor Collins states
that the MetcalfCourt "neglected to indicate whether its newly articulated rule for plaintiffs was based
on [A]rticle III, the terms of the 1875 Act, or general common-law pleading requirements somehow
thought to apply in the absence of a more explicit constitutional or statutory command." Collins, supra,
at 732. Professor Collins then argues that the rule forbidding anticipation of defenses was a common
law principle of pleading. See id. at 732 n.79 (citations omitted). Professor Collins's discussion of
contemporary pleading rules is instructive and reveals a likely foundation underlying the Court's
decisions. Nevertheless, the Court could also construe section 5 of the 1875 Act as requiring that a
federal question appear in the record and be asserted by a party, rather than anticipated, before a federal
court can assume jurisdiction. In fact, this is what the Court expressly did in Keyes, 96 U.S. at 203-04,
which is the same case Professor Collins uses to demonstrate reliance on common law pleading
requirements. See Collins, supra, at 732 n.79 (citations omitted).
34. See 128 U.S. at 589.
35. See id. at 588-90.
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unless and until a federal question existed on the face of a pleading or petition of
the party actually asserting the federal question.38
B. The 1887 and 1888 Amendments and the Prohibition of Federal Defense
Removal
Through amendments made in 1887 and 1888, Congress changed the removal
section of the 1875 statute to eliminate removal by a plaintiff and to add a provision
stating that the lower federal courts had removal jurisdiction only over cases "of
which the [lower] courts of the United States are given original jurisdiction by the
preceding section."39 In Tennessee v. Union & Planters 'Bank,40 the Supreme Court
construed these changes to prohibit removal on the basis of a federal defense.4"
The Union & Planters 'Bank Court explained that by allowing removal only"of
suits of which the Circuit Courts of the United States are given original
jurisdiction," the amendments limited removal jurisdiction "to such suits as might
have been brought in that court by the plaintiff"42 Further, as the Court had
previously established in Metcalf,43 it was essential to the federal court's original
j urisdiction "that theplaintiff's declaration or bill should show that he asserts a right
38. This well-pleaded pleading rule could have constitutional implications. Since Osborn v. Bank
of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824), the Supreme Court has failed to clarify whether it
accepts Osborn's construction that "a mere speculative possibility [of] a federal question" could fall
within the bounds of Article III arising under power. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S.
480, 493 (1983); see also id. at 492-93 (citing Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738) (explaining the broad
nature of the Osborn holding and noting that "[t]he breadth of that conclusion has been questioned,"
but that the Court "need not now resolve that issue"). However, the Court has since clarified that arising
under power at least exists whenever a case actually presents a question of federal law. See Powell v.
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 514 (1969) ("It has long been held that a suit arises under the Constitution
if a petitioner's claim will be sustained if the Constitution... [is] given one construction and will be
defeated if[it is] given another." (omission and alterations in original) (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S.
678, 685 (1946)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, in any case where a defendant actually
asserts a genuine federal defense to a state law cause of action, a federal question-and not the mere
possibility of one has been raised in the proceedings; therefore, it would fall within the power of
Congress to confer such jurisdiction on the federal courts. Notably, however, if the Court rejects
Osborn, and if the Constitution requires that there be more than the mere possibility of a federal
question, then it could be argued that the anticipation of a federal defense or reply by the opposing side
would be insufficient to confer federal jurisdiction, because anticipation merely raises the possibility
of such a question.
39. Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 2, 24 Stat. 552, 553, amended by Act of Aug. 13, 1888, ch.
866, § 2, 25 Star. 433, 434 (emphasis added). The amendments also raised the jurisdictional amount.
See Act of Mar. 3, 1887, § 1, 24 Stat. at 552, amended by Act of Aug. 13, 1888, § 1, 25 Stat. at 434.
40. 152 U.S. 454 (1894).
41. Id. at 461 62.
42. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Act of Aug. 13, 1888, § 2, 25 Star. at 434; Act of Mar. 3, 1887,
§ 2, 24 Stat. at 553) (internal quotation marks omitted).
43. See supra text accompanying notes 35-36.
2008]
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under the Constitution or laws of the United States."44 Consequently, a defendant
could only remove if the plaintiff asserted a right under federal law in the
complaint-removal could not be achieved on the basis of a federal defense. In
support of this construction of the amendments, the Court noted that the change was
"in accordance with the general policy of these acts, manifest upon their face.... to
contract the jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts of the United States. 45 Thus, the
modern rule prohibiting removal on the basis of a federal defense was grounded by
the Court not on policy or efficiency considerations but instead, as Professor
Collins summarizes, purportedly "on a formal choice about the plain meaning of the
statute" as amended in 1887 and 1888.46
Justice Harlan, the author of the Metcalf decision, dissented in Union &
Planters' Bank, arguing that the grant of jurisdiction extended to federal rights
asserted by either party.4 7 Justice Harlan additionally provided what is probably the
most plausible interpretation of the 1887 and 1888 amendments: namely, Congress
included the language restricting removal to cases within the original jurisdiction
of the federal courts to make it clear that the jurisdictional amount and other
restrictions for original jurisdiction applied equally for removal jurisdiction.48
Indeed, the 1887 and 1888 amendments struck the portion of the statute that
44. Union & Planters'Bank, 152 U.S. at 461 (emphasis added). Professor Collins persuasively
argues that Congress could not have relied on Metcalf in fashioning the 1887 and 1888 amendments
because Metcalfwas not decided until after the 1887 amendments were signed into law. See Collins,
supra note 33, at 754 55 & n.185. However, Metcalf was not the first case to establish the well-pleaded
pleading rule relied upon in Union & Planters'Bank. See supra text accompanying notes 28-33.
45. Union & Planters'Bank, 152 U. S. at 462. The legislative histories ofthe amendments, though
never indicating that Congress intended to prohibit removal on the basis of a federal defense, do show
that Congress intended to restrict the federal question removal that it had granted in 1875.
Representative Culberson, the member of the House Committee on the Judiciary who introduced the
bill, explained that "[t]he object of the bill is to diminish the jurisdiction of the [lower federal] courts."
18 CONG. REC. 613 (1887); see also, e.g., 18 CONG. REC. 2727 (1887) ("The amendments of the
Senate... promote the object[] of the bill, which is to reduce the jurisdiction of the courts of the United
States and to regulate the removal of causes from State to Federal courts.") (statement of the House
conferees).
Nevertheless, the primary way in which the House intended to limit federal jurisdiction, outside
of prohibiting removal by a plaintiff, was through restrictions on diversity jurisdiction for corporations.
See, e.g., 10 CONG. REC. 701-02 (1880) (statement of Rep. Culberson proposing an amendment to limit
the diversity jurisdiction of federal courts over corporations). However, the Senate rejected that proposal
and it was never enacted. See 18 CONG. REC. 2543 (1887) (noting that the Senate struck the proposed
amendment).
46. Collins, supra note 33, at 766. Professor Collins posits other motives that may have pushed
the Court to adopt the rule, including special federalism concerns surrounding the validity of
"enforcement actions by Tennessee to collect taxes alleged to be due to the State." Id. at 760.
47. 152 U.S. at 468 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 471 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Collins, supra note 33, at 753 ("Under the 1875
Act, the Court had construed the absence of such a cross reference in [the removal section] to mean that
the limits on original jurisdiction ... did not apply on removal.").
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expressly required a jurisdictional amount for removal.49 Thus, the only indication
that the jurisdictional amount applied for removal was the language, "of which the
circuit courts of the United States are given original jurisdiction."' °
In four House Reports and nearly one hundred pages of discussion in the
Congressional Record from 1880 through 1887 regarding the 1887 and 1888
amendments, there is no mention of the meaning of or the reason for the original
jurisdiction language relied on by the Union & Planters' Bank Court. It seems
unlikely that in debating a bill for over seven years Congress would never mention
that the bill would prohibit removal on the basis of a defense or that the inclusion
of the original jurisdiction language was intended to effect that end. Notably, the
House added an amendment that expressly allowed defendants to remove on the
basis of a federal defense,5 but the Senate struck that portion of the bill, and the bill
was passed without that language." Importantly, and perhaps the strongest
49. Compare Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 2, 18 Stat. 470, 470-71 (allowing removal of any
suit "brought in any State court where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum or value
of five hundred dollars, and arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States"), with Act of
Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, §§ 1 2, 24 Stat. 552, 552 53, amended by Act of Aug. 13, 1888, ch. 866, §§1 2,
25 Stat. 433, 434 (allowing removal of any suit "arising under the Constitution or laws of the United
States... of which the circuit courts of the United States are given originaljurisdiction by the preceding
section"-the preceding section requiring that "the matter in dispute exceeds ... the sum or value of
two thousand dollars").
50. Act of Mar. 3, 1887, § 2, 24 Stat. at 553, amended by Act of Aug. 13, 1888, § 2, 25 Stat. at
434. Professor Collins notes that "various members of the House emphasized that the new limitation
on jurisdictional amount was to apply to removal as well as to original jurisdiction." Collins, supra note
33, at 753 54. Of course, having eliminated the express jurisdictional amount requirement in the
removal provision, see supra note 49 and accompanying text, the only way that the requirement could
apply to removal is if the original jurisdiction language incorporated the jurisdictional amount into
removal jurisdiction.
51. See 10 CONG. REC. 701 (1880); see also infra note 53 for the text of the proposed amendment.
52. See 18 CONG. REC. 2542 (1887). Professor Collins argues the House actually included the
amendment allowing removal on the basis of a federal defense in order to limit removal practice by
federal corporations under the 1875 Act. See Collins, supra note 33, at 744-45. Correspondingly,
Professor Collins argues the Senate struck the amendment in order to preserve the breadth of removal
jurisdiction allowed by the Supreme Court in the Pacific Railroad Removal Cases. See id. at 747.
While it is plausible that this motivated the Senate, which did not examine the bill until 1887, the
Senate is absolutely silent as to why it struck the removal clause. Perhaps it believed that the clause was
superfluous; perhaps it did not want to allow federal defense removal; perhaps it believed, as Professor
Collins argues, see id., that the amendment was too restrictive of federal defense removal-but why not
amend it rather than strike it? See 18 CONG. REC. 2542 43 (1887) (striking the proposed House
amendment but failing to provide any reasoning).
As for the House, the bill remained the same from 1880 to 1887, including the added amendment
expressly allowing removal on the basis of a federal defense. Thus, it is hard to imagine that the House
wanted to alter the 1875 Act to "effectively reverse[] the Court's construction of that Act in the Pacific
Railroad Removal Cases," which the Court decided in 1885-five years after the House added the
amendment. Collins, supra note 33, at 750; see also 10 CONG. REC. 701 02 (1880) (statement of Rep.
Culberson offering amendments).
Certainly, Professor Collins is correct that the House disagreed with the interpretation of federal
jurisdiction promoted in the Pacific Railroad Removal Cases, 115 U.S. 1 (1885), which allowed federal
questionjurisdiction under the 1875 Act to be based on the mere fact that a corporation suing or being
sued was incorporated by an act of Congress. Id. at 11; see Collins, supra note 33, at 747-48. Indeed,
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indication that Congress did not intend the original jurisdiction language to restrict
the ability to remove on the basis of a defense, is the fact that from 1880 until 1887
the bill included both the original jurisdiction language, construed by the Union &
Planters' Bank Court as prohibiting removal on the basis of a defense, and the
proposed language expressly allowing a defendant to remove on the basis of a
defense.53 Apparently, Congress did not see these two clauses as incongruous.
Eight years after Union & Planters'Bank, Congress considered amending the
judicial code to allow for removal on the basis of a federal defense and to allow
removal by either the plaintiff or defendant. 54 The House Report explains that "[t]o
effect [removal on the basis of a defense] it is necessary to omit the words 'of
which the circuit courts[] are given original jurisdiction by the preceding section,'
while never mentioning the Pacific Railroad Removal Cases, part of the 1888 amendment, Act of Aug.
13, 1888, § 6, 25 Stat. at 436 37, repealed section 640 of the Revised Statutes, which allowed for
removal in any suit commenced against "any corporation... [other] than a banking corporation,
organized under a law of the United States," upon the petition of such defendant stating that "they have
a defence arising under or by virtue of the Constitution" or federal law. Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 255,
§ 2, 15 Stat. 226, 227 (emphasis added) (codified in Revised Statutes of 1873, § 640). In 1880,
Representative Wellborn, who introduced the amendment repealing Section 640, explained that "it is
claimed that in every suit against a Federal corporation it necessarily has a defense arising under,
because chartered by, a law of the United States, and therefore that all suits against these corporations
are removable under this [S]ection 640." 10 CONG. REC. 702 (1880); see also id. at 701 02 (statements
of Reps. Culberson and Wellborn in support of repealing Section 640). Debates in the House running
from 1880 until the passage of the 1887 amendment denote that the House did not think the mere fact
that a corporation was created by Congress should be sufficient to create statutory federal question
jurisdiction. See, e.g., 18 CONG. REC. 614 (1887) (statement of Rep. Culberson in support of the
amendment); 14 CONG. REC. 1248 (1883) (same); 10 CONG. REC. 701-02, 724 (1880) (statement of
Reps. Culberson and Wellborn in support of the amendment).
Further, in passing the amendment to expressly allow federal defense removal, the House appears
to have been motivated by an intent to give back a portion of what it was taking away with the repeal
of Section 640. One Congressman explained that if the amendment passed, "no national corporation can
complain at the repeal of [S]ection 640, because if such corporation has a meritorious defense" under
federal law, then by virtue of the amendment it can remove the case. 10 CONG. REC. 702 (1880)
(statement of Rep. Culberson in support of the amendment).
53. From 1880 until amended by the Senate in 1887, the bill provided
[t]hat any suit of a civil nature, at law or in equity, arising under the Constitution
or laws of the United States, or treaties made or which shall be made under their
authority of which the circuit courts of the United States are given original
jurisdiction by the preceding section .... may be removed by the defendant or
defendants therein to the circuit court of the United States for the proper district
whenever it is made to appear from the application of such defendant or
defendants that his or their defense depends in whole or in part upon a correct
construction of some provision of the Constitution or law of the United States.
10 CONG. REC. 701 (1880) (statement ofRep. Culberson proposing amendment) (emphasis added); see
18 CONG. REC. 613 (1887) (statement of Rep. Culberson quoting the same language in the bill); see also
18 CONG. REc. 2542 (1887) (record of Senate striking the language as proposed by the House).
54. See H.R. 14840, 57th Cong. (1902); S. 2660, 57th Cong. (1902). The House Report explains
that H.R. 14840 was intended "to restore in a measure to the plaintiff the right and opportunity to
remove his cause given him by the [A]ct of March 3, 1875." H.R. REP. No. 57-2459, at 1 (1902).
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found in the existing law.""5 Congress certainly understood in 1902-whether or
not it initially intended so through the 1887 enactment that the original
jurisdiction language had been construed to prohibit removal on the basis of a
defense. The 1902 bills were not passed in either the House or the Senate. In fact,
the Senate reported adversely on the bill, explaining that it was "a very unwise
change in the law."56 To this day, the removal statute contains the restriction that
removal is limited to cases "of which the district courts of the United States have
original jurisdiction." 7 Since Union & Planters' Bank, multiple bills have been
introduced in Congress to repeal the well-pleaded complaint rule, at least to the
extent that the rule forbids removal on the basis of a federal defense, but Congress
has yet to pass such an act.58
111. THE HISTORY OF THE COMPLETE PREEMPTION DOCTRINE
A. Complete Preemption Prior to Anderson
1. Avco and Complete Preemption Under the LMRA
Seventy-four years after Union & Planters'Bank, the Supreme Court created
what it would later call a corollary to the well-pleaded complaint rule and
eventually would be dubbed the complete preemption doctrine. In Avco Corp. v.
Aero Lodge No. 735, International Ass 'n of Machinists,59 the Supreme Court
allowed removal of a case asserting solely state law claims based on the federal
55. H.R. REP. No. 57-2459, at 1 (quoting Act of Mar. 3, 1887, § 2, 24 Stat. at 553, amended by
Act of Aug. 13, 1888, § 2, 25 Stat. at 434); see also id. ("The relief sought by H.R. 14840 will be
effected principally by omitting from [S]ection 2 of the statute as it now stands the words 'of which the
circuit courts are given original jurisdiction by the preceding section' ... , which were added.., by the
act of 1887 88." (quoting Act of Mar. 3, 1887, § 2, 24 Stat. at 553, amended by Act of Aug. 13, 1888,
§ 2, 25 Stat. at 434)).
56. S. REP. No. 57-1077, at 2 (1902).
57. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2001).
58. In addition to the 1902 bills, see supra notes 54 56 and accompanying text, multiple bills
allowing removal on the basis of a federal defense were introduced in 1905. See H.R. 18213,58th Cong.
(1905); S. 7131, 58th Cong. (1905); H.R. 8758, 59th Cong. (1905); H.R. 9744, 59th Cong. (1905). The
Senate also introduced a similar bill in 1907. See S. 8290, 59th Cong. (1907). Further, a major effort
was made in 1971, based on a study by the American Law Institute (ALI), A.L.I., STUDY OF THE
DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS (1969) [hereinafter ALl STUDY],
to change the judicial code to allow removal on the basis of a federal defense. See S. 1876, 92d Cong.
(1971). Additionally, in 1948 Congress completely revamped the judicial code. See Act of June 25,
1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 869 ("[An Act meant to] revise, codify, and enact into law title 28 of the United
States Code entitled 'Judicial Code and Judiciary."'). Although at least one commentator recommended
that Congress allow removal by the defendant on the basis of a federal defense, the well-pleaded
complaint rule remained unchanged. See Herbert Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of
the Judicial Code, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 216, 233 34 (1948) (suggesting that the pending
"statute ought to be reshaped in terms of a consistent theory that permits removal by the party who puts
forth the federal right" or should drop federal question removal entirely).
59. 390 U.S. 557 (1968).
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defense that section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA)
preempted the state law claims.60 The Avco Court provided no explanation for why
it was allowing removal and, indeed, did not even mention the well-pleaded
complaint rule.6' The Court's only explanation for allowing removal was that "[a]n
action arising under [Section] 301 is controlled by federal substantive law even
though it is brought in a state court. 62
In Franchise Tax Boardv. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern
California,63 the Supreme Court in dicta attempted to provide a rationale forAvco.64
The Court stated that, "Avco stands for the proposition that if a federal cause of
action completelypre-empts a state cause of action any complaint that comes within
the scope of the federal cause of action necessarily 'arises under' federal law."65
The Supreme Court's explanation that removal was allowed when a federal statute
"completely pre-empts" a state law claim did not explain why or when substantive
60. Id. at 560 62 (construing the Labor Management Relations Act (LMIRA), ch. 120, § 301, 61
Star. 136, 156-57 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (2000))). The plaintiff in Avco
filed a suit in Tennessee state court to enjoin the defendant union from striking at the plaintiff s plant.
Id. at 558. The state court issued the requested injunction, and the defendants removed the case to
federal court. Id. The federal court denied the motion to remand and dissolved the injunction. Id. at
558-59. The Supreme Court upheld removal of the case. Id. at 560-62.
61. See id. at 558 62.
62. Id. at 560 (emphasis added). Another aspect of Avco is notable. Under the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), which prohibited federal courts from issuing injunctions in labor
disputes, see id. § 1, 47 Star. at 70, the Avco plaintiffs could not obtain their requested injunction in
federal court although such an injunction was available in state court. Thus, removal deprived the
plaintiffs of their requested relief. Noting that the plaintiffs still had remedies available under section
301 of the LMIRA albeit different remedies from the injunction available in state court the Avco
court held that "the breadth or narrowness of the relief which may be granted under federal law in
[Section] 301 cases is a distinct question from whether the court has jurisdiction over the parties and
the subject matter." Avco, 390 U.S. at 561.
In Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987), the Court rejected the court of appeals'
holding "that a case may not be removed to federal court on the ground that it is completely pre-empted
unless the federal cause of action relied upon provides the plaintiff with a remedy." Id. at 391 n.4. The
Caterpillar Court stated that the requirement of a "replacement" federal cause of action "is squarely
contradicted by [the Court's] decision in Avco," because the Avco plaintiffs lost their remedy of an
injunction. Id. (citing Avco, 390 U.S. 557). However, the Avco plaintiffs did have a remedy under
federal law just not the same remedy that they had under state law. Thus, the requirement of a
replacement cause of action does not appear, as the Caterpillar Court claimed, to contradict Avco.
Nevertheless, the Caterpillar discussion seems to allow the possibility of complete preemption even
where there is not a replacement federal cause of action; however, the Beneficial National Bank v.
Anderson decision, 539 U.S. 1 (2003), bases complete preemption on finding an exclusive federal cause
of action that preempts the state cause of action and not just federal law that preempts the state claim.
Id. at 9 & n.5. As discussed in this Article, reliance on congressional intent to determine complete
preemption would leave to Congress the question of whether a replacement federal claim is required.
See infra notes 314 18 and accompanying text.
63. 463 U.S. 1 (1983).
64. See id. at 23 26.
65. Id. at 23-24 (emphasis added).
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preemption, which did not allow for removal, became complete preemption, which
did allow for removal.66
2. Taylor and Complete Preemption Under ERISA
Nearly twenty years after its decision in Avco, the Supreme Court held that a
statute other than section 301 of the LMRA invoked complete preemption, and
hence, removal of state law claims. In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Taylor,
6 7
the Supreme Court held that state law claims falling within the preemptive scope
of section 502(a) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA)68 were removable to federal court.6 9 In finding complete preemption, the
Court relied on the clear congressional intent that Section 502(a) claims be
removable.7° The Court noted that "the language of the jurisdictional subsection of
ERISA's civil enforcement provisions closely parallels that of [section] 301 of the
LMRA," and that a presumption that similar language was intended to have similar
meaning was "fully confirmed by the legislative history of ERISA."'7 In fact, the
legislative history specifically stated: "[A]IJ such actions in Federal or State courts
are to be regarded as arising under the laws of the United States in similar fashion
to those brought under section 301 of the [LMRA]. 72 The Taylor Court explained,
No more specific reference to the Avco rule can be expected
and the rest of the legislative history consistently sets out this
clear intention to make [Section] 502(a)(1)(B) suits brought by
participants or beneficiaries federal questions for the purposes of
federal court jurisdiction in like manner as [section] 301 of the
LMRA.73
66. Professor Seinfeld posited a practical explanation for Avco, although it does not include any
theoretical explanation for determining when exceptions to the well-pleaded complaint rule should be
made. See Seinfeld, supra note 14, at 563 n.87. He explained,
There is considerable evidence that the Congress that enacted the LMRA was
deeply concerned about the capacity and willingness of state courts to enforce
collective bargaining agreements against labor unions.... Hence, the most likely
explanation for the Supreme Court's decision inAvco (though the Court does not
bother to say so), is that the Justices were responding to these very concerns.
Id.
67. 481 U.S. 58 (1987).
68. Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 502(a), 88 Stat. 829, 891 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004)).
69. 481 U.S. at 66 67.
70. Id. at 66.
71. -d. at 65.
72. Id. at 65-66 (emphasis altered) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 93-1280, at 327 (1974) (Conf. Rep.),
as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038, 5107) (internal quotation marks omitted).
73. Id. at 66.
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The Court concluded that "the touchstone of the federal district court's removal
j urisdiction is... the intent of Congress." And, for ERISA, Congress had "clearly
manifested an intent to make causes of action within the scope of the civil
enforcement provisions of [Section] 502(a) removable to federal court" an
intent the federal judiciary "must honor. 76
The Court stopped short of making clear congressional intent of removability
an absolute requirement for finding complete preemption. Indeed, the Court did not
say that without clear congressional intent removal would be foreclosed only that
it "would be reluctant to [so] find,, 77 and that absent "explicit direction from
Congress, this question would be a close one. 78
The concurring opinion of Justice Brennan,joined by Justice Marshall, further
stressed the importance of congressional intent of removability. Justice Brennan
explained that he wrote "separately only to note that today's holding is a narrow
one" 79 and that the Court "focuses on the 'intent of Congress,' to make respondent's
cause of action removable to federal court."80 Justice Brennan then explained, in a
passage that lower federal courts have quoted often,
[O]ur decision should not be interpreted as adopting a broad rule
that any defense premised on congressional intent to pre-empt
state law is sufficient to establish removal jurisdiction. The Court
holds only that removal jurisdiction exists when, as here,
"Congress has clearly manifested an intent to make causes of
action ... removable toffederal court." In future cases involving
other statutes, the prudent course for a federal court that does not
find a clear congressional intent to create removal jurisdiction
will be to remand the case to state court.8'
B. The Anderson Foray
1. The Anderson Decision
Another sixteen years passed before the Supreme Court added a third statute
to its list of federal statutes that invoked complete preemption. In Beneficial
National Bank v. Anderson, 2 the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the
Eleventh Circuit and held that section 30 of the National Bank Act (NBA), which
74. Id.
75. Id. (emphasis added).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 65.
78. Id. at 64.
79. Id. at 67 (Brennan, J., concurring).
80. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
81. Id. at 67 68 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (quoting id. at 66 (majority opinion)).
82. 539 U.S. 1 (2003).
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is codified at § § 85 and 86 of Title 12,83 brought about complete preemption of state
law claims falling within its scope.84 The Eleventh Circuit, relying on Taylor, had
held that complete preemption did not apply, because the court could "find no clear
congressional intent to permit removal under §§ 85 and 86."85 Although the NBA
had been enacted in 18648611 years before the passage of the 1875 Act, 7 which
contained the initial provision generally allowing removal from state to federal
court-the Eleventh Circuit examined statutory provisions and legislative history
that nonetheless indicated that Congress was not concerned with taking the
preemption question away from state courts. 9 First, the venue provision for the
NBA expressly allowed for suit in either federal or state court. 9° Second, even
before 1875, Congress had provided for removal of cases under several specific
statutes but did not do so in the NBA." Third, and perhaps most telling, four years
after enacting the NBA, Congress enacted a statute allowing any corporation
organized under national law except national banks-to remove a case to federal
court on the basis of a federal defense.92 Thus, soon after the enactment of the NBA,
Congress expressly excluded national banks from being able to remove on the basis
of a defense, while granting that right to all other nationally chartered
corporations. 3 Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit "reject[ed] the defendants'
suggestion that the early history of national banks offers clear congressional intent
to make claims under the NBA removable. 94
The Supreme Court reversed.95 In reviewing its previous caselaw, the Court
provided a new rationale for Avco and Taylor:
In the two categories of cases where this Court has found
complete pre-emption-certain causes of action under the LMRA
and ERISA the federal statutes at issue provided the exclusive
83. Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, § 30, 13 Stat. 99, 108 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§§ 85-86 (2000)).
84. See Anderson, 539 U.S. at 11.
85. Anderson v. H&R Block, Inc., 287 F.3d 1038, 1048 (1 lIth Cir. 2002), reversed sub. non].
Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1 (2003).
86. Act of June 3, 1864, 13 Stat. 99.
87. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470.
88. See discussion supra Part I1.A.
89. See H&R Block, at 1045 46 (discussing Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 255, 15 Stat. 226).
90. Id at 1045.
91. Id.
92. See id at 1045-46 (citing Act of July 27, 1868, 15 Stat. at 226-27); see also supra note 52
(discussing the text of the 1868 Act).
93. See also Seinfeld, supra note 14, at 558 ("it is exceedingly difficult to reconcile the exclusion
of national banks from this removal provision with the notion that Congress was seriously concerned
that NBA claims be eligible for federal jurisdiction.").
94. H&R Block, 287 F.3d at 1046.
95. Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 11 (2003).
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cause of action for the claim asserted and also set forth procedures
and remedies governing that cause of action."
The Court relied on the statement from Franchise Tax Board that attempted to
explain Avco-asserting that removal is proper when "a federal cause of action
completely pre-empts a state cause of action." 97 Yet, as noted, the Court in
Franchise Tax Board had never explained when federal law completely preempted
state claims as compared to when federal law merely preempted state claims.98 The
Anderson Court concluded from this quote, and purportedly also from the Court's
decisions in Taylor and Avco, that "the framework for answering the dispositive
question [was]: Does the National Bank Act provide the exclusive cause of action
for usury claims against national banks? If so, then the cause of action necessarily
arises under federal law and the case is removable. '99
But how could the Court construe the existence of an exclusive cause of action
as the rule and acknowledge Taylor's emphasis on clear congressional intent of
removability? The Court fused the Taylor focus on clear congressional
intent-although dropping the modifier "clear"-with its rule of an exclusive
federal cause of action and stated that "the proper inquiry focuses on whether
Congress intended the federal cause of action to be exclusive rather than on whether
Congress intended that the cause of action be removable."'0 0 Indeed, the Court
stated that arguments regarding the pertinent jurisdictional statutes affecting the
NBA were "irrelevant."' 0'
However, the Anderson Court's construction of Taylor as requiring
congressional intent of an exclusive federal cause of action cannot find its root in
Taylor-or, for that matter, in Avco, which says nothing on the topic.1 2 Notably, in
Taylor, the fact that section 502(a) of ERISA is an exclusive federal cause of action
is mentioned exactly once in the Court's very brief Section 11 of the opinion, which
discusses the substantive preemption ofthe asserted common law claims.'0 3 Indeed,
96. Id. at 8 (footnote omitted).
97. Id. at 7 (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust of S. Cal., 463 U.S.
1, 24 (1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
98. See supra text accompanying notes 63-66. Indeed, in his Anderson dissent, Justice Scalia says
of the Franchise Tax Board quote, "Of course it is not an explanation at all. It provides nothing more
than an account of what Avco accomplishes, rather than a justification (unless ipse dixit is to count as
justification) for the radical departure from the well-pleaded-complaint rule." Anderson, 539 U.S. at
14-15 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
99. Anderson, 539 U.S. at 9 (emphasis added).
100. Id. at 9 n.5 (emphasis added).
101. Id.
102. Professor Seinfeld has posited that the Anderson Court's "shift in focus-from inquiring
directly whether Congress intended to create removal jurisdiction to inquiring whether Congress
intended to create an exclusive federal cause of action-is sensible only if the latter is a good proxy for
the former." Seinfeld, supra note 14, at 556. This inquiry will be examined in the context of the
Carmack Amendment infra Part V.A. 1.
103. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 62 63 (1987) (citing Pilot Life Ins. Co. v.
Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987)).
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Section 502(a)'s nature as an exclusive federal cause of action is mentioned
nowhere in Section III of Taylor regarding the well-pleaded complaint rule,
complete preemption, removal jurisdiction, or congressional intent." 4 Further, the
fact that section 502(a) of ERISA was an exclusive cause of action was included in
the already-recited facts upon which the Court said it would be reluctant to find
complete preemption "in the absence of explicit direction from Congress."' ' Thus,
the required explicit direction from Congress cannot regard the already identified
fact that the cause of action was exclusive. Further, to ascertain such direction from
Congress, the Taylor Court examined the jurisdictional statutes of ERISA and the
LMRA, as well as the legislative history of the ERISA jurisdictional provisions.0 6
The Taylor Court certainly did not indicate, as did the Anderson Court,0 7 that
arguments regarding the pertinent jurisdictional provisions and legislative history
were irrelevant. Finally, it is untenable to read Taylor's full statement that the
touchstone of complete preemption is congressional intent and claim the Court was
referring to congressional intent of an exclusive cause of action rather than intent
of removability.0 8
After redefining congressional intent as used in Taylor, the Anderson Court
proceeded to determine that §§ 85 and 86 provided the exclusive federal cause of
action and held that removal was proper. 09 Yet the Court's method for discerning
congressional intent is illuminating. The Court determined that Congress had
intended to provide an exclusive federal cause of action by citing to its own prior
caselaw regarding the preemptive scope of the NBA."' No mention was made of
the statutory language or legislative history of the NBA. The Anderson method
contrasts with the Taylor analysis. The Taylor Court examined the text of the
ERISA jurisdictional provision as well as reliable pieces of legislative history from
104. See id. at 63-67.
105. See id. at 63 64.
106. See id. at 65-66.
107. See Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 9 n.5 (2003).
108. In Taylor, the Court stated,
But the touchstone of thejederal district court's removal jurisdiction is not the
"obviousness" of the pre-emption defense but the intent of Congress. Indeed, as
we have noted, even an "obvious" pre-emption defense does not, in most cases,
create removal jurisdiction. In this case, however, Congress has clearly
manifested an intent to make causes of action within the scope of the civil
enforcement provisions of [Section] 502(a) removable to federal court. Since we
have found Taylor's cause of action to be within the scope of [Section] 502(a), we
must honor that intent whether pre-emption was obvious or not at the time this
suit was filed.
Accordingly, this suit, though it purports to raise only state law claims, is
necessarily federal in character by virtue of the clearly manifested intent of
Congress.
481 U.S. at 66 67 (emphasis added).
109. Anderson, 539 U.S. at 11.
110. See id. at 10 (discussing a series of Supreme Court opinions that broadly construe substantive
preemption under the NBA).
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the House Report and a sponsor of the ERISA bill."' Indeed, Taylor looked to
Congress in order to determine congressional intent.112
Importantly, the Anderson Court admitted that its holding was influenced by
"the special nature of federally chartered banks."' 3 Quoting M'Culloch v.
Maryland,"14 the Anderson Court explained,
The same federal interest that protected national banks from the
state taxation that Chief Justice Marshall characterized as the
.,power to destroy," supports the established interpretation of
§§ 85 and 86 [as the exclusive cause of action for usury against
national banks] that gives those provisions the requisite pre-
emptive force to provide removal jurisdiction.'
Indeed, the Court's desire to protect the historic independence of national banks
from state encroachments was likely the catalyst for changing and broadening
complete preemption-as the NBA did not satisfy Taylor's test of clear
congressional intent of removability." 6
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented,' explaining that the new
exclusive federal cause of action test "implicitly contradict[ed]" Taylor and the
Taylor Court's examination of jurisdictional provisions and legislative history to
determine the propriety of removal." 8 Further, Justice Scalia contended that the
creation of a federal cause of action failed to demonstrate congressional intent to
effect jurisdictional changes or "to wrest from state courts the authority to decide
questions of pre-emption.""' 9 Justice Scalia also explained that fear of state court
error, which had been advocated as a reason to allow removal, was "inadequate for
judicial authority, because it is up to Congress, not the federal courts, to decide
when the risk of state-court error with respect to a matter of federal law becomes
111. See Taylor, 481 U.S. at 65 66.
112. See id.
113. Anderson, 539 U.S. at 10.
114. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
115. Id. at 11 (citation omitted) (quoting I'Culloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 431).
116. See supra text accompanying notes 73-81. The same interest of protecting national banks
probably played a role in the Osborn Court's extremely broad construction of constitutional arising
under power. See Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 822 (1824) (explaining that the
arising under power exists where "the title or right set up by the party[] may be defeated by one
construction of the [C]onstitution or law of the United States, and sustained by the opposite
construction" (emphasis added)).
117. Notably, in Taylor, it was the liberal Justices Brennan and Marshall that pushed for an
extremely narrow interpretation of complete preemption, while inAnderson, it was Justices Scalia and
Thomas. Compare Taylor, 481 U.S. at 67-68 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., concurring)
(emphasizing the limited nature of the majority's holding regarding federal defense removal), with
Anderson, 539 U.S. at 20-22 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dissenting) (advocating a narrow
interpretation of complete preemption).
118. Anderson, 539 U.S. at 16 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia indicated the Court could not
contradict Avco because it "has no discussion to be contradicted." Id.
119. Id. at 19.
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so unbearable as to justify divesting the state courts of authority to decide the
federal matter.' 120 Finally, expressing concern about the potentially broad reach of
the Anderson decision, Justice Scalia concluded that "as between an inexplicable
narrow holding and an inexplicable broad one, the former is the lesser evil.'
12
2. The Effect of Anderson in the Lower Courts
In 1998, Professor Miller explained that, while various multi-factored tests for
complete preemption existed among the federal circuits,
[A]ll [the tests] focus on a similar goal: to determine whether
Congress not only intended a given federal statute to provide a
federal defense to a state cause of action that could be asserted
either in a state or a federal court, but also intended to grant a
defendant the ability to remove the adjudication of the cause of
action to afederal court by transforming the state cause of action
into a federal [one]. 22
Following Anderson, federal courts are ceasing to ask if Congress "intended to
grant a defendant the ability to remove the adjudication ... to a federal court,""'23
examining instead whether the federal statute creates the exclusive cause of action
for the alleged state law claims.
For example, the Second Circuit noted, "Until the Supreme Court's recent
decision in .. .Anderson .... [w]e had understood the doctrine [of complete
preemption] to be restricted to the very narrow range of cases where Congress has
clearly manifested an intent to make specific action within a particular area
removable."' 24 The Second Circuit had held that "there is no complete preemption
without a clear statement to that effect from Congress.' '125 Similarly, prior to
Anderson, the Fifth Circuit had articulated a three-prong test for complete
preemption, the third prong of which was whether "there is a clear Congressional
intent that claims brought under the federal law be removable.' 26 And the Ninth
120. Id. at 21.
121. Id.
122. Miller, supra note 9, at 1797-98.
123. Id.
124. Briarpatch Ltd. v. Phoenix Pictures, Inc., 373 F.3d 296, 304 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Fax
Telecommunicaciones Inc. v. AT&T, 138 F.3d 479, 486 (2d Cir. 1998)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
125. Marcus v. AT&T Corp., 138 F.3d 46, 55 (2d Cir. 1998).
126. Johnson v. Baylor Univ., 214 F.3d 630, 632 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Heimann v. Nat'l
Elevator Indus. Pension Fund, 187 F.3d 493, 500 (5th Cir. 1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted);
see also Willy v. Coastal Corp., 855 F.2d 1160, 1166 (5th Cir. 1988) (finding no complete preemption
because the allegedly preemptive federal laws "and the legislative history of those statutes indicate no
intent, manifest or otherwise, that Avco should apply in this character of case"); Beers v. N. Am. Van
Lines, Inc., 836 F.2d 910, 913 n.3 (5th Cir. 1988) (finding no complete preemption for Carmack
Amendment claims because the court could "find no manifest congressional intent, of the type
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Circuit had explained that "complete preemption occurs only when
Congress .. .intends to transfer jurisdiction of the subject matter from state to
federal court.'
121
In 2004, the Second Circuit explained that Anderson changed the "analytical
framework"' 28 and "extend[ed] the complete preemption doctrine to any federal
statute that both preempts state law and substitutes a federal remedy for that law,
thereby creating an exclusive federal cause of action.', 129 Notably, under the Second
Circuit's formulation of the Anderson test, a federal court must determine the
substantive preemption question to determine its own removal jurisdiction. 30 In like
manner, post-Anderson, the Fifth Circuit abandoned its three-pronged test and held
that "the proper focus of complete preemption analysis is on whether Congress
intended that the federal action be exclusive."'' The Fifth Circuit, prior to
Anderson, had "considered complete preemption to be a narrow exception,"''12 but
construed Anderson to "make[] finding complete preemption easier than existed
under Taylor."'33 The Ninth Circuit likewise explained thatAnderson clarified when
complete preemption applied: namely, when "the federal statutes at issue provide[]
the exclusive cause of action for the claim asserted.' 34
The Fourth Circuit's caselaw has also changed acutely post-Anderson. Prior to
Anderson, the Fourth Circuit's seminal case regarding complete preemption was
Rosciszewski v. Arete Associates, Inc.' In Rosciszewski, the Fourth Circuit held
that complete preemption applied to state law claims coming within the preemptive
scope of § 3 01 (a) of the Copyright Act. 36 The court explained that the focus of its
contemplated in Taylor, to make this state claim removable to federal court").
127. Wayne v. DHL Worldwide Express, 294 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Ansley
v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., 340 F.3d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Wayne's language as the test
for complete preemption: a party must show that Congress intended "to transfer jurisdiction of the
subject matter from state to federal court" (quoting Wayne, 294 F.3d at 1183) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Wayne, 294 F.3d at 1184 (holding no complete preemption by the Airline Deregulation Act).
128. Briarpatch, 373 F.3d at 304 (citing Anderson, 539 U.S. at 8 11).
129. Id. at 305 (emphasis added).
130. See City of Rome v. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc., 362 F.3d 168, 177 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing
Anderson, 539 U.S. at 9-10) (explaining that to determine complete preemption the court "must
undertake a two-step inquiry to determine first whether [s]ection 253 [of the Telecommunications Act]
preempts any common-law or state statutory rule and then whether Congress intended Section 253 to
provide an exclusive cause of action").
131. PCI Transp., Inc. v. Fort Worth & W. R.R. Co., 418 F.3d 535, 544 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing
Hoskins v. Bekins Van Lines, 343 F.3d 769, 776 (5th Cir. 2003)) (finding complete preemption by the
Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act).
132. Id. at 543.
133. Id. at 544 n.32 (citing Anderson, 539 U.S. at 16-19 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
134. Lippitt v. Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc., 340 F.3d 1033, 1042 (9th Cir. 2003); see also
Miles v. Okun, 430 F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Anderson, 539 U.S. at 8-9) (stating that the
Anderson Court "clarified that removal is proper under the complete preemption doctrine only when
Congress intended the federal cause of action to be exclusive" and finding complete preemption by the
Bankruptcy Code "for damages resulting from the filing of an involuntary bankruptcy petition").
135. 1 F.3d 225 (4th Cir. 1993).
136. Id. at 227 (construing the Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 301(a), 90 Stat.
2541, 2572 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2000)).
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inquiry was congressional intent, and it examined both the scope of the intended
preemption by Congress and, as revealed by the statutory jurisdictional provisions
and legislative history, the intent of Congress to place adjudication of the federal
claims in federal court.'37 Although not paralleling the jurisdictional language used
in the LMRA-as the Taylor Court had found with ERISA-the Fourth Circuit held
that the provision for exclusive federal jurisdiction over copyright claims was
"strong evidence that Congress intended copyright litigation to take place in federal
courts."' 38 The court concluded,
The grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the federal district courts
over civil actions arising under the Copyright Act, combined with
the preemptive force of § 301(a), compels the conclusion that
Congress intended that state-law actions preempted by § 30 1(a)
of the Copyright Act arise under federal law.
39
In stark contrast with its Rosciszewski decision, 4 ° the Fourth Circuit recently
took complete preemption to a new level in Discover Bank v. Vaden.'4 ' In Vaden,
Discover Financial Services, Inc. (DFS), allegedly on behalf of Discover Bank,
sued Vaden in Maryland state court for nonpayment of a credit card debt.'42
Discover Bank is a Delaware-chartered bank not a national bank as in
137. See id. at 232.
138. Id. Notably, and as the Roscisiewski court itself recognized, when the Copyright Act was
enacted, the so-called "derivative jurisdiction rule" prohibited removal of a claim within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the federal courts. See id. at 232 n.6. The idea was that because the state courts did not
have jurisdiction, the case could not be moved from state to federal court-rather, it had to be
dismissed. See, e.g., Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 258 U.S. 377,382 (1922) ("If the
state court lacks jurisdiction of the subject-matter or of the parties, the federal court acquires none,
although it might in a like suit originally brought there have hadjurisdiction.") superseded by statute,
Judicial Improvements Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-336, § 3, 100 Stat. 633, 637 (1986) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1441(t) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004)). The derivative jurisdiction rule was
statutorily overturned in 1986 by what is currently 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (f). Thus, while it is sound for the
Roscisiewski court to state that Congress' s grant of exclusive jurisdiction showed an intent by Congress
that copyright claims be adjudicated in federal court and not by state courts, it is hard to argue that
Congress intended that state law claims in state court be removed to federal court on the basis of a
federal copyright preemption defense, because at the time of the statute's enactment the derivative
jurisdiction rule prevented removal of even express copyright claims. See Roscisiewski, 1 F.3d at
232-33.
139. Roscisiewski, I F.3d at 232.
140. In Lontf v. Tharp, 413 F.3d 435 (4th Cir. 2005), the Fourth Circuit stated that the Anderson
"view of the complete preemption doctrine is consistent with our approach in Roscisiewski." Id. at 441
(citing Roscis ewski, I F.3d 225). As will be demonstrated, the Fourth Circuit's current approach, as
employed in Discover Bank v. Vaden, 489 F.3d 594 (4th Cir. 2007), is quite divergent from the
approach taken in Roscisfewski. However, the Fourth Circuit's view of the Anderson test in Lontf is
arguably different from its view ofAnderson indicated by Vaden. See infra note 162 and accompanying
text.
141. 489 F.3d 594.
142. Id. at 597.
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Anderson-but is federally insured.'43 Vaden filed counterclaims against DFS
alleging that the fees and interest rates DFS charged violated Maryland law.'44
Discover Bank then filed a petition in federal court seeking to compel arbitration
under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). 4 ' According to the Fourth Circuit, it had
jurisdiction under the FAA only if it would have had jurisdiction over the
underlying action-which, again, involved an affiliate of a state-charted bank suing
a debtor under state law in state court, where the debtor counterclaimed that the
bank's fees and interest rates violated state law.'46
The Fourth Circuit held that the complete preemption doctrine gave it federal
question jurisdiction over the underlying case.'47 According to the court, Vaden's
state counterclaims against DFS, which the court construed to be against the bank
itself, were completely preempted by the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDIA).1
48
Leaving aside the Fourth Circuit's questionable determination that federal question
jurisdiction existed on the basis of preemption of state law counterclaims, 49 the
court's analysis underscores the change wrought by Anderson; the Vaden court
focused entirely on congressional intent to preempt state law rather than on
anything regarding jurisdiction.' Indeed, the court summarized in conclusion,
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 598.
146. See id. at 599 (construing the Federal Arbitration Act, ch. 213, § 4, 43 Stat. 883, 883-84
(1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2000)) (citations omitted).
147. Id. at 600.
148. Id. at 606 07 (construing the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, ch. 967, 64 Stat. 873 (1950)
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1835a (2000 & Supp. IV 2004)).
149. The dissent in Vaden rightly pointed out that "a counterclaim which appears as part of the
defendant's answer, not as part of the plaintiff's complaint-cannot serve as the basis for arising under
jurisdiction." Id. at 610 (Goodwin, J., dissenting) (quoting Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vorando Air
Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 830 (2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Vaden
majority contended that Holnes Group was not controlling because it "did not ... involve complete
preemption." Id. at 600 n.4. According to the majority, complete preemption is an exception to, and
overcomes all aspects of, the well-pleaded complaint rule to the extent that federal questionjurisdiction
may be based on a state law counterclaim that is completely preempted by federal law. See id..
The theory of complete preemption has been that the plaintiff's complaint in fact raises a federal
question because the state law claims are preempted by federal law. See id. at 611 (Goodwin, J.,
dissenting). The same cannot be said of counterclaims. Even assuming counterclaims are completely
preempted by federal law, that only means the defendant raised invalid state law claims that are
preempted by federal law. Certainly the idea of "recharacterization" by complete preemption of the
plaintiffs state claims as being controlled by federal law does not have force with counterclaims.
Moreover, to allow complete preemption on the basis of a state law counterclaim that the plaintiff
asserts in reply is preempted by federal law and, further, to allow the plaintiff to use that assertion to
invoke a federal forum is essentially returning to the jurisdictional scheme of 1875 1887, during which
either a plaintiff or a defendant could remove a case to federal court. See supra text accompanying notes
20 24. However, Congress determined in 1887 that plaintiffs should not be able to remove cases to
federal court and that once they selected their forum they could not move to a different one. See supra
notes 39 46 and accompanying text. Whether or not the rule is justifiable as a matter of principle, the
decisive point is that Congress has expressly so limited federal removal jurisdiction, and without a
change from Congress, the federal judiciary simply has no authority to declare it otherwise.
150. See Vaden, 489 F.3d at 606.
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Given the express preemption language of the FDIA, the statute's
legislative history affirming Congress' intent to provide
competitive equality between national and state-chartered banks,
the virtual identity of the preemption language in the NBA and
that of the FDIA, and the Supreme Court's finding of complete
preemption under the NBA, we are hard-pressed to conclude other
than that Congress intended complete preemption of state-court
usury claims under the FDIA."5 '
Notably, each aspect of the FDIA that led the court to find complete preemption
dealt with the scope of substantive preemption by the FDIA.5 2 Noticeably missing
from the analysis was anything akin to the analysis in Taylor or Rosciszewski. In
Taylor, the Court compared thejurisdictionalprovisions for ERISA and the LMRA
to see if ERISA was intended to have the same jurisdictional effect as the LMRA
was construed to have." 3 Similarly, in Rosciszewski, the Fourth Circuit focused on
the jurisdictional provision providing exclusive federal jurisdiction for copyright
claims and held that the provision indicated a congressional desire that copyright
claims be adjudicated in federal court, to the exclusion of state courts.1
5 4
While the Vaden court compared statutory provisions of the NBA to those of
the FDIA, it based its finding of complete preemption on the comparison of the
substantive preemption provisions,"15 basically ignoring any jurisdictional
provisions of either statute. The court acknowledged in a footnote "one difference"
between the NBA and the FDIA: namely, that § 86 of the NBA did not mention the
type of courts in which the action was to be brought, while the FDIA stated that the
action was to be commenced "in a court of appropriate jurisdiction."'56 The court
summarily dismissed this difference because "both statutes speak to the creation of
a federal cause of action."' 57 Arguably, under Anderson, the Fourth Circuit was
correct in placing its focus on the fact that both statutes created a federal cause of
action with a similar preemptive scope rather than examining any jurisdictional
provisions.
Finally, the Vaden decision is illuminating because of its emphasis on
following Anderson and its assumption that Congress has the same interest in
protecting state banks from state court encroachments as it has in protecting federal
banks. The Anderson Court emphasized "the special nature of federally chartered
151. Id.
152. See id. 604 05.
153. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65-66 (1987).
154. See Rosciszewski v. Arete Assocs., 1 F.3d 225, 232 (4th Cir. 1993).
155. See Vaden, 489 F.3d at 606-07. In finding complete preemption, the Vaden Court compared
§ 85 of the NBA the substantive preemption provision to the FDIA but made no comparison of the
FDIA to § 86 of the NBA, which created the NBA claim. See id. The Supreme Court in Anderson had
found that the combination of § § 85 and 86 brought about complete preemption. Beneficial Nat'l Bank
v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 9-11 (2003).
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Indeed, the Court noted that M'Culloch's "power to destroy" language supported
complete preemption of state law claims against national banks.159 The Fourth
Circuit in Vaden interpreted the Anderson decision as "elucidat[ing]" the broad
proposition that "federal banking laws preempt state law."'6 ° The Vaden court then
took that proposition a step further and held that such substantive preemption
triggered removal under the doctrine of complete preemption-even in cases
involving state banks rather than national banks. 6' While the Anderson Court's
bottom line concern may have been to preserve the historic independence of
national banks from state encroachment, it did not limit its decision to such
problems; rather, the Court phrased the dispositive inquiry in terms of a broad new
test that would expand complete preemption removal to statutes of every sort.,62
IV. ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS FOR DETERMINING COMPLETE PREEMPTION
Commentators have expressed various views on the proper scope of both the
well-pleaded complaint rule and the complete preemption doctrine. The entire
gamut everything from allowing removal on the basis of any federal defense'63 to
158. Anderson, 539 U.S. at 10 (quoting Tiffany v. Nat'l Bank of Mo., 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 409, 412
(1874)).
159. Id. at 11 (quoting M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819)).
160. Vaden, 489 F.3d at 604 n.ll (citing Anderson, 539 U.S. at 11).
161. Id. at 606-07. The Fourth Circuit's theory was that Congress intended to create parity
between state and federal banks, and if the court "found no complete preemption here, we would be
treating state banks differently under the FDIA than national banks are treated under the NBA." See id.
at 607 n.18.
162. Again, the Anderson Court framed the dispositive question for complete preemption as
whether the "National Bank Act provide[s] the exclusive cause of action for usury claims against
national banks'?" Anderson, 539 U.S. at 9; see also id. at 9 n.5 (stating that the proper inquiry is
"whether Congress intended the federal cause of action to be exclusive"). In none of its articulations
of the test does the Supreme Court hint that the historical independence of the national banks played
a role in determining complete preemption.
In Lontf v. Tharp, the Fourth Circuit recognized the Anderson Court's emphasis on the unique
federal interests implicated by potential state encroachment on national banks as part of the complete
preemption analysis. See 413 F.3d 435, 441 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing Anderson, 539 U.S. at 10-11).
Specifically, the Lonti court indicated that the test for complete preemption fromAnderson was whether
"Congress intended [the preemptive statute] to 'provide the exclusive cause of action' for claims of
overwhelming national interest."-d. (emphasis altered) (quoting Anderson, 539 U.S. at 9). The Fourth
Circuit in Lont noted that the Anderson Court "stressed that national banks were the subject of unique
national concern." Id. (emphasis added). However, in Vaden, the Fourth Circuit in similar fashion to
the other federal courts of appeal and Anderson's own articulation of its test-made no recognition that
complete preemption in Anderson was found to be appropriate because of a special or unique federal
interest involving national banks.
163. Several scholars, while not specifically discussing complete preemption, have argued that
removal should be allowed on the basis of a federal defense and that the "well-pleaded complaint rule
must ... be abandoned." Doernberg, supra note 29, at 658. Similarly, A. Mark Segreti contends that
because the Supreme Court is unlikely to change the well-pleaded complaint rule, Congress should
"replace the phrase 'arising under' with some kind of 'federal ingredient' language" to eliminate the
well-pleaded complaint rule and bestow on the federal courts the full-extent of arising under power as
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abolishing the complete preemption exception and fully enforcing the well-pleaded
complaint rule'64 has been recommended. Pertinent for the purposes of this Article
is scholarly commentary regarding what the proper test or framework for complete
preemption should be.
One recommendation is to allow removal whenever any federal preemption
defense is raised. For example, Professor Jordan argued that complete preemption
should be allowed whenever there is a federal defense that has the potential to
nullify a state cause of action whether or not a federal cause of action is
available. 6 ' Professor Jordan argues that her framework would create greater
efficiency because the state claim, if properly removed, will either be dismissed in
federal court or adjudicated as a federal claim.'66 If the case is remanded, "there will
be no need to relitigate the merits of the preemption issue [in state court] since the
law of the case doctrine applies to issues over which the federal court had
jurisdiction to decide."' professor Jordan also posits that "the shift in authority to
decide the preemption issue will not deprive the state court of the opportunity to
construe state law, but only of the opportunity to interpret federal law."' 68
Commentators have also favored an approach similar to Anderson that allows
removal when there is a preemptive federal cause of action.'69 Professor Twitchell
argues for such an approach but, cognizant of federalism issues, structures her
interpreted in Osborn. See A. Mark Segreti, Jr., Vesting the Whole "Arising Under" Power of the
District Courts in FederalPreemption Cases, 37 OKLA. L. REv. 539, 545 (1984) (citing Osborn v. Bank
of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824)). Doernberg notes that others have recommended allowing
removal on the basis of a federal defense and specifically cites to Chadbourn & Levin, supra note 29,
at 665: Paul J. Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 157, 164
(1953); and Herman L. Trautman, Federal Right Jurisdiction and the Declaratory Remedy, 7 VAND.
L. REV. 445, 460-62 (1954). Doernberg, supra note 29, at 659 & n.268.
164. See, e.g., A. Benjamin Spencer, Anti-Federalist Procedure, 64 WASH & LEE L. REV. 233,
288 (2007) ("To place the scope of federal jurisdiction back within its proper confines, the Supreme
Court will have to take two radical steps: (1) adopt Justice Holmes's 'Creation Test' for determining
the presence of federal question jurisdiction and (2) abolish the complete preemption doctrine.").
165. See Karen A. Jordan, The Complete Preemption Dilemma: A Legal Process Perspective, 3 1
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 927, 984 (1996); see also Segreti, supra note 163, at 545, 551-54 (arguing for
allowing removal of federal preemption defenses as an alternative to abandoning the well-pleaded
complaint rule).
166. See Jordan, supra note 165, at 989.
167. Id. Professor Jordan's conclusion that the state court would not need to revisit the preemption
issue is subject to question. See infra note 407.
168. Jordan, supra note 165, at 990. The validity of this contention will be examined infra Part
V.B.1.
169. See Mary P. Twitchell, Characterifing Federal Claims: Preemption, Removal, and the
Arising- Under Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 812, 865, 869 (1986) (citing
Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust of S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1 (1983)): see also Tristin
K. Green, Comment, Complete Preemption Removing the Mysteryfrom Removal, 86 CAL. L. REV.
363, 391 (1998) ("[W]hen Congress provides a replacement cause of action and creates preempting
federal law, it may be logical to presume that there is reason to fear state court determination in that
particular area of law, either due to bias [of the state courts] or complexity [of federal law]. In these
situations, Congress has gotten involved by creating preempting law as well as a replacement cause of
action, and the courts may infer a certain congressional concern for fair and accurate adjudication.").
2008]
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"jurisdictional analysis to avoid unnecessary preemption decisions" by the federal
court while determining whether or not it has removal jurisdiction.' 70 Under her
three-step analysis, a court must first determine "whether Congress has given [the]
plaintiff an express cause of action," and if not, the suit is remanded because the
state law claims cannot be recharacterized as federal claims. 7' Second, if there is
a federal cause of action, the court examines "whether [the] defendant could
reasonably argue that Congress intended" to preempt the state law claim, and if not,
remand the suit to state court.'72 Third, if the first two requirements are met, the
court will perform a full substantive preemption analysis and determine whether the
plaintiffs claim is preempted.' In her analysis, Professor Twitchell sees the
federal judiciary-particularly the Supreme Court-as the proper authority to
determine what is "a meaningful way to divide power in our federal system," even
though Congress has chosen not to change (whether unable or unwilling) the
current jurisdictional allocation between federal and state courts created by the
well-pleaded complaint rule.'74
Post-Anderson, Professor Seinfeld' advocates a new test for determining
complete preemption.'76 Noting that a primary justification for federal jurisdiction
is the uniform interpretation of federal law, Professor Seinfeld argues that complete
preemption should be based on the breadth of the substantive preemption of a
federal statute and would generally exist when there is field preemption. 7
Professor Seinfeld recognizes that the delineation between field preemption and
other forms of substantive preemption is "notoriously blurry,"' 78 and so "[t]he
hallmark of a preemptive regulatory regime that should suffice to underwrite federal
defense removal is that supplementary state legislation is prohibited" regardless




174. See id. at 870.
175. Professor Seinfeld was a law clerk for Justice Scalia at the time the Anderson decision was
rendered. Seinfeld, supra note 14, at 548 n.31.
176. See id. at 573-77. Professor Seinfeld notes that the Supreme Court has never "attempted to
justify its development of this unusual jurisdictional rule without explicit (or even implicit)
congressional authorization," but the Court "shows no signs of abandoning complete preemption" or
leaving its crafting to Congress. Id. at 571. Thus, Professor Seinfeld proposes his own test for complete
preemption that could be adopted by the judiciary. See id. at 573-77.
177. See id. at 574 75. Professor Seinfeld explains,
[T]he more broadly preemptive federal law is, the more likely it is that the interest
in regulatory uniformity is in play. And it would therefore make sense to tether
a rule offederal defense removal to the scope offederalpreemption-that is, to
the extent to which federal law prohibits state intervention in a given field. Such
a rule would channel into the courts thought most likely to provide a uniform
interpretation of federal law those cases in which the need for such an
interpretation is most pressing.
Id. at 574 (emphasis added).
178. Id. at 576.
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ofthe label attached to the preemption involved.'79 Finally, Professor Seinfeld notes
that under his proposed test, "some reshaping of the basic structure of federal
question jurisdiction" would be required, including abandoning "the pretense that
removal on the basis of a defense is prohibited" and allowing removal by the
plaintiff where the defendant raises a federal defense. 8 ' The combination of these
two features of "reshaping" constitute a repeal of the post-Union & Planters'Bank
well-pleaded complaint rule.' 8 '
Scholars have also argued that complete preemption should be abandoned
altogether. Arguing that the well-pleaded complaint rule serves federalism
purposes, Professor Ragazzo contends that artful pleading exceptions to the well-
pleaded complaint rule, including complete preemption, should be abandoned.'82
179. Id. at 576-77; see also id. at 577 (explaining that "[i]f federal law is construed to prevent
states from heaping on regulated entities obligations above and beyond those animated by federal law,
then it is reasonable to conclude that Congress has endeavored to assure" uniformity, and federal
removal jurisdiction would be proper).
180. Id. at 577 (emphasis added).
181. Professor Seinfeld emphasizes throughout his article that there are separation of powers
concerns with the judiciary creating and expanding the complete preemption doctrine without any
congressional authorization. See id. at 550, 569 71. Professor Seinfeld nevertheless proposes his own
jurisprudential theory for complete preemption, because "the Supreme Court shows no signs of
abandoning complete preemption doctrine and leaving the task of crafting exceptions to the well-
pleaded complaint rule to Congress alone." Id. at 571.
Surprisingly, then, Professor Seinfeld includes in his proposed judicial approach to complete
preemption both abandoning the idea that removal cannot be based on a federal defense, see id. at 577,
and allowing the plaintiff to remove, see id. at 578. The second of these cannot be accomplished by the
judiciary no matter how "sound" the policy of allowing plaintiffs the right to remove. See id. From 1887
to the present, Congress has limited the right of removal to defendants. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2000)
(restricting removal to "the defendant or the defendants"). Professor Seinfeld probably recognized that
this change would have to be made by Congress because he cites to the current statute, see Seinfeld,
supra note 14, at 577 n. 123 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1441), but he fails to so state and adds confusion as to
which parts of his framework could be accomplished by judicial interpretation and which require
congressional action.
Similarly, Professor Seinfeld posits in a footnote that there are compelling reasons to treat the well-
pleaded complaint rule "in effect, as if it were a creature of statute, rather than one of judicial
construction," in light of the strong history of acquiescence by Congress. See id. at 570 n.107.
Nevertheless, Professor Seinfeld proposes as part of his judicial complete preemption doctrine
abandoning the idea that removal cannot be based on a federal defense, see id. at 577, which is the heart
of the post- Union & Planters 'Bank well-pleaded complaint rule. Again, while criticizing the Supreme
Court for not addressing separation of powers problems with complete preemption, see id. at 550,
569-71, Professor Seinfeld's own proposal arguably raises even greater separation of powers concerns
than the Supreme Court's current, and far more narrow, complete preemption doctrine.
182. See Robert A. Ragazzo, Reconsidering the Artful Pleading Doctrine, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 273,
327 34 (1993). Professor Ragazzo alternatively argues that the Court, at the very least, "should restrict
the artful pleading doctrine to those cases in which federal law both preempts state law and provides
replacement federal claims." Id. at 335.
In his article, Professor Ragazzo discusses not only the complete preemption doctrine but also
another "artful pleading" exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule founded on Federated
Departnent Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394 (1981). See Ragazzo, supra, at 303-16. In Rivet v.
Regions Bank of Louisiana, 522 U.S. 470 (1998), the Supreme Court did exactly what Professor
Ragazzo suggested and abandoned the alleged "Moitie doctrine." See id. at 478 (citing Moitie, 452 U.S.
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Professor Ragazzo also argues that judicial efficiency is strained by complete
preemption, both because a case is passed between state and federal systems.8 and
because such exceptions are "exceedingly difficult to apply."' 4 Finally, Professor
Ragazzo appears to put the abolishment of complete preemption in the hands of the
Supreme Court, but "[flailing action by the Court, Congress would do well to
eliminate a doctrine that is contrary to sound jurisdictional theory, exceedingly
difficult to apply, and the bane of judges and litigants alike.' 8 5 More recently,
Professor Spencer advocated abolishing complete preemption "to the extent that the
Court infers its existence in any given case."' 86 Although sounding fairly absolute,
Professor Spencer supports complete preemption "where Congress adopted the
[jurisdictional] language" used in the LMRA that the Supreme Court interpreted "as
indicative of an intent to permit" removal.'87
Finally, in a short response to Professor Seinfeld's article discussed above, 8'
Professor Morrison argued that "any attempt to fashion a rule of complete
preemption entails decisions better made by Congress, not the Courts."' 8 9 Noting
some problems with Professor Seinfeld's theory, Professor Morrison argues briefly
that "complete preemption should depend on congressional intent, not judicial
invention," because "Congress is simply better than the courts at making the kinds
of decisions necessary to craft sensible and coherent doctrine in this area.'
90
Similarly, Arthur Miller has contended that the "Supreme Court probably should
find an opportunity to offer some guidance as to what terms should appear in the
statute or, at least, be set out in reliable legislative history to create complete
preemption."' ' Placing "the burden on Congress," rather than allowing the "lower
394). However, as demonstrated by Anderson itself, the Supreme Court has not shown any indication
of similarly abandoning the complete preemption doctrine.
183. Ragazzo, supra note 182, at 329 31.
184. Id. at 331.
185. Id. at 335.
186. Spencer, supra note 164, at 290 (emphasis added). Indeed, Professor Spencer notes that
"Congress of course retains the authority to provide expressly for the removability of preempted state
law claims, as it has done in the past." Id.
187. Id. Professor Spencer argues that removal would be allowed not because of complete
preemption, but "rather to honor the clear expression of congressional intent that such be the case" as,
he contends, occurred in Taylor. Id. (citing Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987)).
Notably, in Taylor, it was not just Congress's adoption of the jurisdictional language used in the
LMIRA that influenced the Court, but additionally it was the legislative history with a clear statement
from Congress indicating that certain ERISA preemption defenses were intended to provide a basis for
removal similar to section 301 of the LMRA. See Taylor, 481 U.S. at 65 66. Thus, it is a stretch to say
that the Supreme Court in Taylor declared that whenever the jurisdictional language used in the LM RA
is used in another statute that such use demonstrates Congress's intent to allow removal.
188. See supra notes 175-81 and accompanying text.
189. Trevor W. Morrison, Complete Preemption and the Separation of Powers, 155 U. PA. L.
REV. PENNUMBRA 186, 186 (2007), http://www.pennumbra.com/issues/articles/155-3/Morrison.pdf.
190. See id. at 187, 194.
191. Miller, supra note 9, at 1800. The primary focus of Miller's article was the Moitie doctrine,
see supra note 182, which was overturned in Rivet v. Regions Bank ofLouisiana, 522 U.S. 470 (1998),
although Miller does examine complete preemption as well.
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federal courts to construct their own potentially divergent multi-factored tests[,]
would achieve greater uniformity and would avoid much litigation in the long
run." 1
V. SEPARATION OF POWERS, FEDERALISM, AND EFFICIENCY PROBLEMS WITH THE
ANDERSON RULE
The Eleventh Circuit stated in the intermediate Anderson decision, "When a
federal court acts outside its jurisdiction, it violates principles of separation of
powers and federalism, interfering with Congress's authority to demarcate the
jurisdiction of lower federal courts, and with the states' authority to resolve disputes
in their own courts."' 93 The Eleventh Circuit could not have known that its
statement would be prophetic about the direction that complete preemption would
take on the direct appeal of that very decision.
A. Separation of Powers Problems
1. Congressional Power to Determine Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction
The Anderson test raises separation of powers concerns because it is Congress
that generally has the power to define the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts.
The history of federal court jurisdiction'94 and pronouncements from the Supreme
Court' 9 verify-at least to the extent relevant to complete preemption and removal
jurisdiction that Congress controls thejurisdiction of the lower federal courts and
may "withhold[] jurisdiction from them in the exact degrees and character which
192. Miller, supra note 9, at 1800.
193. Anderson v. H&R Block, Inc., 287 F.3d 1038, 1041 (1lth Cir. 2002), rev'd sub nor.
Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1 (2003).
194. The most obvious example of congressional ability to define and limit federal jurisdiction
is that federal courts were not even given federal question jurisdiction until 1875. See Act of Mar. 3,
1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470. And even then federal question jurisdiction was limited by a
jurisdictional amount until 1980. See Federal Question Jurisdictional Amendments Act of 1980, Pub.
L. No. 96-486, 94 Stat. 2369 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000)). Further, the lower federal courts
were not given general removal jurisdiction from a state to federal court until 1875. See Act of Mar. 3,
1875, § 2, 18 Stat. at 470 71. And, as noted above, although Congress initially gave both plaintiffs and
defendants the right to remove to federal court, it restricted that grant ofjurisdiction in 1887, limiting
removal to defendants. See supra text accompanying notes 20 24, 3941.
195. For example, in Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850), the Supreme Court explained
that "Congress, having the power to establish the courts, must define their respective jurisdictions," id.
at 448-49, and "may withhold from any court of its creation jurisdiction of any of the enumerated
controversies," id. at 449, for "[c]ourts created by statute can have no jurisdiction but such as the
statute confers," id. See also Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234 (1922) (explaining that only
the Supreme Court is created by the Constitution itself, but "[t]he Constitution simply gives to the
inferior courts the capacity to take jurisdiction in the enumerated cases, but it requires an act of
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to Congress may seem proper for the public good."' 96 Even the extensive realm of
academic dialogue regarding the extent of congressional control over federal
jurisdiction is restricted to a rather narrow area' and does not generally refute
congressional control over granting and denying removal j urisdiction. 98
196. Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 698 (1992) (quoting Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3
How.) 236, 245 (1845)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
197. One major theory is that Article III requires that there be some federal court
adjudication-either original or appellate-over cases enumerated in Article Ill. However, because state
court adjudication of the federal preemption defense is subject to Supreme Court review, this theory
does not implicate removal jurisdiction by means of complete preemption. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar,
A Neo-Federalist View ofArticle I1L Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U.L. REV.
205, 240-41, 255-57 (1985) (arguing that enumerated powers containing the term "all" require
mandatory jurisdiction, including federal question cases); Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of
Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest for the Original Understanding ofArticle III, 132 U. PA.
L. REV. 741, 753 (1984) ("[T]he overriding objective of [Article III is] to ensure that some federal court
would have at least a discretionary opportunity to review each class of case enumerated in [S]ection 2
of [A]rticle III.").
Theodore Eisenberg has contended that "Congress cannot withdraw federal jurisdiction to hear
cases in which constitutional rights are at stake." Theodore Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to
Restrict Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498, 532 (1974). But with complete
preemption, the federal defense at issue is one of statutory federal preemption and not constitutional
right.
Other commentators argue that the Due Process Clause and other constitutional provisions curtail
Congress's ability to limit jurisdiction. Under such theories, Congress cannot eliminate all judicial
review both state and federal for federal rights. See, e.g., David Cole, Jurisdiction and Liberty:
Habeas Corpus and Due Process as Limits on Congress ' Control of Federal Jurisdiction, 86 GEO. L.J.
2481, 2489 90 (1998) (identifying three constitutional problems associated with removing alljudicial
review for federal rights); Louise Weinberg, The Article III Box: The Power of "Congress" to Attack
the "Jurisdiction " of "Federal Courts," 78 TEX. L. REV. 1405, 1425 (2000) ("It is right and good to
continue to suppose that the Supremacy Clause and/or the Due Process Clause must pry open the doors
of some court in this country to a constitutional claim, if we are to remain a nation of laws."). Also,
Congress cannot strip federal courts of "jurisdiction to achieve unconstitutional substantive ends."
Lawrence Gene Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on
Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 42
(1981); see also Ronald D. Rotunda, Congressional Power to Restrict the Jurisdiction of the Lower
Federal Courts and the Problem of School Busing, 64 GEO. L.J. 839, 840 (1976) (stating that, while free
to abolish the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts, Congress cannot "restrict substantive rights that
it could not directly affect" through "the guise of a jurisdictional limitation"); Lawrence H. Tribe,
Jurisdictional Gerrymandering: Zoning DisfavoredRights Out of the Federal Courts, 16 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 129, 136 (1981) ("[C]ongress cannot blind an [A]rticle Ill court toa relevant constitutional
issue or provision-or, indeed, to any relevant proposition of federal law-nor can Congress replace
what the court sees in the legal landscape before it with a picture more to Congress' liking.").
Finally, some scholars contend Congress has broad authority to control the jurisdiction of the
lower federal courts, excepting only facially discriminatory or arbitrary devices. See, e.g., Gerald
Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the
Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895, 913 (1984) ("A broad congressional power over the jurisdiction
of the lower federal courts is supported.., by a long line of decisions and by repeated practice.").
198. But see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 20, § 3.3, at 191 (explaining that one approach, "and the
only one that seems clearly untenable," requires the lower federal courts to be vested with "the full
judicial power," and "[b]y this view, all attempts to restrict jurisdiction would be unconstitutional").
Under such an approach, the well-pleaded complaint rule would be unconstitutional along with all
jurisdictional amount requirements.
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Notwithstanding scholarly criticism of the well-pleaded complaint rule, the
prohibition against removal on the basis of a federal defense was created as a
judicial construction of the 1887 and 1888 amendments to the judicial code, and
Congress has refused to repeal or revise the rule which may not be wise
anyway 9--though given the opportunity on multiple occasions. 00 Despite
congressional authority over removal jurisdiction, under Anderson removal
jurisdiction becomes disassociated with congressional intent and congressional
allocations of jurisdiction. Indeed, post-Anderson, federal courts have allowed
removal jurisdiction where Congress has made no indications that such jurisdiction
is authorized and where congressional manifestations indicate an intent to restrict
federal jurisdiction. 0' Moreover, the general rule forthe last 120 years has provided
state courts with exclusive jurisdiction to determine federal preemption defenses
when only state law claims are pled, and most federal courts have recognized the
complete preemption doctrine to be exceptionally narrow and limited to a handful
of statutes. Consequently, Congress could not have implicitly understood in passing
legislation over the past century that by creating a preemptive federal cause of
action, it was authorizing removal on the basis of a federal defense.
As a case in point, the 1906 Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce
Act 20 2 demonstrates how Anderson and other proposed tests for complete
preemption fail to distribute cases in a manner consistent with congressional
allocations of federal and state judicial power.
199. The well-pleaded complaint rule does not necessarily provide the perfect delineation, but
Congress is unlikely to greatly enlarge the jurisdiction of the federal courts by permitting wholesale
removal on the basis of a federal defense. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 197, at 270 ("Absolutely
comprehensive federal question jurisdiction by federal trial courts . . . appears to be impracticable,
unwieldy, and politically infeasible."); Eisenberg, supra note 197, at 517 (noting that ifrequired to hear
cases now limited under § 1331, the federal "courts would be swamped or the judiciary would have to
be expanded to a dangerous extent"); Ragazzo, supra note 182, at 319 20 (contending that the ALI
proposal "that every federal issue deserves a federal forum-would be a practical disaster" because it
"portends an explosion of cases subject to federal jurisdiction at a time when the federal courts are in
danger of being overwhelmed by the volume of federal litigation" and, additionally, because it is
"unsound as a matter of theory"); Seinfeld, supra note 14, at 546 ("The restriction of federal question
jurisdiction to those cases in which the well-pleaded complaint rule is satisfied reduces the likelihood
that the federal courts will be faced with a caseload that is beyond their capacity to process
expeditiously.").
200. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. Professor Twitchell states in passing that there
have been countless attempts to get Congress to change the well-pleaded complaint rule. See Twitchell,
supra note 169, at 862.
201. In a related context, the Supreme Court has recently allowed federal question jurisdiction
"only if federal jurisdiction is consistent with congressionaljudgment about the sound division oflabor
between state and federal courts governing the application of§ 1331 ." Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc.
v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 313 14 (2005) (emphasis added); see also Richard D. Freer, Of
Rules and Standards: Reconciling Statutory Limitations on "Arising Under" Jurisdiction, 82 IND. L.J.
309, 344 (2007) (discussing the Grable standard and its "sensitive balancing approach reflecting the
delicate task at hand-that of allocating judicial power between separate sovereigns").
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a. The Carmack Amendment and Congressional Intent of
Removability
The Carmack Amendment provides a federal cause of action under which a
shipper may recover from the initial carrier for loss, delay, or damage to goods
shipped in interstate commerce. 20 3 Despite containing a savings clause declaring
that "nothing in this section shall deprive [a shipper of goods] of any remedy or
right of action which he has under existing law, ' , 20 4 the Supreme Court has
construed preemption by the Carmack Amendment very broadly and interpreted the
savings clause as a virtual nullity.20 5 Beginning in 1913 with Adams Express Co. v.
Croninger,20 6 the Court held that the Carmack Amendment "embraces the subject"
of carrier liability and "supersedes all the regulations and policies [of the states]
upon the same subject.'' 2 The Court subsequently held that "state laws have no
203. Id. sec. 7, § 20, 34 Stat. at 595.
204. Id.
205. See Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491, 507-08 (1913). According to the
Croninger Court, the purpose of the Carmack Amendment was to create a uniform body of law as to
carrier liability. See id. To allow applicability of diverse state laws and remedies would "cause the
[savings] proviso to destroy the act itself" Id. Thus, the Court held that Congress intended only to save
existingfederallaw-ofwhich there was none, other than pre-Erie general federal common law-while
superseding all state law, both common law and statutory. See id.
Contemporary commentators note that prior to Croninger, not a single court or commentator had
so construed the savings clause; rather, all assumed Congress meant to preserve state substantive laws
and remedies in favor of the shipper. See, e.g., Wayland H. Sanford, The Carmack Amendment in the
State Courts, 15 MICH. L. REV. 314, 314 15 (1917) ("It had been thought, both by state and by federal
courts, that the proviso above quoted was intended to save to the shipper whatever rights he had under
existing state law .... The decision in the Croninger case ... came as a distinct surprise, and was
subjected to not a little adverse criticism .. "); E.C.G., Note, The Effect of the Carmack Amendment
to the Hepburn Act upon State Laws as to Limitation by Contract of the Amount of the Liability of a
Common Carrier, 11 MICH. L. REV. 460, 461 (1913) ("[The Carmack savings clause] has frequently
been considered by the courts, and heretofore the conclusion has always been reached that the very
purpose of the proviso was to save to shippers in certain of the states ... their more extensive rights
against the carrier." (emphasis added)).
Further, contemporary accounts, including the only piece of legislative history from the initial
enactment, see 40 CONG. REC. 9579, 9580 (1906) (statement of Rep. Richardson), indicate that the
Carmack Amendment was not intended to occupy the field of carrier liability, but to address a particular
problem by making the initial carrier liable for damages to a shipment and to avoid requiring the shipper
to prove which particular carrier, among many in an interstate shipment, was at fault. See Ad. Coast
Line R.R. Co. v. Riverside Mills, 219 U.S. 186, 200 01 (1911) (noting the problems of proof for a
shipper and explaining that "[flhis burdensome situation of the shippingpublic in reference to interstate
shipments over routes including separate lines of carriers was the matter which Congress undertook to
regulate" in the Carmack Amendment and referencing the existing piece of legislative history in support
of this assertion (emphasis added)); 3 DEWITT C. MOORE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CARRIERS 1922
(2d ed. 1914) ("This burdensome situation of the shippers demanded regulation by Congress in the
public interest." (emphasis added)); F.E. Riddle, The CarmackAmendmnent to the Hepburn Law, 14
OKLA. L.J. 9, 9 (1916) (arguing same).
206. 226 U.S. 491.
207. Id. at 505; see also Charleston & W. Carolina Ry. Co. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U.S.
597, 603 (1915) ("[T]he special regulations and policies of particular States upon the subject of the
carrier's liability for loss or damage to interstate shipments and the contracts of carriers with respect
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application [and] cannot be applied in coincidence with, as complementary to or as
in opposition to" the Carmack Amendment.2 8
Prior to Anderson, United States Courts of Appeals that examined the Carmack
Amendment under the Taylor test requiring clear congressional intent of
removability determined that the Carmack Amendment did not give rise to
complete preemption, because there was "no manifest congressional intent, of the
type contemplated in Taylor, to make [allegedly preempted] state claim[s]
removable to federal court."20 9 District courts that examined whether congressional
intent of removability existed similarly held that preemption by the Carmack
Amendment did not give rise to removal by complete preemption.20 Indeed, these
cases are correct in so holding. For while it is often stated that the 1906 Carmack
thereto, have been superseded." (quoting Mo., Kan. & Tex. Ry. Co. ofTex. v. Harris, 234 U.S. 412,420
(1914)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
208. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co. v. Porter, 273 U.S. 341, 346 (1927).
209. Beers v. N. Am. Van Lines, Inc., 836 F.2d 910, 913 n.3 (5th Cir. 1988); see also Wayne v.
DHL Worldwide Express, 294 F.3d 1179, 1183-85 (9th Cir. 2002) (forbidding removal where
defendants had argued complete preemption of state law claims by the Airline Deregulation Act and
the Carmack Amendment, and explaining that complete preemption required congressional intent not
only to preempt state law "but also [intent] to transferjurisdiction of the subject matterfrom state to
federal court" (emphasis added)); Hunter v. United Van Lines, 746 F.2d 635, 639 (9th Cir. 1984)
("Until Congress changes [the well-pleaded complaint] rule, it will remain true that ... defendants
relying on federal law are not entitled to a federal forum unless the plaintiff also relies on federal law.").
Prior to Taylor, the Second Circuit impliedly found complete preemption under the Carmack
Amendment in North American Phillips Corp. v. Emery Air Freight Corp., 579 F.2d 229, 234 (2d Cir.
1978) (finding federaljurisdiction because plaintiff s state law claims were preempted by the Carmack
Amendment). However, post-Taylor, the Second Circuit held that "there is no complete preemption
without a clear statement to that effect from Congress." Marcus v. AT&T Corp., 138 F.3d 46, 55 (2d
Cir. 1998). After Marcus, lower courts in the Second Circuit were split as to whether the Carmack
Amendment gave rise to complete preemption. Compare Sorrentino v. Allied Van Lines, No.
3:01CV1449(AHN), 2002 WL 32107610, at *2 (D. Conn. Mar. 22, 2002) (following North American
and finding complete preemption), with Ben & Jerry's Homemade, Inc. v. KLLM, Inc., 58 F. Supp. 2d
315, 318 (D. Vt. 1999) (applying Taylor and Marcus and finding no complete preemption because
"Congress has not clearly manifested an intent to make any action involving carrier liability removable
to federal court").
210. See, e.g., Lamm v. Bekins Van Lines Co., 139 F. Supp. 2d 1300, 1308 (M.D. Ala. 2001)
("[N]othing in the amendment's language, legislative history, or surrounding legislative context
manifests a specific congressional intent.., to provide a federal defense to a state cause of action...
[or] to grant a defendant the ability to remove the adjudication of the cause of action to a federal
court .... (quoting BLAB T.V. ofMobile, Inc. v. Comcast Cable Commc'ns, Inc., 182 F.3d 851, 857
(11th Cir. 1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 1309 ("[The Carmack] jurisdictional
provisions ... do not just fail to echo [section] 301 of the LIRA, they seem almost diametrically
opposed to the jurisdictional language of the latter .... ); see also Ben & Jerry's Homemade, 58 F.
Supp. 2d at 318 (finding no complete preemption because "Congress has not clearly manifested an
intent to make any action involving carrier liability removable to federal court"); Circle Redmont, Inc.
v. Mercer Transp. Co., 78 F. Supp. 2d 1316, 1319 (M.D. Fla. 1999) (holding that "the Carmack
Amendment's language and history do not manifest an intent to make state law claims removable as
Carmack claims" and finding no complete preemption); Simmer v. N.A. Van Lines, Inc., No. CIVA.
98-T-665-N, 1998 WL 1754006, at *3 (M.D. Ala., July 31, 1998) (noting that federal courts lack even
original jurisdiction over all Carmack claims, and the lack of such jurisdiction "undermines greatly" a
finding of complete preemption).
2008]
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Amendment has almost no legislative history,21' which is fairly accurate, legislative
history exists for other enactments of Congress that specifically limit federal court
jurisdiction over Carmack Amendment claims. These provisions, as well as their
legislative history, show a desire to limit removal of and federal jurisdiction over
Carmack cases.
For example, 28 U.S.C. § 1445(b) prohibits removal of Carmack Amendment
claims "unless the matter in controversy exceeds $10,000, exclusive of interest and
costs.,,2 12 The predecessor of this provision was enacted in 1914 as a result of small
Carmack claims being removed to federal court.213 At the time the Carmack
Amendment was adopted in 1906, a jurisdictional amount existed for federal
questionjurisdiction.2 14 Congress subsequently amended thejudicial code to except
cases "arising under any law regulating commerce" from thej urisdictional amount
requirement. 15 In 1913, the Supreme Court in Croninger interpreted the Carmack
Amendment as an "act[] of Congress regulating interstate commerce, '216 which
brought about removal of Carmack claims regardless of the amount in
211controversy.
Congress reacted in 1914 by passing what became 28 U.S.C. § 1445(b), which
prohibited removal of Carmack claims not reaching ajurisdictional amount.2 8 The
legislative history reveals that Congress approved of Carmack claims being "tried
in the State where [the case] is brought, and tried to a final conclusion" in state
211. See, e.g., Hoskins v. Bekins Van Lines, 343 F.3d 769, 776 (5th Cir. 2003) ("The Carmack
Amendment was adopted without discussion or debate." (quoting Rini v. United Van Lines, Inc., 104
F.3d 502, 504 (lst Cir. 1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Gordon v. United Van Lines, Inc.,
130 F.3d 282, 286 (7th Cir. 1997) ("There is virtually no legislative history for the statute ...."); Bear
MGC Cutlery Co. v. Estes Express Lines, Inc., 132 F. Supp. 2d 937, 946 (N.D. Ala. 2001) ("[T]here
is a dearth of legislative history surrounding the Carmack Amendment . .
212. 28 U.S.C. § 1445(b) (2000). Section 1445(b) states in full that
[a] civil action in any State court against a carrier or its receivers or trustees to
recover damages for delay, loss, or injury of shipments, arising under [§] 11706
or [§] 14706 of [T]itle 49, may not be removed to any district court of the United
States unless the matter in controversy exceeds $10,000, exclusive of interest and
costs.
Id.
213. See Act of Jan. 20, 1914, ch. 11,38 Stat. 278 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1445(b));
51 CONG. REC. 1544, 1545 (1914) (statement of Rep. Towner) ("All that is attempted to accomplish by
these bills is to place the law in the condition it was intended and supposed to be-to prevent the right
of transfer unless the amount in controversy exceeds $3,000 in all such cases.").
214. See Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, 24 Stat. 552 (setting the jurisdictional amount at $2,000).
215. See Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 24, 36 Stat. 1087, 1091 92.
216. Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491, 500 (1913).
217. See, e.g., McGoon v. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 204 F. 998, 1005 (D.N.D. 1913) ("The conclusion
seems to me irresistible that the present suits arise under section 20 ofthe Interstate Commerce Act, and
are, therefore, suits of which the federal courts would have had original jurisdiction, and were for the
same reason properly removed under section 28 of the Judicial Code.").
218. See Act of Jan. 20, 1914, 38 Stat. at 278 (setting the jurisdictional amount at $3,000). The
jurisdictional amount was initially set at $3,000 and later increased to $10,000 as jurisdictional amounts
for diversity and federal questionj urisdiction were increased. See Act of Oct. 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
486, § 9(b), 92 Stat. 1629, 1634 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1445(b) (2000)).
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court-even where the defendant wanted a federal forum and the complaint
expressly relied on the Carmack Amendment.2 9
Congress provided several reasons for keeping smaller Carmack Amendment
cases in state court, including avoiding a large docket shift from state to federal
court and sparing the federal judiciary from the heavy caseload it would
acquire and had already started to acquire by the potential removal of all
Carmack cases to federal court.220 Further, the legislative history demonstrates
repeatedly that Congress never intended to bring about the removal of these smaller
Carmack cases but intended the contemporary jurisdictional amount to keep such
claims in state court.
221
This legislative history is insightful because, under the then-existing judicial
code, all claims under the Carmack Amendment would have been and in fact
briefly were-removable to federal court."' But Congress did not want all Carmack
Amendment claims removable to federal court.223 Rather, Congress adopted a
jurisdictional amount specific to the Carmack Amendment to keep a sizable number
of Carmack claims in state court and out of federal court.224 While Congress did not
address complete preemption-a doctrine that had not yet been
formulated Congress's strong assertion rings out: it did not want all Carmack
Amendment claims removable to federal court but was perfectly happy to have state
courts adjudicate and thus determine the substantive preemption of a large
portion of claims arising under the Carmack Amendment.225
Another interesting point revealed by the legislative history is that Congress did
not seem at the time to have any issue with the broad substantive preemption
219. 51 CONG. REC. 1547 (1914) (statement of Rep. Borland); see also 51 CONG. REC. 1327
(1913) (statement of Sen. Shields) ("The object ofthis amendment is to prevent removals ofthese cases
from the State courts where the amount involved is under $3,000[; rather, such cases] shall remain in
the State courts, to be there finally determined.").
220. See H.R. REP. No. 63-120, at 3 (1913) ("[H]undreds of cases, many of them involving small
amounts, have been removed."); id. (noting that a railroad lawyer stated that more than 250 cases have
been removed in the state of Iowa alone); see also 51 CONG. REC. 1547 (1914) (statement of Rep.
Borland) ("[I]t is utterly impossible for the Federal courts, with the business they have, to try these little
damage cases. These cases for damages in shipment have been accumulating rapidly in the Southwest
and West .... "); id. (statement of Rep. Garner) ("[T]he Federal judges throughout the country are
asking that this legislation be passed in order to relieve them of the litigation [that is removed to
them.]"); id. (statement of Rep. Garner) ("Federal judges ... have ... stated that the law as it now
stands was cluttering up their dockets .... ); 51 CONG. REC. 1544, 1545 (1914) (statement of Rep.
Towner) ("Since [McGoon and Croninger,] hundreds of cases have been transferred where the amount
in controversy was less than $3,000.").
221. See, e.g., 51 CONG. REC. 1544, 1545 (1914) (statement of Rep. Towner) ("I think I am
justified in saying that there was no intention or expectation of thus changing the law. No one thought
at the time of its enactment that such an interpretation would be placed upon it. But nevertheless the
condition exists and ought to be remedied."); see also H.R. REP. No. 63-120, at 2 ("It is not likely the
effect was intended which a literal application of this latest utterance of the legislative power gives.").
222. See Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 24, 36 Stat. 1087, 1091-92 (providing the district courts
with original jurisdiction for "all suits and proceedings arising under any law regulating commerce").
223. See supra notes 218-21 and accompanying text.
224. See Act of Jan. 20, 1914, ch. 11, 38 Stat. 278.
225. See supra notes 218-21 and accompanying text.
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announced by the Supreme Court in Croninger.226 Congress referred to this
construction in passing and seemed content with this aspect 2 7 of the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the statute. 22" Nevertheless, the legislative history reveals
that post-Croninger, Congress concerned itself with and saw an urgent need to
"remedy"-thejurisdictional consequences of the Croninger decision resulting in
all Carmack Amendment claims being removable to federal court.2 9 Again, this
demonstrates that Congress can intend (or at least recognize) a very broad
preemptive purpose eliminating nearly all state causes of action and replacing them
with a federal cause of action, and yet at the same time Congress may determine
that it does not want such cases to be removable to federal court and that it trusts
the state courts to handle the preemption determination.
The question of jurisdiction over Carmack claims arose again in 1977, when
Congress passed what is now 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (2000)."' While § 1445(b) prohibits
removal jurisdiction over Carmack claims for less than $10,000,231 § 1337 prohibits
original jurisdiction over Carmack claims unless the amount in controversy is over
$10,000.232 Notably, Congress enacted § 1337 with ajurisdictional amount stricter
than other amount restrictions. 233 Section 1337 prohibits aggregation of claims
against a carrier even by the same plaintiff against the same defendant; rather, the
amount for each bill of lading has to encompass $10,000 or more.234 The legislative
history shows that § 1337 was enacted in response to original federal filings of
small Carmack claims, resulting in an inundation of a particular federal district with
Carmack claims,235 which Congress feared could happen "in almost any
226. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 63-120, at 2 3 (noting that the Croninger interpretation of the
Carmack Amendment "abrogates all State and common law liabilities on interstate shipments of
property," and expressing concern with the jurisdictional consequences of Croninger but indicating no
concern with the Supreme Court's interpretation of the breadth ofCarmackpreemption); 51 CONG. REC.
1544, 1545 (1914) (statement ofRep. Towner) (explaining the Croninger interpretation of the Carmack
Amendment but emphasizing only that it resulted in cases being construed as arising "under the law
regulating commerce," which in turn made Carmack claims removable).
227. Congress demonstrated its disapproval of another aspect of the Croninger interpretation by
passing the Cummins Act the following year to overturn the Supreme Court's ruling regarding a
carrier's ability to limit its liability. See Cummins Act of 1915, chap. 176, § 1, 38 Star, 1196, 1197.
228. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
229. See, e.g., 51 CONG. REC. 1544, 1545 (1914) (statement of Rep. Towner) ("I think I am
justified in saying that there was no intention or expectation of thus changing the law. No one thought
at the time of its enactment that such an interpretation would be placed upon it. But nevertheless the
condition exists and ought to be remedied."); H.R. REP. No. 63-120, at 4 (determining that automatic
removal of Carmack claims to federal court created hardship on both plaintiffs and carriers, which
created an urgent need for a jurisdictional amount limitation).
230. See Act of Oct. 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, § 9(a), 92 Stat. 1629, 1633-34.
231. 28 U.S.C. § 1445(b) (2000).
232. Id. § 1337(a).
233. See id. ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction . . . only if the matter in
controversyfor each receipt or bill of lading exceeds $10,000 .... " (emphasis added)).
234. See id
235. By 1977 the District of Massachusetts had "the highest perjudgeship pending civil caseload
among the 94 district courts, 1,737 [as] compared to 278, for the 93 other district courts," because of
original Carmack claims filed in federal court. See S. REP. No. 95-117, at 50 (1977), as reprinted in
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metropolitan area., 23 6 Further, testimony in congressional hearings indicated that
federal judicial expertise was not needed for these claims.23
As demonstrated by the express provisions of §§ 1337 and 1445 and their
legislative histories, Congress has shown no desire to move Carmack Amendment
cases from state to federal court or to take the preemption question away from state
courts.238 Indeed, Congress has expressly denied federal courts both original and
removal jurisdiction over a substantial number of Carmack claims, leaving such
claims within the exclusive jurisdiction of state courts.
2 3 9
It could be argued that these provisions and their legislative histories merely
show that Congress is content with allowing state courts to adjudicate Carmack
claims actually asserted as such by plaintiffs, yet Congress is not comfortable with
allowing state courts to adjudicate Carmack preemption defenses to state law
claims. Nevertheless, there certainly have been no congressional manifestations that
a Carmack preemption defense should be removable as required by Taylor240 even
assuming that §§ 1337 and 1445 fail to indicate a contrary manifestation. Further,
the major cases regarding Carmack substantive preemption typically include
actually-asserted Carmack claims as well as state law claims, because plaintiffs with
a valid Carmack claim usually assert multiple federal and state claims.24'
Particularly where a plaintiff is attempting to recover mental, emotional, or punitive
damages, which are not recoverable under the Carmack Amendment, the plaintiff
is likely to assert state law claims that would allow such damages in addition to an
express Carmack claim.242 Thus, limits on removal and original jurisdiction as to
expressly-asserted Carmack claims also leave to state courts the adjudication of
federal preemption defenses to the state claims that are joined with a federal
Carmack claim. Indeed, such a scenario may be more likely with small Carmack
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3569, 3613. Indeed, "Carmack [A]mendment cases represented 64 percent of the
pending cases in Massachusetts." Id.
236. Limitation of Federal Jurisdiction ofFreightDamage Claims: Hearing on S. 346 Before the
S. Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 1
(1975) [hereinafter 1975 Hearing] (introductory statement of Sen. Burdick).
237. See id. at 33 (testimony of C.J. Andrew A. Caffrey). Chief Judge Caffrey of the United States
District Court for the District of Massachusetts stated, "These cases do not involve sophisticated or
difficult legal ruling by any judge of our court [and] do not need Federal judge expertise." Id. Judge
Caffrey further contended that "these cases are perfectly adequate for State courts and they are in State
courts in all the other 49 States, which puts to rest any question that this type [of] litigation cannot be
handled by State courts." Id.
238. See supra text accompanying notes 218-29.
239. In the legislative histories for §§ 1337 and 1445, Congress noted the large number of cases
adjudicated in federal court that would be restricted to state courts after the amendments. See supra
notes 220, 235 and accompanying text.
240. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 66 (1987).
241. See, e.g., Gordon v. United Van Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 282, 285 (7th Cir. 1997) (listing the
plaintiffs claims, which included claims arising under the Carmack Amendment as well as multiple
state law claims); Rini v. United Van Lines, Inc., 104 F.3d 502, 503 (1st Cir. 1997) (same); Hunter v.
United Van Lines, 746 F.2d 635, 638 (9th Cir. 1984) (same).
242. See, e.g., Gordon, 130 F.3d at 285 (alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress in
addition to claims under the Carmack Amendment); Rini, 104 F.3d at 503 (same).
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claims because plaintiffs will want to increase damages by asserting other state law
claims that might provide a greater recovery, and defendants will not be able to
remove because of the jurisdictional amount for the federal Carmack claim. 43 For
small Carmack claims, the state courts are thus left with exclusive jurisdiction in
making the substantive preemption determination, and for all others, the state court
is provided with express concurrent jurisdiction to make such a determination.
Additionally, the jurisdictional provisions of both the LMRA and ERISA
expressly exempted the statutes from the then-existing federal question
jurisdictional amount that otherwise would have applied.244 In Taylor, the
similarities of these jurisdictional provisions both of which provide federal
jurisdiction "without respect to the amount in controversy or the citizenship of the
parties '24 5  led the Court to find clear congressional intent of removability. 246 In
stark contrast, the jurisdictional provisions surrounding the Carmack Amendment
contain an amount in controversy requirement where none would otherwise exist.
24 7
Further, Congress retained the specific jurisdictional amount limitations over
Carmack Amendment claims even after eliminating the jurisdictional amount
requirement for general federal question jurisdiction.248 Under a Taylor analysis,
then, there is no congressional intent clear or otherwise of removability of
Carmack preemption defenses; instead, there is the opposite.24 9
Moreover, the fact that Congress exempted the LMRA and ERISA from the
then-existing amount in controversy restrictions on federal question jurisdiction
may indeed indicate a specific desire as to those statutes to avoid state court
hostility, to promote uniformity, orto employ the federal law expertise of a federal
judiciary. However, when Congress imposes extra restrictions on federal court
243. See, e.g., Hunter, 746 F.2d at 648-52 (finding no removal jurisdiction where plaintiffs
brought alow-dollar Carmack claim and high-dollar state law claims for fraud, bad faith, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress, because the state claims could not be aggregated with the Carmack
claim, and remanding the preemption defense of the high-dollar state claims by the low-dollar Carmack
claim for adjudication in state court).
244. See 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2000); 29 U.S.C. § 1132(t) (2000). When the LMRA and ERISA
were enacted, a jurisdictional amount existed for general federal question jurisdiction, which was later
eliminated. See inira note 247.
245. Taylor, 481 U.S. at 65 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1132(f)).
246. See id. at 65 66.
247. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (2000) (limiting federal question jurisdiction in Carmack cases
to only those cases where "the matter in controversy for each receipt or bill oflading exceeds $10,000"),
and 28 U.S.C. § 1445(b) (2000) (forbidding removal of Carmack claims "unless the matter in
controversy exceeds $10,000"), with 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2000) (exempting claims brought under the
LM RA from any jurisdictional amount requirement), and29 U.S.C. § 1132(f) (2000) (exempting claims
brought under ERISA from any jurisdictional amount requirement).
248. In 1980, Congress amended § 1331 to eliminate the jurisdictional amount for federal question
jurisdiction. Federal Question Jurisdictional Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486, sec. 2,
§ 1331, 94 Star. 2369 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1331) (striking the jurisdictional amount for
general federal question jurisdiction). However, Congress chose not to change § 1337 or § 1445,
retaining ajurisdictional amount on original and removal jurisdiction over Carmack Amendment claims.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1337(a); 28 U.S.C. § 1445(b).
249. See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
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jurisdiction for a specific federal statute-as it imposed for Carmack
claims resulting in exclusive state courtj urisdiction for many claims arising under
that statute, it is difficult to conceive that Congress is seriously concerned with
problems of judicial uniformity or state court hostility and error, or that it
recognizes a need for federal-court expertise for that statute. Thus, tying complete
preemption to congressional intent of removability may have the added benefit of
supplying the uniform, sympathetic, and expert adjudication offered by the federal
judiciary when it is most needed, and correspondingly, as with Carmack claims,
denying or limiting access to that resource when Congress determines that it is not
needed.
b. Complete Preemption by the Carmack Amendment Under
Anderson
After Anderson, both the Fifth and Ninth Circuits have overturned their prior
decisions and found complete preemption for state law claims preempted by the
Carmack Amendment. In Hoskins v. Bekins Van Lines,25 ° the Fifth Circuit held that
Anderson "overruled the analysis used in Beers to reject the complete pre-emptive
effect of the Carmack Amendment." '' The Hoskins court held the dispositive
inquiry to be "whether Congress intended the Carmack Amendment to provide the
exclusive cause of action for claims arising out of the interstate transportation of
goods by a common carrier." '252 Failing entirely to analyze the language of the
statute itself(and stating that there was no legislative history 253), the court examined
early-twentieth century decisions ofthe Supreme Court, including Croninger,2"4 and
cases from the Fifth Circuit25 that discussed the broad preemptive scope of the
Carmack Amendment. The court then concluded that "Congress intended for the
Carmack [A]mendment to provide the exclusive cause of action for loss or damages
to goods"; therefore, "the complete preemption doctrine applies."2 6
Interestingly, the Hoskins court recognized that § 1445 prohibited the removal
of Carmack claims unless a jurisdictional amount was reached and that 49 U.S.C.
§ 14706(d)(3) expressly provided for concurrent jurisdiction for larger Carmack
250. 343 F.3d 769 (5th Cir. 2003).
251. Id. at 775.
252. Id. at 776.
253. See id. ("[T]he Carmack Amendment was adopted without discussion or debate." (quoting
Rini v. United Van Lines, 104 F.3d 502, 504 (1 st Cir. 1997)) (alteration in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
254. See id. at 776-77 (discussing Supreme Court cases decided between 1913 and 1953). The
Supreme Court decided all ofthe Carmack cases relied on by the Hoskins court well before Avco created
the complete preemption doctrine in 1968. See Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, Int'l Ass'n of
Machinists, 390 U.S. 557, 560 (1968).
255. See Hoskins, 343 F.3d at 777 (citing Morris v. Covan World Wide Moving, Inc., 144 F.3d
377, 379 (5th Cir. 2003); Moffit v. Bekins Van Lines Co., 6 F.3d 305, 307 (5th Cir. 1993); Air Prods.
& Chems., Inc. v. Ill. Cent. Gulf R.R. Co., 721 F.3d 483, 487 (5th Cir. 1983)) (discussing the Fifth
Circuit's broad construction of Carmack preemption).
256. Id. at 778 (first emphasis added).
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claims. 25 7 Yet the court viewed these congressional enactments as immaterial to the
complete preemption inquiry:
Although both of these facts may have been relevant to an
analysis of whether Congress intended for Carmack claims to be
removable, they have no bearing on the salient issue today, i.e.
whether Congress intended the Carmack Amendment to provide
the exclusive cause of action for claims for loss or damage to
goods arising from the interstate transportation of those goods by
a common carrier.25 8
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit, in Hall v. North American Van Lines, Inc.,259 held
that a plaintiffs state law claims were completely preempted by the Carmack
Amendment.260 Quoting Anderson's test for complete preemption,2 6' the Hall court
reviewed judicial precedent and concluded that it was "well settled that the
Carmack Amendment is the exclusive cause of action for interstate-shipping
contract claims alleging loss or damage to property. 262 The Hall court then
examined Hall's state law claims and concluded that her breach of contract claim
fell within Carmack complete preemption.263 Having found one completely
preempted claim, the Ninth Circuit asserted supplemental jurisdiction over the
remaining state claims and similarly held that Hall's claims for fraud and
conversion were preempted by the Carmack Amendment. 264 Further, because the
plaintiff had refused to amend her complaint after removal to federal court to
expressly add a Carmack claim (which would have been barred under a contractual
257. Id. at 778 n.7 ("A civil action under this section may be brought in a United States district
court or in a State court." (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 14706(d)(3) (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
258. Id. (emphasis added).
259. 476 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2007).
260. Id. at 689 90. Hall contracted with the defendants to ship her household goods from San
Francisco, California, to Montana for the price of $6,144, which was to be paid when the goods arrived.
Id. at 685. Hall moved to Montana, but her household goods failed to arrive. Id. She contacted the
defendants, who told her that they had put her goods into storage and would not release them until she
paid them $9,000. Id. She paid the $9,000. Id. After another fourteen months passed, defendants
demanded that Hall pay an additional $18,000. Id. Hall refused to pay the $18,000, returned to San
Francisco where her goods were being held and was able to get the defendants to release the goods for
an additional $4,612. Id. at 685 86. In total, Hall paid nearly $14,000 (although she had contracted to
pay approximately $6,000), she was without her household goods for well over a year, and the
defendants never shipped the goods to her, forcing her to return to California and move the goods
herself. Id. at 686.
261. See id. at 687 ("The Carriers argue that the Carmack Amendment is among the few statutes
that completely preempt well-pleaded state claims by provid[ing] the exclusive cause of action for the
claim asserted and also set[ting] forth procedures and remedies governing that cause of action." (citation
and footnote omitted) (quoting Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 8 (2003)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
262. Id. at 688.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 689.
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limitations period of nine months265), the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's
dismissal of the case with prejudice.
266
Taking the Anderson test at face value, where Carmack preemption is defined
broadly to preempt any state law claims arising out of a shipper-carrier relationship,
courts will inevitably find complete preemption, as did the Fifth and Ninth Circuits,
because the Carmack Amendment will always provide the exclusive cause of
action. Even for courts that do not construe Carmack preemption as broadly,
removal will still be likely and the determination of the propriety of removal will
require a full substantive preemption analysis. Indeed, courts need only find one
claim completely preempted in order to assume jurisdiction over the plaintiffs
other state law claims under supplemental jurisdiction.267
Other proposed tests for complete preemption would similarly result in removal
of Carmack preemption defenses. Obviously, if removal is allowed for any federal
preemption defense, then there would be removal of Carmack defenses.268 Scholars
recommending complete preemption whenever a federal cause of action preempts
a state cause of action essentially adopt the Anderson approach.269 Although
Anderson uses the phrase "exclusive cause of action,"27 a federal cause of action
is exclusive whenever it nullifies the alleged state law cause of action. Professor
Twitchell's detailed framework for determining preemption is preferable to the
Anderson rule because her approach delays a federal court's undertaking of a full
substantive preemption analysis until other questions indicate that preemption is
likely. 271 Nevertheless, because the Carmack Amendment provides a federal cause
of action and preemption is generally arguable, a full substantive preemption
analysis is inevitably required to determine the propriety of removal in a given
Carmack preemption case-even under Professor Twitchell's approach.272
Professor Seinfeld' s proposed test basing complete preemption on the breadth
of substantive preemption7 3-would result in a similar fate for state law claims
allegedly preempted by the Carmack Amendment. As noted above, the preemptive
265. The Carmack Amendment allows a carrier to limit its liability by requiring the plaintiff to
file a claim within nine months ofthe incident. See 49 U.S.C. § 14706(e)(1) (2000). Hall failed to make
her claim within the nine month contractual limitations period and declined to amend her complaint
even after the district court granted her leave to do so. Hall, 476 F.3d at 686. Thus, the district court
held, as an alternative basis for dismissing Hall's case, that even if Hall had asserted a claim under the
Carmack Amendment, it would be barred by the contractual limitations period. See id. at 686, 690 n.9.
266. See id. at 690 & n.9.
267. See Hall, 476 F.3d at 689.
268. See supra Part IV.
269. However, as with Anderson, this test may require a federal court to perform a substantive
preemption analysis to determine its jurisdiction. For example, under Professor Jordan's proposal,
removal would be proper only if the state law claim is preempted. See Jordan, supra note 165, at 984
(describing a proposed two-pronged analysis).
270. Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 8 (2003).
271. See supra text accompanying notes 169-74.
272. See Twitchell, supra note 169, at 864 65 (describing a three-prong analysis to determine
complete preemption); see supra text accompanying notes 169-74 (providing a detailed description of
Professor Twitchell's approach).
273. See supra notes 175-81 and accompanying text.
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scope of the Carmack Amendment has been construed to be exceptionally broad
and to "supersede[] all the regulations and policies of [the states] upon the same
subject."" 4 Even among circuits that recognize exceptions to Carmack preemption,
the exceptions are generally narrowly drawn and narrowly applied.2 75 Professor
Seinfeld would allow federal defense removal whenever "supplementary state
legislation is prohibited., 216 Thus, the Carmack Amendment would clearly fall
within the complete preemption rule advocated by Professor Seinfeld.
As exemplified by the Carmack Amendment, the complete preemption rule of
Anderson, as well as other tests proposed by scholars, results in jurisdiction at odds
with congressional allocation ofjudicial power. Congress has made no indication
that it desires to remove Carmack preemption determinations from state courts
(indeed, both statutory provisions and legislative history reveal congressional
designs to limit federal jurisdiction over Carmack cases), 277 and yet the Anderson
test produces removal jurisdiction for Carmack preemption defenses. This result is
not peculiar to the Carmack Amendment, but occurred in Anderson itself,278 and
will surely arise in other contexts. Allowing removal in such circumstances is
contrary to separation of the legislative and judicial powers and to the role of
Congress in delineating the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts.
2. Judicial Interpretation as the Basis for Determining Judicial Power
As explained in Cary v. Curtis, 279 to deny the congressional role in defining
lower federal courtjurisdiction "would be to elevate the judicial over the legislative
branch of the government, and to give to the former powers limited by its own
discretion merely. 2 ° Thus, the "jurisdiction of the federal courts is carefully
guarded against expansion by judicial interpretation.,28 ' As noted above,
"expansion [of federal jurisdiction] by judicial interpretation, 28 2 is precisely the
result of the Anderson rule as well as Professor Seinfeld's proposal to allow
removal based on the breadth of preemption. The Anderson test, as well as
Professor Seinfeld's proposal, gives the federal judiciary the ability to expand its
own jurisdiction by construing federal preemption more broadly.
274. Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491, 505 (1913).
275. See infra notes 294 97 (discussing the application of tests used to determine complete
preemption in the First, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits).
276. See Seinfeld, supra note 14, at 576 77.
277. See discussion supra Part V.A. ].a.
278. As noted, see supra text accompanying notes 92 93, soon after enacting the NBA, Congress
expressly provided for removal on the basis of a federal defense for all nationally chartered corporations
except national banks. See Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 255, § 2, 15 Stat. 226, 227. The Anderson Court,
like the court in Hoskins, stated that arguments regarding such jurisdictional enactments were
"irrelevant" to determining removal jurisdiction and allowed removal because the NBA claim was
exclusive. Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 9 n.5 (2003).
279. 44 U.S. 236 (1845).
280. Id. at 245 (emphasis added).
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Also noticeable in Anderson-and in the Carmack Amendment cases that
followed is the fact that the Court did not examine the statute or any legislative
history to determine if Congress intended to create an exclusive cause of action. 8 3
Notably, none of the recent cases finding complete preemption for the Carmack
Amendment have examined the savings clause to the statute or other statutory
provisions. 2" Rather, the determination of congressional intent has been based
entirely on judicial decisions regarding the breadth of federal Carmack
preemption.285
Of course, there is nothing illegitimate with federal courts interpreting the
scope of federal preemption in general and as applied to specific state law claims;
indeed, it is a judicial function to undertake such statutory interpretation,
286
especially where the statute's preemptive scope as enacted by Congress is
unclear. 287 The quandary is that federal courts will be looking at the scope of
substantive preemption to determine jurisdiction as opposed to determining
substantive preemption, which is problematic for several reasons. First, by looking
to the scope of substantive preemption as required by Anderson to determine
federal jurisdiction, courts will be relying on a factor that does not accurately
demonstrate congressional intent to confer or deny removalj urisdiction on the basis
of a preemption defense. Second, by looking to the scope of substantive
preemption, courts will need to rely more on judicial pronouncements and less on
statements from Congress itself. For example, courts that have applied
Taylor looking for clear congressional intent of removability generally have
examined congressional enactments regarding jurisdiction and the history thereof,
and have not needed to examine judicial pronouncements.288 Indeed, the focus on
jurisdictional enactments and congressional history under a Taylor analysis is
283. See supra text accompanying notes 109 16.
284. See supra text accompanying notes 250-67.
285. See id.
286. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.").
287. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525,541 (2001) (noting that state action
may be preempted "by implication from the depth and breadth of a congressional scheme that occupies
the legislative field,... or by implication because of a conflict with a congressional enactment"); Fid.
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982) (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218,230 (1947)) ("Absent explicit pre-emptive language, Congress' intent to supersede
state law altogether may be inferred.").
288. See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65-66 (1987) (examining the
jurisdictional provisions of ERISA and its legislative history to find clear congressional intent of
removability); Rosciszewski v. Arete Assocs., Inc., I F.3d 225, 232 (4th Cir. 1993) (examining the
provisions and legislative history of the Copyright Act and concluding that "[t]he grant of exclusive
jurisdiction to the federal district courts over civil actions arising under the Copyright Act, combined
with the preemptive force of § 301(a), compels the conclusion that Congress intended that state law
actions preempted by § 301 (a) ofthe Copyright Act arise under federal law"); Anderson v. H&R Block,
Inc., 287 F.3d 1038, 1045 46 (1 1th Cir. 2002) (examining the legislative history and jurisdictional
provisions surrounding the enactment of the NBA and finding a lack of-"clear congressional intent to
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exemplified in Taylor itself,28 9 as well as in the Fourth Circuit's Rosciszewski
decision examining the Copyright Act,290 and in the Eleventh Circuit's reversed
Anderson opinion. 29' In contrast, by determining jurisdiction by the scope of
substantive preemption and the analysis of a particular state law cause of action,
courts often will be required to rely on judicial pronouncements as to the scope of
preemption. Moreover, judicial pronouncements as to the scope of substantive
federal preemption over specific state law claims will vary from circuit to circuit,
in contrast to congressionalj urisdictional enactments and history, which remain the
same; consequently, such judicial pronouncements will broaden or narrow federal
jurisdiction depending on the federal court's construction as to the reach of federal
substantive law.
Returning to the Carmack Amendment as a case in point, there is significant
variation among the federal courts as to the scope of Carmack preemption over state
law.292 Some of the federal circuits, usually quoting and relying heavily on
Croninger, have found that the Carmack Amendment preempts all state common
law and statutory claims that relate in any way to the carrier-shipper relationship.293
Other federal courts have held that state law claims based on a separate and
independent injury.. or, alternatively, based on separate conduct295  from any
damage to, loss of, or delay of the shipped goods escape preemption by the
Carmack Amendment. Consequently, federal courts that define Carmack
substantive preemption more broadly will, underAnderson, find federal jurisdiction
under the complete preemption doctrine more often. Even assuming a uniform rule
289. See Taylor, 481 U.S. at 65 67.
290. Roscisfewski, 1 F.3d at 232-33.
291. Anderson, 287 F.3d at 1045 47.
292. See Lammv. Bekins Van Lines Co., 139 F. Supp. 2d 1300, 1312 (M.D. Ala. 2001) ("[T]here
is a wide range of opinion among the appellate and trial courts about the scope of the Carmack
Amendment's ordinary preemption of state common law-claims.").
293. See, e.g., Hall v. N. Am. Van Lines, Inc., 476 F.3d 683, 689 (9th Cir. 2007) ("It is well
settled that the Carmack Amendment constitutes a complete defense to common law claims alleging
all manner of harms."); Hoskins v. Bekins Van Lines, 343 F.3d 769, 776 8 (5th Cir. 2003) (examining
the breadth of Carmack Amendment preemption over common law claims and remedies and concluding
that the Carmack Amendment "provide[s] the exclusive cause of action for loss or damage to goods
arising from the interstate transportation of those goods by a common carrier" (emphasis omitted));
Hopper Furs, Inc. v. Emery Air Freight Corp., 749 F.2d 1261, 1264 (8th Cir. 1984) (citing Se. Express
Co. v. Pastime Amusement Co., 299 U.S. 28, 30 (1936)) ("All actions against a common carrier,
whether designated as tort or contract actions, are governed by the federal statute .... ); Duerrmeyer
v. Alamo Moving & Storage One, Corp., 49 F. Supp. 2d 934, 936-37 (W.D. Tex. 1999) (finding
substantive preemption of "state court causes of action, whether based in contract or tort, seek[ing]
damages flowingfrom the shipping contract" (emphasis added)).
294. See, e.g., Gordon v. United Van Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 282, 284 (7th Cir. 1997) ("[C]laims
involving a separate and independently actionable harm to the shipper distinct from [loss or damage to
goods] are not preempted."); Rini v. United Van Lines, Inc. 104 F.3d 502, 506 (1st Cir. 1997) (stating
that if the plaintiff had prevailed on her intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, "it would not
have been preempted").
295. See, e.g., Smith v. United Parcel Serv., 296 F.3d 1244, 1249 (1 th Cir. 2002) ("[S]eparate
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or interpretation by the Supreme Court, the broader the Court construes federal
substantive preemption in an area, the larger it will define federal courtjurisdiction
over state law claims brought in state court.
Further, the variation among the federal courts as to the scope of Carmack
preemption will lead to a variation in whether federal jurisdiction will exist over the
same claims. In certain circuits (such as the Fifth or Ninth), state law claims for
fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress will be completely preempted
by the Carmack Amendment and will be removable to federal court even if the
shipper alleges no loss or damage to property.296 In other circuits (such as the First,
Seventh, or Eleventh), the law will be unclear and will require a case-specific
substantive preemption analysis by the federal court to determine whether the
alleged claim is preempted by the Carmack Amendment and thus within federal
removal jurisdiction.297 Notably, the varying results among these circuits will not
correlate to a legitimate difference between the scope of the state law claims being
preempted. The same state laws, aimed at the same conduct and policies, would be
preempted in the Fifth Circuit while perhaps escaping preemption in the Eleventh
Circuit. 298 Thus, there would be federal jurisdiction in the Fifth Circuit but not in
the Eleventh. In theory, the Supreme Court could eventually resolve jurisdictional
variations. But such a resolution would have to be done on a federal-statute-by-
federal-statute (as in, is there complete preemption by the Carmack Amendment as
opposed to other federal statutes?), state-claim-by-state-claim (assuming there is
complete preemption under the Carmack Amendment, does it apply to preempt
these specific state law claims?), case-by-case (under the facts of this case, is there
296. See discussion supra Part V.A. Lb.
297. For example, in Rini, 104 F.3d 502, a case dealing solely with substantive Carmack
preemption, the First Circuit held that state law claims are preempted when they "impose liability on
carriers based on the loss or damage of shipped goods" but are not preempted if increased liability is
based on "an injury separate and apart from the loss or damage of goods." Id. at 506. The Seventh
Circuit has adopted a similar test. See, e.g., Gordon, 130 F.3d at 284 ("[C]laims involving a separate
and independently actionable harm to the shipper distinct from such damage are not preempted [by the
Carmack Amendment]."). While sounding straightforward, the application ofthese tests requires a fact-
specific inquiry into the harms alleged and the recovery sought. Indeed, in Rini itself, it would appear
that the plaintiff s claims for misrepresentation and deceptive trade practices, which the district court
and ajury had found valid, would certainly entail injuries "separate and apart from the loss or damage
of goods." 104 F.3d at 506. Yet the First Circuit held that "the state law claims at issue all stem from
the loss of goods": "involve no injury save the loss of property": and were thus preempted by the
Carmack Amendment which lowered the plaintiffs damages from $350,000 to $50,000. Id. (emphasis
added).
The Eleventh Circuit's test for substantive preemption under the Carmack Amendment is distinct
from that employed by the First and Seventh Circuits. In Smith, 296 F.3d 1244, the Eleventh Circuit
held that state law claims may avoid Carmack preemption only if the claim is "based on conduct
separate and distinct from the delivery, loss of, or damage to goods .... In other words, separate and
distinct conduct rather than injury must exist for a claim to fall outside the preemptive scope of the
Carmack Amendment." Id. at 1249 (emphasis added). Again, under this test, a fact-intensive inquiry
into the alleged conduct is required.
298. Such a result is distinct from the one discussed below where courts of two different states
define facially similar state laws differently, and one state determines there is preemption by a federal
law while another does not. See discussion infra Part V.B. 1.
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Carmack preemption?) basis-and that is hardly a desirable method for determining
federal court jurisdiction.
Reliance on congressional intent of removability avoids these problems. A
federal court can determine its own jurisdiction by looking to statements of
Congress, in the statute itself, or in reliable legislative history. Consequently, a
federal court's jurisdiction is not based on the court's own interpretation of the
breadth of federal preemption but is based on whether Congress deems the state
courts inadequate to deal with preemption determinations or sees a special need for
the independence and expertise of the federal judiciary.
3. Superiority of Congress to Make Jurisdictional Allocations
The generally recognized purposes of federal court jurisdiction over questions
of federal law are to promote uniformity of federal law, to secure decisions
sympathetic to federal law and not subject to state court hostility, and to utilize the
expertise of the federal judiciary in areas of federal law.29  Notably, Congress may
determine that the purposes of federal jurisdiction are particularly important for
certain legislation and less important perhaps not requisite for others.
In fact, Congress has determined that certain federal defenses should give rise
to removal jurisdiction. For the Price-Anderson Act and the Securities Litigation
Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA), Congress has expressly allowed removal on the
basis of a federal defense."' Further, through legislative history and adoption of
jurisdictional language parallel to the LMRA, Congress has similarly provided for
removal of claims preempted by section 502(a) ofERSA.3 °' These are all examples
where Congress has determined that the defendant should be able to adjudicate his
federal defenses in federal court. For other federal statutes, Congress has provided
exclusive federal jurisdiction,3"2 and for the majority of statutes, it provides
299. See, e.g., Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 514 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that the
grant of federal question jurisdiction "was designed to preserve and enhance the expertise of federal
courts in applying federal law; to achieve greater uniformity of results" and provide a forum "likely to
apply federal law sympathetically" (citing Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347-48
(1816))).
300. Under the Price-Anderson Act, "any public liability action," 42 U.S.C. § 221 0(n)(2) (2000),
(which, in turn is defined as "any suit," id. § 2014(hh), asserting "any legal liability [based on state or
federal law] arising out of or resulting from a nuclear incident or precautionary evacuation," id.
§ 2014(w)), filed in state court, "[u]pon motion of the defendant.... shall be removed or transferred
to the United States district court," id. § 2210(n)(2); see also id. § 2014(hh) ("A public liability action
shall be deemed to be an action arising under [§] 2210 of this title .... ").
SLUSA likewise provides as follows: "Any covered class action brought in any State court
involving a covered security... shall be removable to the Federal district court for the district in which
the action is pending." 15 U.S.C. § 77p(c) (2000). As explained by the Supreme Court, SLUSA does
not involve typical preemption because it "does not itself displace state law with federal law but makes
some state-law claims nonactionable through the class action device in federal as well as state court."
Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 126 S. Ct. 2145, 2150 n. 1 (2006).
301. See discussion supra Part Ill.A.2.
302. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2000) (providing federal jurisdiction that is "exclusive of the
courts of the states in patent, plant variety protection and copyright cases").
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concurrent jurisdiction without defensive removal. 303 Apparently, Congress does
not see the need for federal adjudication as being equal for all federal statutes or
preemption defenses.
While not dealing with complete preemption, Mitchum v. Foster0 4 provides an
example of a situation where Congress intended to vest the federal courts with
power to take jurisdiction from the state courts. 3 0 5 In Mitchum, the Supreme Court
held that the Anti-Injunction Act did not prohibit a federal court from enjoining a
state court proceeding under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.3o6 The Court examined the language
and legislative history of § 1983 and determined that Congress intended § 1983 "to
enforce ... the Fourteenth Amendment" against executive, legislative, or judicial
state action.0 7 Indeed, the legislative history revealed that "state courts were being
used to harass and inj ure individuals, either because the state courts were powerless
to stop deprivations or were in league with those who were bent upon abrogation
of federally protected rights' ,30 8 and that Congress "was concerned that state
instrumentalities [including courts] could not protect those rights."3 °9
In circumstances such as those involved in Mitchum, where state courts have
demonstrated hostility to enforcing federally protected rights, Congress can
appropriately determine any heightened need for federal adjudication. Importantly,
unlike Congress, the judiciary has no ability to hold hearings or make
determinations as to whether there is a problem with state court adjudication of
particular federal laws on a national level. Courts are limited to the facts before
them, which may or may not reflect an overall problem with state court adjudication
of a particular area of federal law. Indeed, as to the Carmack Amendment, the
congressional hearings and legislative history indicate that there has not been a
problem with state court adjudication of federal law, that state courts are competent
to determine the cases, and that limited-rather than expanded federalj urisdiction
over such cases is requisite. 10
Nevertheless, a major justification for expanding complete preemption is the
fear that state courts will prefer state law over federal law or will err in making a
preemption determination. 31 But complete preemption under Anderson provides a
303. See, e.g., Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 821 (1990) (concluding that
"Congress did not divest the state courts of their concurrent authority to adjudicate federal claims"
under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); see also Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S.
473, 478 (1981) ("In considering the propriety of state-court jurisdiction over any particular federal
claim, the Court begins with the presumption that state courts enjoy concurrent jurisdiction.").
304. 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
305. See id. at 240-43.
306. See id
307. Id. at 240 (citing Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1879)).
308. Id. at 240.
309. Id. at 242.
310. See discussion supra Part V.A.l.a.
311. See Twitchell, supra note 169, at 819 ("The concern is that if states make the preemption
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bankrupt method for allocating cases between state and federal court.3 1 2 It results
in the removal of cases to federal court, such as Carmack Amendment cases, when
Congress has indicated there is a lesser need for employing the federal judicial
resource. The litmus test under Anderson is whether Congress created a federal
cause of action that excludes state law claims.3 13 But, as Professor Seinfeld asserts,
the reasons that may motivate Congress to create a private cause of action do not
equate with a desire to divest state courts of jurisdiction to determine federal
preemption." 4
Indeed, there may be situations where Congress deems federal court
adjudication over preemption defenses to be desirable even absent the creation of
a federal cause of action.3 15 Under an approach relying on Congress to determine
appropriate federal preemption defense removal, the question of whether complete
preemption should apply in situations where no replacement federal cause of action
is provided does not need to be resolved. Congress could provide as it did with
ERISA-that all claims preempted by a specific section affording a federal cause
312. Professor Seinfeld explained as follows:
[T]he Court has made no effort to anchor the doctrine of complete preemption in
some broader vision of judicial federalism. The cases say next to nothing about
the federal courts' relative expertise in the application of national law, the interest
in securing a uniform interpretation of such law, or the need to sidestep state
courts due to fear that localist bias might affect their decision making.
Seinfeld, supra note 14, at 554; see also id. at 570 n.107 (examining Justice Scalia's dissent in
Anderson).
313. See Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 8 (2003).
314. See Seinfeld, supra note 14, at 556-66. Professor Seinfeld explains thoroughly why the
provision of a preemptive federal cause of action might be indicative of a desire to create federal
jurisdiction. See id Namely, by requiring the plaintiff to bring a claim under federal law and excluding
state law, federal jurisdiction can be invoked either by the plaintiff originally or by the defendant
through removal. See id at 557. Nevertheless, Professor Seinfeld recognizes that such reasoning is
problematic both because there are situations where Congress has provided an exclusive federal cause
of action-such as the NBA and, as shown above, the Carmack Amendment-while lacking "a strong
desire to channel cases into the federal courts," see id. at 558 59, and because the provision of a cause
of action may be driven by determinations about whether public or private enforcement will be more
effective regardless of jurisdiction, see id. at 559.
See also Morrison, supra note 190, at 189 (explaining that "[a] variety of considerations may go
into Congress's decision whether to" create a cause of action and thus rely (in whole or in part) on
private enforcement, "but there is no reason to conclude that the choice of private enforcement
invariably reflects a heightened concern for the polices underlying federal jurisdiction," particularly
because the Court has suggested "that public enforcement may be [used] for effectuating the federal
government's most important policy aims").
315. Additionally, for proponents of a complete preemption rule based on a replacement federal
cause of action, such as the Anderson rule, the primary justification of state court hostility or error does
not comport with the scope of their proposed rule. As Justice Scalia contended, the rule is irrational
"because there is no more reason to fear state-court error with respect to federal pre-emption
accompanied by creation of a federal cause of action than there is with respect to federal pre-emption
unaccompanied by creation of a federal cause of action." Anderson, 539 U.S. at 20 21 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Similarly, complete preemption applies only to federal preemption defenses and does not
allow for removal based on other, arguably more important, federal defenses such as constitutional
defenses-leaving those in the hands of state courts.
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of action are subject to removal. 16 With such language, complete preemption would
require that the state claim falls within the specific replacement federal cause of
action, as is required for ERISA-claims preempted by ERISA but not falling
within Section 502(a)(1)(B) are not subject to removal to federal court.3 7 Similarly,
if Congress wants all preemption defenses arising under a certain statute to effect
removal to federal court, regardless of whether a federal cause of action is provided,
Congress could so direct. For example, SLUSA expressly allows for removal of
state class actions falling within its scope,3 but does not provide a federal remedy
to replace it; rather, it provides an absolute bar on certain state securities class
actions." 9 Thus, SLUSA represents an area where Congress wanted to eliminate
certain state law remedies involving nationally traded securities without providing
a replacement remedy. Congress enacted SLUSA in order to effectuate its prior
legislation in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), which placed
limits on federal securities class actions because of "perceived abuses of the class-
action vehicle in litigation involving nationally traded securities.""32 Yet after the
PSLRA was enacted, plaintiffs avoided its limitations by "bringing class actions
under state law, often in state court."32' SLUSA was thus enacted by Congress to
316. The jurisdictional provision and legislative history demonstrate that Congress wanted to
allow removal solely for claims falling within section 502(a)(1 )(B) of ERISA. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a),
(e), (f) (2000). Congress explained in the legislative history regarding Section 502(a)(1)(B) that "suits
to enforce benefit rights under the plan or to recover benefits under the plan," whether brought under
state or federal law, "are to be regarded as arising under the laws of the United States in similar fashion
to those brought under [s]ection 301 of the [LMRA]." Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58,
65 66 (1987) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 93-1280, at 327 (1974) (Conf Rep.)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). However, ERISA substantively preempts more than just "suits to enforce benefit rights;"
indeed, ERISA preempts "any and all State laws [that] relate to any employee benefit plan." See 29
U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000). Thus, not all suits relatedto an ERISA plan and falling within ERISA's broad
preemptive scope qualify for removal under the complete preemption doctrine. Instead, only state law
claims to enforce benefit rights, to recover benefits, or to clarify rights to future benefits fall within the
scope of Section 502(a)(1)(B) and thus qualify for removal. See id. §1132(a)(1)(B).
317. See supra note 316 and accompanying text; see also Taylor, 481 U.S. at 64 (explaining that
"ERISA pre-emption, without more, does not convert a state claim into an action arising under federal
law" and holding that complete preemption existed when a state action was "not only pre-empted by
ERISA, but also came 'within the scope of [section] 502(a) of ERISA' (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v.
Const. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 24 (1983))).
318. See 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(t)(2) (2000) ("Any covered class action brought in any State court
involving a covered security ... shall be removable to the Federal district court .... "). See infra note
319 for definitions of covered class actions and covered securities.
319. See 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(1) ("No covered class action based upon the statutory or common
law of any State ... may be maintained in any State or Federal court by any private party alleging.., a
misrepresentation or omission of a material fact in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered
security .... ); see also Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 126 S. Ct. 2145, 2151 (2006) ("A covered class
action is a lawsuit in which damages are sought on behalf of more than 50 people. A covered security
is one traded nationally and listed on a regulated national exchange." (internal quotation marks and
footnote omitted) (quoting Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 83
(2006))).
320. Kircher, 126 S. Ct. at 2150 (quoting Dabit, 547 U.S. at 81) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
321. Id. (quoting Dabit, 547 U.S. at 82) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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"block this bypass" of the PSLRA.322 SLUSA thus exemplifies an area where
Congress saw a special need for federal court jurisdiction (and thus expressly
allowed for defensive removal), because the point of SLUSA was to keep litigants
from avoiding the limitations under the PSLRA through state court adjudication.
If, as feared, state courts really are finding preemption under the current
jurisdictional regime less often than intended by Congress, Congress is not
powerless to ameliorate the problem. First, if Congress thought the problem existed
across the board for federal preemption, it could statutorily repeal the well-pleaded
complaint rule altogether or for federal preemption defenses-a step that Congress
considered in 1902, 1905, 1907, 1948, and 1971, but did not take. 23 Second,
Congress could make it clear in a particular statute or regulatory scheme (or
amendments thereto) that it desires to allow removal when a party raises a
preemption defense on the grounds of that particular statute, as Congress has done
in the Price-Anderson Act and SLUSA. Third, as it did with ERISA, Congress
could evidence through statutory jurisdictional language and express legislative
history that it desires to allow removal on the basis of a federal defense under the
statute. All of these alternatives would leave the allocation of power between the
state and federal courts in the hands of Congress.
In 1971, the ALI proposed legislation that generally allowed removal on the
basis of a federal defense. 24 An examination of the ALI proposal denotes why it is
better to eliminate or make exceptions to the well-pleaded complaint rule on the
basis of legislation or other clear indications from Congress. With legislation,
Congress can determine the extent to which it abrogates the well-pleaded complaint
rule both generally and for specific statutory schemes. For example, the ALI
proposal generally allowed for removal on the basis of a federal defense, yet added
limitations, including ajurisdictional amount and a requirement that the defense be
dispositive of the action.125 The ALI also retained the well-pleaded pleading rule
prohibiting jurisdiction based on anticipated claims or defenses. 26 Further, the
proposed legislation enumerated specific federal defenses where removal would not
be allowed based on previously expressed "congressional policy" to limit removal
or keep certain cases out of federal court.32 7 Indeed, one of those enumerated
exceptions was for defenses raised by the Carmack Amendment which the
proposal rendered unremovable regardless of the amount in controversy. 28 Thus,
322. Id.
323. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
324. See ALl STUDY, supra note 58, § 1312(a), at 25-26; see also S. 1876, 92d Cong. § 1312(a)
(1971) (incorporating the ALI proposal). The proposed legislation was the result of an eight-year study
by the ALl. See ALl Study, supra note 58, at 1.
325. See S. 1876 § 1312(a); ALI STUDY supra note 58, § 1312(a), at 25.
326. ALl STUDY, supra note 58, § 1311 cmrt. at 169, § 1312 cmt. at 188-91.
327. See S. 1876 § 1312(b); ALI STUDY, supra note 58, § 1312(b), at 26 27.
328. See S. 1876 § 1312(b)(4) ("The following civil actions shall not be removed.., from a State
court to any district court of the United States: ... (4) actions against a common carrier or its receivers
or trustees to recover damages for delay, loss, or injury of shipments, under [§] 20 of title 49 ... 
ALI STUDY, supra note 58, § 1312(b)(4), at 26.
The ALl explained that Carmack Amendment claims "are typically for a very small sum and
[Vol. 59: 225
52
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 59, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 2
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol59/iss2/2
COMPLETE PREEMPTION & CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
while abrogating the well-pleaded complaint rule, the ALI determined that
congressional policy directed that certain federal defenses should not be subject to
removal. 32 Although Congress did not enact the ALI proposal, it represents eight
years of work by the ALl as to the appropriate allocation ofj udicial power between
the state and federal courts.330 Once again, this work highlights the flaws with the
Anderson test, which allows removal on the basis of a defense not necessarily an
indefensible policy in the abstract-but does so on a basis that is not tied to any
cogent policy; this results in the removal of preemption defenses, such as the
Carmack Amendment, when congressional pronouncements in statutes and
legislative history, as well as the eight-year study by the ALI, indicate that federal
jurisdiction over such defenses is not warranted.3 '
In contrast to congressionally determined exceptions to the well-pleaded
complaint rule, a broadly-stated, judicially interpreted test, such as that in
Anderson33 2 (and also the Seinfeld test based on the breadth of preemption333 ),
creates jurisdiction, the contours of which are entirely unknown and must be
determined on a case-by-case basis. For example, the Anderson Court which may
have been motivated in large part by its desire to protect national bank
independence from state encroachment certainly did not consider the propriety of
removal for individual statutes that would be wrought by its new test,334 such as
whether its test would allow complete preemption by a Carmack preemption
defense and whether removal of Carmack defenses would be an appropriate or
desirable allocation of judicial power.
would invite the use of removal as a harassing tactic." ALI STUDY, Supra note 58, § 1312(b) cmt. at
201. Noting that current jurisdictional limitations permit removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1445 of Carmack
claims over $3,000, the ALI proposal "prohibits their removal regardless of amount." ALI STUDY,
supra note 58 § 1312(b) cmt. at 201 (emphasis added).
329. Professor Wright, who was on the council for the ALI STUDY, explained as follows:
Removal on the basis of a federal defense was the hardest fought issue
within the Institute in the federal question area, if not indeed in the entire Study.
There was agreement throughout that this kind of removal should be permissible
in some cases, but there were serious differences about how broadly this should
be allowed.
Charles Alan Wright, Restructuring Federal Jurisdiction: The American Law Institute Proposals, 26
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 185, 200 (1969). Nevertheless, in Professor Wright's article, the congressional
hearings, and an article by Professor Currie, there is no objection mentioned to excluding Carmack
cases from those removable. Indeed, Professor Currie, who criticized the jurisdictional amount
limitations on federal defense removal and advocated broader federal defense removal, saw "no reason
to criticize" the limitation on removal for Carmack and other enumerated cases. See David P. Currie,
The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute: Part 11, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 268, 275 (1969).
330. See ALl STUDY, supra note 58, at 1.
331. See discussion supra Part V.A.l.a.
332. See discussion supra Part IlI.B.1.
333. See Seinfeld, supra note 14, at 576 77.
334. See discussion supra Part IlI.B.1.
2008]
53
Tarkington: Rejecting the Touchstone: Complete Preemption and Congressional I
Published by Scholar Commons, 2008
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
B. Federalism Problems
In 1998, Professor Miller stated, "Because of the obvious federalism
implications of the complete-preemption doctrine and its inconsistency with the
well-pleaded complaint rule, its application thus far has been extremely
limited ... Miller did not elaborate on what "obvious federalism implications"
were involved, but the expansion of the complete preemption doctrine under
Anderson.36 illuminates encroachments on federalism.
1. Denying State Courts the Ability to Construe the Reach of State Law
Returning to our case in point, in the short time since federal courts have
consistently recognized complete preemption for Carmack claims, federalism issues
have arisen. In Franyutti v. Hidden Valley Moving & Storage, Inc., ' the plaintiff
filed a complaint in state court alleging two state law claims: fraud and violation of
the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA). 38 The defendants removed,
arguing that the Carmack Amendment preempted both claims. 39 The district court,
relying on Fifth Circuit law, defined Carmack preemption exceptionally broadly. 4 '
The court then found both the fraud and DTPA claims preempted, refused to
remand the case, and ordered the plaintiffs on threat of dismissal with
prejudice-to amend their pleadings to assert a Carmack claim.34' Notably, the
Texas Supreme Court had previously held that the Carmack Amendment did not
preempt claims under the Texas DTPA.342 The district court in Franyutti
acknowledged this holding, but concluded that the Texas Supreme Court decision
"occurred prior to many of the Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit opinions relied
upon" and thus "its holding has limited value." '43 Notably, the only decisions cited
in Franyutti that post-date that of the Texas Supreme Court are two Fifth Circuit
cases regarding substantive Carmack preemption, 44 and Anderson'4 5 and Rivet v.
Regions Bank of Louisiana,346 both of which deal with federal jurisdiction rather
335. Miller, supra note 9, at 1797.
336. See discussion supra Part III.B.
337. 325 F. Supp. 2d 775 (W.D. Tex. 2004).
338. Id. at 776.
339. Id.
340. See id. at 777 (citing Hoskins v. Bekins Van Lines, 343 F.3d 769, 778 (5th Cir. 2003); Air
Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. 111. Cent. Gulf R.R. Co., 721 F.2d 483, 484-85 (5th Cir. 1983)).
341. Id. at 778.
342. See Brown v. Am. Transfer & Storage Co. (Brown 1H), 601 S.W.2d 931, 938 (Tex. 1980).
343. See 325 F. Supp. 2d at 777 78 n.1.
344. See id. at 777 (citing Hoskins, 343 F.3d at 778; Air Prods., 721 F.2d at 484-85)
345. Id. (citing Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1 (2003)) ("When an area of state
law however, is completely preempted, the plaintiffs suit may be removed.").
346. Id. ("Although federal preemption is ordinarily a defense, once an area of state law has been
completely preempted, any claim purportedly based on that preempted state law claim is considered
from its inception a federal claim, and therefore arises under federal law." (quoting Rivet v. Regions
Bank of La., 522 U.S. 470, 476 (1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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than substantive Carmack preemption.347 Indeed, the Franyutti court's substantive
preemption conclusion is based largely on Croninger,348 a decision the Texas
Supreme Court certainly had before it.
It seems unlikely that the Texas Supreme Court would agree that its 1980
decision in Brown v. American Transfer & Storage Co. (Brown 1]),349 "has limited
value," as the Franyutti court held.35 In Brown II, the plaintiff relied solely on a
claim under the Texas DTPA and was awarded treble damages.3"' The defendants
argued that the DTPA was preempted by the Carmack Amendment and,
correspondingly, that a limit of liability found in the bill of lading of thirty cents per
pound shipped should apply. 52 The Texas Supreme Court held that "the DTPA was
a general statute, which provided remedies for persons victimized by false,
misleading and deceptive acts within the police power of the state."3 3 In contrast,
"the Carmack Amendment was [intended] to create a uniform rule of responsibility
for interstate commerce and interstate commerce bills of lading, and ... a DTPA
suit for misrepresentation made prior to contract does not fall within the ambit of
federal regulations." '354 The Texas Supreme Court did not stop with its explanation
of the different purposes and scopes of the statutes and thus lack of preemption.
Rather, the Court emphasized, "We also conclude the DTPA's prohibitions against
false, misleading and deceptive acts protects a deeply rooted state interest and is
347. See supra notes 345 46.
348. See Franyutti, 325 F. Supp. 2d at 777 ("The legislation encompassing the Carmack
Amendment embraces the subject of the liability of the carrier under a bill of lading which he must
issue, and limits his power to exempt himself by rule, regulation, or contract." (quoting Adams Express
Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491, 505 (1913)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
349. 601 S.W.2d 931 (1980).
350. See 325 F. Supp. 2d at 777 78 n.1.
351. See 601 S.W.2d at 931, 939.
352. See id. at 934.
353. Id. at 938.
354. Id. The Texas Supreme Court made these statements in summation of the holding of the
Texas Court of Civil Appeals and then explained, "We agree with this holding of the Court of Civil
Appeals for the reasons stated in its opinion." Id. at 938 (citing Am. Transfer & Storage v. Brown
(Brown 1), 584 S.W.2d 284, 284-91 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979), rev 'don other grounds, 601 S.W.2d 931).
The Texas appellate court's opinion explains more fully as follows:
The uniformity sought by the Carmack Amendment . . .is uniformity in the
requirements of a contract of carriage in interstate commerce and in the carrier's
liability for breach of its duties under such a contract. The Deceptive Trade
Practices Act ... presents no obstacle to full accomplishment of uniformity in
these respects. It applies to false, misleading, and deceptive acts or practices in
general and makes no special provision for interstate shipments or other
transactions in interstate commerce. We find nothing in the Carmack Amendment
or in the decisions construing it suggesting that uniformity was sought with
respect to legal liability for false, deceptive, or misleading acts or practices
preliminary to the formation of the contract .... We conclude that protection of
interstate shippers from such practices is left to the police powers of the several
states.
Brown 1, 584 S.W.2d at 288-89.
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an exercise of the right of the State of Texas to protect its citizens from acts such
as those committed by American Transfer.
'3 55
The Texas Supreme Court's decision upholding its state law against federal
preemption was not illegitimate and in no way validates fears of state court hostility
to federal law if state courts are allowed to determine preemption issues. Indeed, the
United States Supreme Court in Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Co. v. Harris'1
6
held that a state statute was not preempted by the Carmack Amendment because the
statute was a general statute that had "broad sweep [and] only incidentally
include[d] claims arising out of interstate commerce. 357 The Court found no
Carmack preemption because the state statute did not "either enlarge or limit the
responsibility of the carrier for the loss of property. '358 Basing their opinions in part
on Harris, the First, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have allowed for exceptions to
Carmack preemption and articulated tests for doing So. 3 9 The Texas Supreme
Court's Brown Ildecision harmonizes well with both Harris because both Harris
and Brown II involve general statutes not aimed specifically at regulating carrier
conduct-and the cases from the First, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits that examine
whether separate and distinct conduct or harm is involved. 6 ° Additionally, the fact
that the Fifth Circuit has adopted an extremely broad view of Carmack preemption
in no way binds the Texas Supreme Court. A state court is not bound by federal law
interpretations from the circuit encompassing that state. Rather, state courts are
bound by United States Supreme Court decisions-the decisions of other federal
courts are persuasive. 6 ' Thus, the Texas Supreme Court is not bound to follow the
Fifth Circuit interpretation of Carmack preemption over that of the First, Seventh,
or Eleventh Circuits.
355. Brown II, 601 S.W.2d at 938 (emphasis added) (citing Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc.
v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963)).
356. 234 U.S. 412 (1914).
357. Id. at 416.
358. Id. at 420.
359. In Rini v. United Van Lines, 104 F.3d 502 (1 st Cir. 1997), the First Circuit relied heavily on
Harris and contrasted it with Charleston & Western Carolina Railway Co. v. Varnville Furniture Co.,
237 U.S. 597 (1915), a case finding Carmack preemption, to create a test for Carmack preemption. See
Rini, 104 F.3d at 505 06 (citing Harris, 234 U.S. at 416, 420, 421 22; Varnville, 237 U.S. at 603).
The Seventh Circuit, in turn, relied heavily on Rini to determine its test for Carmack preemption.
See Gordon v. United Van Lines, 130 F.3d 282, 289 90 (7th Cir. 1997). Finally, the Eleventh Circuit
in Smith v. United Parcel Service, 296 F.3d 1244 (11 th Cir. 2002), relied for its test in part on Gooch
v. Oregon Short Line R.R., 258 U.S. 22 (1922), where the Court explained that "the Carmack
Amendment did not preempt an action involving a physical injury to a caretaker accompanying an
interstate shipment." See Smith, 296 F.3d at 1249 (citing Gooch, 258 U.S. 22).
360. See supra notes 292-94, 297 and accompanying text.
361. See Penrod Drilling Corp. v. Williams, 868 S.W.2d 294, 296 (Tex. 1993). In Penrod, the
Texas Supreme Court noted that the lower appellate court apparently "felt bound by the
pronouncements of the Fifth Circuit on federal law issues." Id. The Texas Supreme Court explained,
"This is not the case. While Texas courts may certainly draw upon the precedents of the Fifth Circuit,
or any other federal or state court, in determining the appropriate federal rule of decision, they are
obligated to follow only higher Texas courts and the United States Supreme Court." Id.
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If it were not forAnderson, the Franyutti plaintiff's state claims would not have
been subject to complete preemption and would have remained in Texas court.
Texas courts could have continued to recognize the state's "deeply rooted"
interest 362 in protecting its citizens under the Texas DTPA as separate and distinct
from Carmack preemption.363 Moreover, as shown, Congress has not manifested a
design to take Carmack preemption issues from state courts.
364
In fact, the Seventh Circuit, when faced with the question of whether a claim
under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act was
preempted by the Carmack Amendment, deferred to the holding of a state appellate
court "regarding the reach of the Illinois Act. ' ' 36 Notably, the Illinois court had held
that the Illinois statute fell within Carmack preemption.366 The Seventh Circuit's
statement underscores an important federalism interest: namely, state courts have
the authority to determine "the reach" of their statutes and laws, including policies
advocated and conduct prohibited thereby. 361 It is perfectly consistent to have a
Texas court declare that its Deceptive Trade Practices Act is aimed at prohibiting
conduct separate and distinct from liability created under a Carmack claim, and to
have an Illinois court declare that its similar statute does not reach beyond conduct
encompassed by the Carmack Amendment.
Thus, in the Carmack context, in light of the fact that a number of the federal
circuits have determined Carmack preemption is not an absolute bar to all state law
claims relating to a carrier-shipper relationship,368 state court adjudication performs
an important function. Specifically, state courts can legitimately and authoritatively
determine if state law or policy is aimed at separate and independent injuries or
conduct and thus preserve state law from Carmack preemption, or determine that
state law falls within such preemption.
Importantly, these considerations are pertinent beyond the context of the
Carmack Amendment, which is merely one illustration where state courts can
authoritatively construe the reach of their own laws and policies in the legitimate
contours of federal preemption. Because even field preemption requires the
determination of where the field begins and where it ends, state courts can
authoritatively declare where their state laws fall in the known spectrum of
preemption clearly inside the field, on the margins, or outside of it. Further, in
362. See supra text accompanying note 355.
363. The Texas Supreme Court's decision would be subject to review by the United States
Supreme Court. Though grants of certiorari are rare and may be inadequate to protect federal rights in
many areas, where Congress has indicated, as it has in the Carmack area, that it is comfortable with state
court adjudication and determination of federal preemption issues, Supreme Court review is arguably
an adequate protection.
364. See discussion supra Part V.A. l.a.
365. See Gordon v. United Van Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 282, 289 (7th Cir. 1997).
366. Id. (citing Nowakowski v. Am. Red Ball Transit Co., 680 N.E.2d 441, 444 (Ill. Ct. App.
1997)).
367. See id.; Coombes v. Getz, 285 U.S. 434, 436 (1932) ("The decision of the supreme court of
a state construing and applying its own constitution and laws generally is binding upon [the United
States Supreme Court].").
368. See supra note 297 and accompanying text.
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cases involving multiple state law claims, only one of which is preempted by
federal law, moving the adjudication to federal court deprives the state court of
adjudication of purely state law claims. 3 9 Again, the point is particularly poignant
when, as with the Carmack Amendment, Congress has indicated no qualms with
allowing state courts to determine the federal preemption defense. 70
2. Taking Jurisdiction from the States Without Congressional
Authorization
The Carmack Amendment illustrates another federalism problem with complete
preemption under Anderson: For over a century, under the well-pleaded complaint
rule, state courts have generally had exclusive jurisdiction over federal preemption
defenses when only state law claims are pled in state court.3 7 ' The Anderson
decision divests state courts of that jurisdiction without any congressional
authorization to do so. While appearing to be a separation of powers problem, it
also raises federalism concerns regarding the ability of the federal judiciary to strip
state courts of jurisdiction. As the Supreme Court has recognized, separation of
powers and federalism problems often go hand in hand. When the federal judiciary
does not confine its jurisdiction to that determined appropriately by Congress, it
369. See, e.g., Lamm v. Bekens Van Lines Co., 139 F. Supp. 2d 1300, 1313 (M.D. Ala. 2001)
(explaining in a Carmack case on remand, that if the state court determined the outrage claim was not
preempted, then the court would "need to turn to purely state-law issues, such as whether the plaintiffs'
claim rises to the level of severity necessary to make out an Alabama outrage claim" and noting that the
"plaintiffs' suit might well involve novel state-law issues over which a state court could have a claim
to greater competence than a federal court").
370. Professor Twitchell notes that
allowing state courts to identify the law controlling plaintiff s claim in uncertain
preemption situations does not place a significant additional burden on federal
interests. In fact, it could be argued that this division of labor would protect strong
federalism interests. By placing such questions in the hands of the states at the
outset, we may balance the power of the central government with a countervailing
state-oriented weight. Assuming that state courts are more likely than federal
courts to find against preemption, this distribution of power to make initial
preemption determinations may provide an important safeguard for our
constitutional structure. Structural decisions made to maintain an important
balance between state and central power may account for [the well-pleaded
complaint rule] itself and for congressional inertia ... to change the ... rule.
Twitchell, supra note 169, at 861-62. Professor Twitchell notes countervailing federal interests and
explains that the "major factor" in favor of having federal courts perform the preemption analysis
"appears to be the federal interest in avoiding state court error on preemption issues," as "[frequent
errors would undermine federal regulatory interests, create unnecessary judicial conflicts, and increase
the Supreme Court's caseload with direct appeals from state court judgments." Id. at 861. Yet, as noted,
Congress is not impotent to examine and ameliorate such problems.
371. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63 (1987) (explaining that federal
preemption, as a defense not appearing on the face of a complaint, does not authorize removal to a
federal court under the well-pleaded complaint rule).
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correspondingly fails to maintain due regard for the independence and sovereignty
of the states. 72
Justice Scalia, in his Anderson dissent, alluded to concurrent jurisdiction
caselaw as another area where the federal judiciary determines whether state courts
should be deprived of jurisdiction over federal law.37 3 In that context, the federal
courts have presumed state court jurisdiction except in very narrow instances.374
The analogy to concurrent jurisdiction caselaw is helpful. For both contexts, state
courts are divested of deciding something over which they generally have
jurisdiction. Given that federal question jurisdiction did not exist until 1875, state
courts were initially the primary vindicators of federal rights and interpreters of
federal law. Further, Congress's conferral of federal question jurisdiction in 1875
expressly stated that such jurisdiction was granted "concurrent with the courts of
the several States.,
376
The Supreme Court has explained in the concurrent jurisdiction context that
under the "system of dual sovereignty" between the state and federal governments,
"we have consistently held that state courts have inherent authority, and are thus
presumptively competent, to adjudicate claims arising under the laws of the United
States.37 The Court described three possible scenarios where "the presumption of
concurrentjurisdiction can be rebutted": namely, "by an explicit statutory directive,
by unmistakable implication from legislative history, or by a clear incompatibility
between state-court jurisdiction and federal interests., 378 This test, though more
372. For example, in Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263 (1934), the Supreme Court explained as
follows: "Due regard for the rightful independence of state governments, which should actuate federal
courts, requires that they scrupulously confine their own jurisdiction to the precise limits which the
statute has defined." Id. at 270.
373. See Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 18 n.2 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(citing Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobile Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478 (1981)).
374. Id.
375. See Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470.
376. Id. Further, in Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130 (1876), the Supreme Court reiterated that
"if exclusive jurisdiction be neither express nor implied, the State courts have concurrent jurisdiction.
Id. at 136.
377. Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990).
378. Id. at 459-60 (quoting Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478 (1981)
(internal quotation marks omitted)). The concurrence in Tafflin, authored by Justice Scalia, contended
that exclusive federal jurisdiction could not be founded on an unmistakable implication from legislative
history, and perhaps not on an incompatibility between state court jurisdiction and federal interests
either. See id. at 469-73 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia argued that exclusive jurisdiction had
never been found through legislative history, and additionally, "[w]hat is needed to oust the States of
jurisdiction is congressional action (i.e., a provision of law), not merely congressional discussion." Id.
at 472 (Scalia, J., concurring). Later that year, in Yellow Freight System, Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820
(1990), the Court held that jurisdiction under Title VII was concurrent despite "legislative history
indicating that many participants in the complex process that finally produced the law fully expected
that all Title VII cases would be tried in federal court." See id. at 824-25. The Court further explained
that the expectation shown through legislative history, "even if universally shared, is not an adequate
substitute for a legislative decision to overcome the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction." Id.
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exacting than that found in Taylor for complete preemption,37 9 similarly relies on
a congressional design to deprive state courts of their jurisdiction.
Indeed, in the complete preemption context, state courts have been given
exclusive jurisdiction over nondiverse cases pleading only state law causes of
action. 8 ° The divesting of state courts, as dual sovereigns, of such exclusive
jurisdiction should be undertaken with hesitance, in a manner similar to divesting
state courts of concurrent jurisdiction. As the concurrent jurisdiction cases require
a manifestation from Congress of intent to divest the state courts ofjurisdiction (or
a clear incompatibility between state court jurisdiction and the federal regulation),
so too should complete preemption be based on congressional manifestation.
Certainly state courts should not be deprived of jurisdiction in situations like the
Carmack Amendment, where Congress has manifested the opposite intent, namely,
to relegate a large number of such cases to state courts. 8'
Nevertheless, the presence of congressional intent for complete preemption
does not require that state court adjudication be ousted entirely or that there be
exclusive federal jurisdiction. Indeed, for ERISA, Congress expressly gave
concurrent jurisdiction over claims arising under Section 502(a)(1)(B),38 2 but at the
same time explained in reliable legislative history that while there was concurrent
jurisdiction, "[a]ll such actions in Federal or State courts are to be regarded as
arising under the laws of the United States in similar fashion to those brought under
section 301 of the [LMRA]." 383 Thus, Congress designed that both state and federal
courts could entertain an ERISA Section 502(a)(1)(B) claim but also that a
defendant invoking a federal preemption defense by that section of ERISA should
be able to remove the case to federal court even if the plaintiff only alleges state
law claims.384
It is thus up to Congress to examine the purpose and complexity of specific
federal legislation, as well as any state court hostility or likelihood of error, and
determine the slice of federal jurisdiction to be served up with its federal
legislation.385 For some statutes, it will be exclusive federal jurisdiction, for others
379. See discussion supra Part Ill.A.2.
380. See supra text accompanying note 371.
381. See discussion supra Part V.A. La.
382. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1) (2000) (stating in part that "[s]tate courts of competent
jurisdiction and district courts of the United States shall have concurrent jurisdiction of actions under"
Section 502(a)(1)(B)).
383. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65-66 (1987) (emphasis omitted) (quoting H.R.
REP. No. 93-1280, at 327 (1974) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
384. See id. at 66. Similarly, while the finding of complete preemption in Avco is not explained
and does not appear to be based on congressional intent, see supra text accompanying notes 59 62, the
Supreme Court had earlier held in Charles DowdBox Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962), that federal
and state courts shared concurrent jurisdiction over claims under section 301 of the LMRA, see id. at
505-06. As with ERISA, both concurrent jurisdiction and complete preemption exist for the same
statute.
385. See, e.g., Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 698 (1992) (explaining that Congress
makes decisions of investing lower courts "withjurisdiction either limited, concurrent, or exclusive, and
of withholding jurisdiction from them in the exact degrees and character which to Congress may seem
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it will be concurrent jurisdiction while allowing federal defense removal, and for
the majority of statutes it will be concurrent jurisdiction along with the normal
strictures of the well-pleaded complaint rule. As noted above, Congress has the
ability to determine when it would be appropriate to limit state adjudication and
when limitations on state jurisdiction are not needed, thus retaining due regard for
the sovereignty of state courts where the courts are competent to adjudicate issues
of federal law, including federal preemption.
C. Efficiency-An Alleged Benefit of the Anderson Rule
Weighed against these separation of powers and federalism problems are
alleged benefits of the Anderson rule that have been proffered by commentators.
Garrick Pursley insists that Anderson is justified because it promotes judicial
economy, efficiency, and administration. 86 Similarly, Professor Seinfeld states in
passing that Anderson "has brought clarity to the doctrine" of complete
preemption. 8 In terms of articulating an actual test for complete preemption (that
is, if an exclusive federal cause of action, then complete preemption),388 it may be
true that Anderson has brought some clarity; but in terms of creating a test that is
straightforward in its application and clear for litigants to determine when removal
is proper, Anderson has done the opposite.
Professor Wright suggests four criteria "to test the appropriateness of an
allocation ofj urisdiction between state and federal courts" two of which involve
efficiency.389 Namely, the division should be clear, adhering to a "[b]right [l]ine
[p]olicy" that is, "[a] lawyer of reasonable ability should be able to read the
statute and tell with fair assurance whether a particular court has jurisdiction. 39 °
Additionally, the division must be "consistent with efficient judicial
administration," which means that the "allocation should not aggravate.., burdens
by permitting extensive preliminary litigation to decide [jurisdiction], or by
requiring wasteful duplication of proceedings .... or by shuttling the litigants...
back and forth between the two systems.' 3 9'
proper for the public good." (quoting Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. 236,245 (1845)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
386. See Pursley, supra note 13, at 376, 418-45 (justifying the Anderson rule on the basis of
judicial economy and efficiency).
387. Seinfeld, supra note 14, at 548.
388. See Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 8 (2003).
389. See Wright, supra note 329, at 186-87. Notably, Professor Wright's other two criteria are
that the division ought to be rational and that the division should be "designed to reduce friction
between" the state and federal systems. Id. As noted previously, the Anderson test results in an irrational
division because it allows for removal where Congress has determined that use of the federal judicial
resource is unnecessary. See discussion supra Part V.A. Further, as discussed above, Anderson
exacerbates federalism problems. See discussion supra Part V.B.
390. Wright, supra note 329, at 187.
391. Id. Professor Wright explains, "If we must choose between a reasoned division ofj urisdiction
and a workable division ofjurisdiction, I would choose the latter every time." Id. at 207.
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As to adhering to a bright line policy, Anderson notoriously fails. TheAnderson
test is horribly unpredictable. Anderson requires a case-by-case analysis that first
examines whether the alleged preemptive statute falls within the complete
preemption doctrine, and then examines whether a specific state claim asserted by
the party falls within the preemptive scope of the statute, thus requiring the federal
court to construe both state and federal law. 92 In essence, the federal court is
required to determine the merits of the substantive federal preemption defense to
determine if it has jurisdiction over the case.39 A jurisdictional test that generally
requires a full preemption analysis, often comprising the merits ofthe case, does not
make jurisdiction clear for the lawyer of reasonable (or perhaps extraordinary)
ability-particularly where preemption is unsettled or difficult to determine. As
Professor Cohen noted, "It goes without saying that it is undesirable for
jurisdictional rules to be uncertain." '3 94 This is not only because it is horribly
inefficient to have uncertain jurisdictional rules (and an appellate court may later
rule that the district court erred and that removal was granted improvidently, and
thus remand the case to state court on the basis of a lack ofj urisdiction39 ), but also
because uncertain jurisdictional rules can be manipulated by plaintiffs and
defendants.
In fact,Anderson arguably broadened the scope and application ofthe complete
preemption doctrine to unknown areas that attorneys may be all too happy to
explore or exploit. 96 As the scope of complete preemption broadens, the more
likely it becomes that defense attorneys will file removal petitions, either in hope
that the court will find complete preemption and remove the case or in order to
delay the proceedings (but with ajurisdictional rule that is opaque enough to allow
a defendant to persuasively argue that it had an "objectively reasonable basis" for
392. See discussion supra Part III.B.1.
393. Though not on point, the problem is related to the issue in Steel Co. v. Citifensfor a Better
Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998), regarding whether a federal court should make an easy determination
on the merits prior to determining its own jurisdiction. See id at 88-89. The Supreme Court held that
jurisdiction must be determined before a federal court can decide the merits. See id. at 94. In the
complete preemption context, and particularly under the Anderson test, a federal court must determine
the merits of the preemption defense as a prerequisite to determining its jurisdiction. See discussion
supra Part lll.B.2. And if, upon remand to state court, the federal court's substantive preemption
determination is given law-of-the-case or other preclusive effect, see infra note 407, then the federal
court, without jurisdiction, has determined the merits.
394. William Cohen, The Broken Compass: The Requirement thata Case Arise "Directly" Under
FederalLaw, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 890, 908 (1967) ("[S]ince objections tojurisdiction ofthe district court
cannot be waived, and since in many cases the lack ofjurisdiction can even be asserted by the party who
invoked federal jurisdiction, there should not be doubt about the threshold question of jurisdiction.")
(footnotes omitted).
395. See, e.g., Beers v. N. Am. Van Lines, Inc., 836 F.2d 910, 912-14 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding
removal to have been improvident because there was no complete preemption, vacating a federal jury
trial verdict, and remanding to state court).
396. For a discussion of several contexts in whichAnderson has already broadened the scope and
application of the complete preemption doctrine, see supra Part llI.B.2.
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removal397 and avoid being assessed attorneys' fees and costs under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447(c)398 even if the case is remanded). One surprising example of the
uncertainty of complete preemption being manipulated-in this case by the
plaintiffs is Hoover v. Allied Van Lines, Inc.3 99 In Hoover, the plaintiffs filed a
complaint based entirely on state law, and the state court held that some of the state
law claims were preempted by the Carmack Amendment.4 "0 The plaintiffs were then
allowed to amend their complaint to add a Carmack claim.40 ' Defendants then
removed on the basis that the case had become removable by the assertion of a
federal question by the plaintiffs. 4 2 Shockingly, the court remanded the action to
state court, agreeing with the plaintiffs that by virtue of complete preemption the
case had been removable at the time the case was filed, and thus had to be removed
within thirty days of receiving the complaint.4 3 Because the defendants allegedly
"waived" the right to remove the case as initially pled, the federal district court
refused to allow them to remove once the case became removable by subsequent
events-namely, the amendment of the complaint adding a federal claim.
40 4
Professor Wright's criterion of efficient judicial administration is also not
satisfied by the Anderson test.40 ' Pursley argues that Anderson allows "removal at
397. See Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 141 (2005) ("Absent unusual
circumstances, courts may award attorney's fees under § 1447(c) only where the removing party lacked
an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal. Conversely, when an objectively reasonable basis
exists, fees should be denied.").
398. Section 1447(c) provides, "An order remanding the case may require payment ofjust costs
and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447(c) (2000).
399. 205 F. Supp. 2d 1232 (D. Kan. 2002).
400. Id. at 1235.
401. Id.
402. See id. at 1235, 1241. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2000), a defendant is required to remove
within thirty days of receiving the complaint. However, the statute also provides as follows:
Ifthe case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice ofremoval may
be filed within thirty days after receipt by the defendant . . .of a copy of an
amended pleading... from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one
which is or has become removable ....
Id.
403. Hoover, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 1236, 1241.
404. See id at 1234, 1241. Notably, this case was decided prior to Anderson and prior to the
Hoskins and Hall decisions finding complete preemption by virtue of the Carmack Amendment. See
discussion supra Part V.A. 1 .b. Indeed, the Hoover court noted that courts were divided on the question
of complete preemption under the Carmack Amendment and included in its citations both circuit court
cases on the matter, each of which had found no complete preemption. Id. at 1237 (citing Beers v. N.
Am. Van Lines, 836 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1988); Hunter v. United Van Lines, 746 F.2d 635, 643-46 (9th
Cir. 1984)). Thus, it is hard to justify the court's claim that the defendants should have recognized that
the complaint was removable at the time of the filing of the initial complaint. See id at 1241.
However, the Tenth Circuit had a more lenient test for complete preemption than did other circuits
prior to Anderson. The Tenth Circuit's test required two determinations: first, that there was substantive
preemption of the state law claim; and second, that Congress "intended to allow removal in such cases,
as manifested by the provision of a federal cause of action." See Schmeling v. Nordam, 97 F.3d 1336,
1343 (10th Cir. 1996).
405. See Wright, supra note 329, at 186-87.
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the outset" and "skips over state court adjudication of the substantive preemption
defense, thereby conserving judicial and litigant resources."4 6 Anderson does not
"skip" litigation of the preemption defense-rather, it moves it to federal court to
be litigated as a motion to remand. The remand motion becomes based on a
potentially complex issue of substantive preemption at the very early stages of
litigation-before facts are fleshed out at all. The federal court hears the remand
motion, determines substantive preemption, and either sends the case back to state
court or keeps it. If it remands to state court, the case was unnecessarily shuttled
between federal and state court, and additional litigation may arise in state court as
to whether or not the federal court's substantive preemption determination is either
law ofthe case or otherwise preclusive.0 7 Notably, ifthe federal court's substantive
ruling is not somehow binding on the state court, the parties will be required to
litigate the same substantive preemption question twice 0 8-a decisively inefficient
method for "conserving judicial and litigant resources."4 9
406. Pursley, supra note 13, at 441.
407. In Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 126 S. Ct. 2145 (2006), the Court held that the federal
court's determination that SLUSA did not apply was not issue preclusive on the state court. See id. at
2156 57. The Court explained that while the state court could not revisit the decision to remand, "it
[was] perfectly free to reject the remanding court's reasoning," id at 2157, and "[c]ollateral estoppel
should be no bar to such a revisitation of the [substantive] issue," id. at 2156 57. Issue preclusion was
not applicable because 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) prevented appeal of the district court's substantive
determination. Kircher, 126 S. Ct. at 2156 57. Further, the Court held, "Nor is there any reason to see
things differently just because the remand's basis coincides entirely with the merits of the federal
question; it is only the forum designation that is conclusive." Id. Thus, a state court could revisit the
merits subject to Supreme Court review. See id.
Nevertheless, the Kircher Court failed to acknowledge or cite its prior contradictory statement in
Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574 (1999):
Issue preclusion in subsequent state-court litigation, however, may also
attend afederal court ' subject-matter determination .... 1ff, for example,] the
district court determines that state law does not allow punitive damages for breach
of contract and therefore remands the removed action for failure to satisfy the
amount in controversy, the federal court's conclusion will travel back with the
case. Assuming a fair airing of the issue in federal court, [the federal] court's
ruling on permissible state-law damages may bind the parties in state court ....
Id. at 585-86 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Kircher seems to state the better policy for both
federalism reasons and in light of the lack of appeal of the remand order. Nevertheless, it results in
repetitive litigation in state and federal court.
Further, Kircher says nothing about law-of-the-case doctrine. However, "[a] number of federal
courts have stated that law-of-the-case principles do not bind the state court after remand for want of
federal subject-matter jurisdiction, even in cases in which the determination of subject-matter
jurisdiction involves a ruling on the reach of federal law." 18B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R.
MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4478.4, at 788 (2d ed. 2002).
408. On the other hand, if the federal court's determination is binding on the state court on
remand, that raises rather grave federalism problems as the state court has exclusive jurisdiction over
the merits and yet is bound by the determination of a federal court without jurisdiction to decide the
merits. See also supra note 393 (noting that the actions required of a federal court under the Anderson
test are in tension with those required under the rule that a federal court must determine whether
jurisdiction is proper prior to deciding the merits of a case).
409. See Pursley, supra note 13, at 441.
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On the other hand, if the federal court finds complete preemption and the case
remains in federal court, the federal court will either (1) construe the plaintiffs
complaint as asserting the preemptive federal claims and adjudicate it on its
merits;410 (2) request that the plaintiff amend the complaint to add the federal cause
of action (and if the plaintiff fails to amend, dismiss the action);4 1' or (3) dismiss the
case for failure to state a cause of action because the plaintiff asserted a "non-
existent" state law claim that is preempted by an unasserted federal cause of
action.4 2 The second and third scenarios are precisely what would happen
procedurally in state court without complete preemption-if the state court
determines the substantive preemption question adversely to the plaintiff, the court
would generally allow the plaintiff to amend the complaint to assert the federal
claim or dismiss the preempted claims. Indeed, if the state court determines that the
plaintiff must amend the complaint or else have it dismissed, and the plaintiff
decides to amend the complaint to add the federal cause of action, then removal of
the case to federal court falls squarely under statutory removal jurisdiction,4 13
avoiding the jurisdictional battle over removal or remand.
Further, if a federal court determines that there is complete preemption over
one or more of the plaintiffs state law claims, the question of exercising
supplemental jurisdiction over other non-preempted state law claims arises-not an
uncommon scenario.414 Often the plaintiff has justifiably decided to forego a federal
claim (for example, the limitations period has run on the federal claim but not on
410. See, e.g., Hoskins v. Bekins Van Lines, 343 F.3d 769, 771 (5th Cir. 2003) (explaining that
the district court held that the plaintiffs did not need to amend the complaint to expressly allege a
Carmack claim because the facts pleaded sufficed to raise such a claim).
411. See, e.g., Hall v. N. Am. Van Lines, Inc., 476 F.3d 683, 690 n.9 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that
the plaintiff was required to amend the complaint to expressly add a claim under the Carmack
Amendment once the district court found complete preemption and that the plaintiff's refusal to do so
required dismissal of the action).
412. See, e.g., Carr v. Olympian Moving & Storage, No. 1:06 CV 00679, 2006 WL 2294873, at
*2 (N.D. Ohio June 6, 2006) (holding that the plaintiff s state law claims were completely preempted
by the Carmack Amendment but were not thereby "translate[d] magically" into a Carmack claim and
dismissing the case with prejudice for failure to state a claim).
413. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2000).
414. Surprisingly, many commentators discuss complete preemption with the assumption that
federal law preempts all of the asserted claims. See discussion supra Part IV. Thus, the questions
surrounding complete preemption are analyzed as state adjudication of only state law claims (assuming
no federal preemption of any claims) or federal adjudication of only federal claims (assuming federal
preemption of all claims). But there are plenty of cases where some claims are potentially preempted
by federal law and some are not. See, e.g., Gordon v. United Van Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 282, 289-90 (7th
Cir. 1997) (holding that state law claims for breach of contract, fraud, willful and wanton conduct, and
violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act were preempted by the
Carmack Amendment but that a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was not); Hoover
v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 205 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1235 (D. Kan. 2002) (noting that the state court found
that the Carmack Amendment preempted negligence and breach of contract claims but not claims for
fraud, misrepresentation, or violations of the Kansas Consumer Protection Act).
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a state claim that may or may not be preempted by federal law4 15) but has other state
causes of action that are not preempted by federal law. If the case remains in state
court, the state court can determine whether the one claim is preempted by the
federal claim. If it is, the court may give the plaintiff the opportunity to amend to
assert the federal claim, but the plaintiff is unlikely to amend if for some justifiable
reason the plaintiff cannot recover under the federal claim. The state court will then
determine the merits of the other state law claims. If, on the other hand, the
defendant uses complete preemption of the one claim as a basis for removal, the
federal court will take jurisdiction and, even assuming it finds complete
preemption, will also determine that the federal claim is barred and dismiss the
federal claim. Thus, even though the federal court would initially have
supplemental jurisdiction, the court would likely remand the remaining state law
claims upon dismissing the federal claim. In such a scenario, complete preemption,
even where found, simply adds the extra steps of removal and eventual remand.
Similarly, if the plaintiffs alleged federal claim was not barred, but recovery
under it was tenuous, and the plaintiff had other state law claims, the plaintiff may
choose-after a state court determines that the tenuous federal claim preempts any
state law claim to forego preempted state claims and remain in state court for
adjudication of the remaining non-preempted state claims. If, however, one of the
plaintiffs state law claims is preempted by the tenuous federal claim, and the
defendant removes on the basis of complete preemption, the federal court could
assert jurisdiction over the tenuous federal claim as well as the other state law
claims under supplemental jurisdiction. The federal court would thus be
determining primarily state law claims in addition to a federal claim on which the
plaintiff only has a marginal chance of recovery and may have preferred to forego
in order to retain a state forum.4 6
Of course a bright line rule that streamlined procedure and reduced costs to
litigants would have little value if it failed to produce a correct result. Such error
costs are an essential component in determining efficiency. Yet it is important to
examine what a correct result would look like in the complete preemption
context-and, correspondingly, what errors should be avoided. If a correct result
means a correct substantive determination of federal preemption defenses and, also,
if federal courts in fact provide a more correct substantive determination of federal
preemption than do state courts, then the Anderson test would lower error costs in
some cases by increasing federal jurisdiction and providing a federal forum for such
415. See, e.g., Hall, 476 F.3d at 690 n.9 (noting that the plaintiffs unasserted Carmack claim
would have been barred by the contractual limitations period); Ritchie v. Williams, 395 F.3d 283,
286 89 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding complete preemption of state law claims by § 301 of the Copyright Act,
17 U.S.C. § 301 (2000), and holding that the copyright claim was barred by the statute of limitations).
416. Professor Twitchell has recommended that where a "plaintiffhas viable state law claims and
never sought to rely on federal law," the "plaintiff should still be given the option of dismissing [the
federally preempted] claims and returning to state court to assert any viable state claims." See Twitchell,
supra note 169, at 868-69 & n.273.
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determinations.417 Yet complete preemption is ajurisdictional doctrine and thus the
key question is not what the ultimate substantive determination should be, but
which court, state or federal, should be given the authority to make that decision.
The error to be avoided is an error in the allocation ofj udicial power between state
and federal governments rather than any specific errors as to the ultimate
substantive outcome. Under Anderson, as shown in the Carmack Amendment
context and in Anderson itself,418 the Anderson test results in jurisdiction at odds
with congressional intent. Because the Anderson tests fails to properly allocate
judicial power between state and federal governments in accordance with
congressional intentions, Anderson not only provides a complex and unworkable
framework for determining federal jurisdiction, it additionally increases error costs.
Overall, the Anderson framework is far from efficient and certainly cannot be
justified on the basis of creating efficiency in judicial administration.
VI. RETURNING TO CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
Although Taylor rightly focuses on the need to tie complete preemption to
congressional intent,4 9 Taylor could be improved as a workable test for complete
preemption. Notably, while the Taylor concurrence was straightforward in requiring
clear congressional intent of removability,42 ° the majority opinion merely said it
would be hesitant to find complete preemption without such intent.42 ' It is likely
that the Taylor majority did not want to foreclose complete preemption to unknown
future cases where a clear manifestation from Congress was absent but where
allowing removal on the basis of the federal defense might nevertheless seem
requisite to effectuate the purposes of a federal statute. However, the Taylor
majority left the door open without explaining when complete preemption should
be allowed absent such a manifestation.422 Consequently, federal courts created
divergent multifactored tests for complete preemption.423
417. But if a correct substantive determination is the correct and desired result in fashioning a rule
for removal jurisdiction, then federal courts should always be given removal jurisdiction for federal
defenses rather than employing the complex case-by-case analysis required by the complete preemption
doctrine post-Anderson. Anderson does not provide a federal forum for all federal preemption defenses,
but only where the preemptive federal law provides the exclusive federal cause of action. See discussion
supra Part IlI.B. Where no federal cause of action is provided or where the federal cause of action is
not exclusive, Anderson does not create a federal forum through complete preemption.
418. See discussion supra Part V.A. I.b. Further, as noted, see supra text accompanying notes
92 93, soon after enacting the NBA, Congress expressly provided for removal on the basis of a federal
defense for all nationally chartered corporations except national banks. See Act of July 27, 1868, ch.
255, § 2, 15 Stat. 226, 227. The Anderson Court stated that arguments regarding such jurisdictional
enactments were "irrelevant" to determining removal jurisdiction and allowed removal because the
NBA claim was exclusive. Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 9 n.5 (2003).
419. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 66-67 (1987).
420. See id at 67 68 (Brennan, J., concurring).
421. See id. at 64-65.
422. See id
423. See Miller, supra note 9, at 1797-1800 (discussing pre-Anderson tests in federal circuits).
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Thus, while Taylor's premise-relying on congressional intent of
removability is appropriate, there are other methods of reaching the same goal
that would be more predictable and reliable. Arguably, the most efficient option is
through legislation clearly setting out which federal defenses are subject to removal
and which are not, similar to the 1971 ALI proposal discussed previously.424
Whether or not one agrees with each aspect of the ALl proposal, the proposal
demonstrates that well-drafted legislation can create clear, efficient delineations of
jurisdiction and effectuate congressional policy determinations on the appropriate
allocation of authority in light of the purposes of federal jurisdiction.
Absent such congressional action, ajudicial test could be crafted similar to the
one articulated for concurrent jurisdiction in Tafflin v. Levitt.42 5 Under this
framework, removal on the basis of a federal defense would be authorized if the
statute so directed-as with the Price-Anderson Act-or by Congress's
manifestation of its intent, as found in the statutory provisions and reliable
legislative history, that the jurisdictional provision should allow removal on the
basis of a federal defense as with ERISA.426 At the very least, as in Rosciszewski
v. Arete Associates Inc.,42 7 to allow for removal on the basis of a federal defense,
Congress should clearly manifest its intent that the adjudication of federal
preemption should occur in federal courts to the exclusion of state courts. 428 In
short, the complete preemption test would require some manifestation from
Congress that it intends the jurisdictional provision to allow removal based on a
preemption defense under that statute.429
424. See supra text accompanying notes 324 30.
425. As noted, supra text accompanying notes 377-78, the Court described three scenarios where
"the presumption of concurrentj urisdiction can be rebutted": namely, "by an explicit statutory directive,
by unmistakable implication from legislative history, or by a clear incompatibility between state-court
jurisdiction and federal interests." 493 U.S. 455, 459 60 (1981) (quoting Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil
Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478 (1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
426. See Tafflin, 493 U.S. at 459 60. Justice Scalia contended that legislative history should not
be allowed to provide the basis for exclusive federal jurisdiction, see id. at 472 (Scalia, J., concurring),
and the Supreme Court in Yellow Freight v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820 (1990), seemed to lean in that
direction, see id. at 824-25.
Nevertheless, while Justice Scalia is correct in stating that exclusive federal jurisdiction has never
been found on the basis of legislative history, see Tafflin, 493 U.S. at 472 (Scalia, J., concurring), the
same cannot accurately be said of complete preemption. Indeed, the finding of complete preemption in
Taylor for ERISA is based on legislative history that explained what Congress intended to effect by
adopting the same j urisdictional provision for ERISA as that used for the LMRA. See Taylor, 481 U.S.
at 65-66. The jurisdictional provision itself, however, does not expressly provide for federal defense
removal, but only exempts ERISA and the LMIRA from any jurisdictional amount and citizenship
requirements. See id. Reliable legislative history, such as that found in Taylor, which directly explains
what Congress intends to effect by the adoption of certain statutory language, certainly demonstrates
clear congressional intent of removability and should suffice to effect complete preemption.
427. 1 F.3d 225 (4th Cir. 1993).
428. See supra text accompanying notes 135-39.
429. Despite not being tied to anything, the Avco decision, allowing removal for preemption
defenses based on section 301 of the LMRA, see supra text accompanying notes 59-62, should be
upheld for stare decisis purposes and because Congress, in stating in the ERISA legislative history that
it wanted ERISA to work like section 301 of the LMRA actions as interpreted by Avco, see supra text
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Again, following the concurrentjurisdiction model, complete preemption could
additionally be allowed in the extreme and rare instance where there exists a
"disabling incompatibility between the federal [statute] and state-court
adjudication" of the federal preemption defense.43 Like the Taylor majority, this
would leave the door open for the possible, however unlikely, situation where there
is no clear manifestation from Congress, but where removal on the basis of a federal
defense is necessary to effectuate congressional purposes. Such an allowance
should be construed very narrowly, as it appears to have been in the concurrent
jurisdiction caselaw.43 1 Indeed, in the concurrent jurisdiction context, the Supreme
Court has rejected claims of incompatibility based on contentions that interpretive
variation among state courts will lead to nonuniformity, explaining that state court
misinterpretations are subject to Supreme Court review and would not "result in any
more inconsistency than that which a multimembered, multitiered federal judicial
system already creates. 41 2 Further, the incompatibility must be with a distinctive
congressional design for the statute at issue and not from something that is a general
federal interest applicable to all or many federal preemption defenses.4 3 That is,
allowing state court adjudication of the federal preemption defense must "plainly
disrupt the [specific] statutory scheme" as authored and envisioned by Congress.434
Otherwise, the "clear incompatibility" analysis could be just as malleable,
accompanying notes 72 73, impliedly authorized such removal. However, the Avco decision remains
an anomaly and would not come within the scope of a rule based on congressional intent of
removability.
430. See Gulf Offshore, 453 U.S. at 477-78. A different articulation requires "a clear
incompatibility between state-court jurisdiction [over the federal preemption defense] and federal
interests." Tafflin, 493 U.S. at 459-60 (quoting Gulf Offshore, 453 U.S. at 478) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
431. See, e.g., Tafflin, 493 U.S. at 472-73 (Scalia, J., concurring) (explaining that exclusive
jurisdiction had yet to be found by the Supreme Court on the basis of a clear incompatibility).
432. See Tafflin, 493 U.S. at 465; see also Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 514
(1962) (noting that "diversities and conflicts" would occur "no less among the courts of the eleven
federal circuits, than among the courts of the several States," which is the "usual consequence" of
concurrent jurisdiction, and to resolve such conflicts "is one of the traditional functions of this Court").
433. See Tafflin, 493 U.S. at 472 (Scalia, J., concurring) (explaining that clear incompatibility
might be established where "a statute expressly mentions only federal courts, plus the fact that state-
court jurisdiction would plainly disrupt the statutory scheme").
Notably, in situations where Congress has not made any express manifestations that it desires to
allow removal on the basis of a preemption defense and where it has expressly allowed concurrent
jurisdiction, it will be difficult ifpossible at all-to demonstrate a clear incompatibility with allowing
state court adjudication of the preemption defense. This is so because by expressly conferring
concurrent jurisdiction, Congress is allowing state courts to determine federal preemption where both
express federal claims and state claims are brought in the same action and where the defendant does not
seek removal. On the other hand, a court may be more likely to find a clear incompatibility where the
federal preemptive statute provides for exclusive federal jurisdiction, or where Congress fails to enact
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unpredictable, and entirely divorced from congressional intent of removability as
the analysis under the Anderson test.43
V11. CONCLUSION
The Anderson test creates a policy-bankrupt allocation of state and federal
jurisdiction. Complete preemption underAnderson completely fails to comport with
separation of powers and federalism principles by allocating cases to federal court,
contrary to congressional intent and despite congressional manifestations that state
courts are competent to adjudicate the federal preemption defense. Further, the
Anderson test is unpredictable, shuttles cases between state and federal court, and
is generally inefficient. This is so not because removal on the basis of a defense is
necessarily inefficient but because an unpredictable rule requiring a full substantive
analysis to determine jurisdiction is inefficient.
In contrast, a test for complete preemption based on congressional intent of
removability has a solid foundation in the structure of American government,
giving weight to separation of powers and federalism concerns. First, it allows
Congress, rather than federal courts, to expand the jurisdiction of the federal
judiciary. Judicial allowance of federal jurisdiction is thus tied to the constitutional
foundation for lower federal courtjurisdiction namely, authorization by Congress.
This foundation is particularly important for removal jurisdiction, which is "entirely
435. See discussion supra Part III.B. Other commentators, such as Professors Morrison, Miller,
Ragazzo, and Spencer, have recommended that courts rely on Congress to determine complete
preemption or abandon complete preemption as a judicial doctrine. See discussion supra Part IV.
However, both Professor Morrison's and Professor Spencer's discussions are nearly cursory-they lack
elaboration or explanation of how reliance on Congress would actually work. See Morrison, supra note
189, at 194; Spencer, supra note 164, at 290. Professor Ragazzo offers a full treatment of the issue, but
the force ofhis argument is to abandon complete preemption and similar exceptions rather than offering
a framework for relying on congressional intent. See Ragazzo, supra note 182, at 329-31, 335. Finally,
Professor Miller briefly recommends that the Supreme Court "clarify the analytical standard," Miller,
supra note 9, at 1822, and suggests the Court "[p]lac[e] the burden on Congress-at least prospectively"
by offering "guidance as to what terms should appear in the statute, or, at least, be set out in reliable
legislative history, to create complete preemption," id at 1800. This would allow Congress to
knowingly craft legislation providing for federal defense removal; however, the Price-Anderson Act,
SLUSA, and ERISA indicate that where Congress particularly has wanted to allow federal defense
removal, it has been able to manifest that desire.
This Article contributes to the work of these scholars by offering a new framework for the
judiciary to apply, modeled on concurrent jurisdiction caselaw, that ensures reliance on congressional
intent but still a lows a narrowly defined area for the judiciary to provide federal defensive removal
absent such manifestations where necessary to effectuate specific congressional purposes. Further, the
Article explores efficiency, separation of powers, and federalism problems created by Anderson and
examines a specific statutory scheme as a case in point, the Carmack Amendment, see discussion supra
Part V.A., to demonstrate that reliance on a replacement federal cause of action does not accurately
demonstrate congressional intent of removability and, indeed, may accompany congressional desires
to limit federal jurisdiction.
[Vol. 59: 225
70
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 59, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 2
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol59/iss2/2
COMPLETE PREEMPTION & CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
a creature of statute." '436 Second, contrary to the Anderson and Seinfeld analyses,
the breadth of federal jurisdiction would not be dependent on federal court
interpretations of federal power. Third, federalism and comity are promoted where
state court jurisdiction over federal preemption defenses is taken away only when
Congress determines that such action is needed-whether it be for uniformity, state
hostility, or federal law expertise reasons.
Reliance on Congress to create exceptions to the well-pleaded complaint rule
would also be far more predictable, and thus more efficient, than the current regime:
if there are no congressional manifestations that a federal preemption defense
should be removable, then it is not removable absent the rare clear
incompatibility. This way courts and litigants could determine, with far more
certainty than under Anderson, whether removal was proper and would not have to
litigate the preemption defense in order to find out if the federal court has
jurisdiction. Finally, complete preemption could become grounded in the purposes
of federal jurisdiction because Congress can determine when the "interest in
securing a uniform interpretation of federal law or safeguarding against state court
bias is most pressing" and when it is not pressing or necessary.437
While the Supreme Court's decision in Anderson employs the Taylor rubric of
looking to congressional intent as the touchstone of complete preemption, by
changing the test from congressional intent of removability to congressional intent
that a cause of action be exclusive, the Court has abandoned reliance on Congress
as the proper and best authority to permit removal on the basis of a federal defense.
436. See Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32 (2002) ("The right of removal is
entirely a creature of statute and a suit commenced in a state court must remain there until cause is
shown for its transfer under some act of Congress. [Removal statutes] are to be strictly construed."
(citation omitted) (quoting Great N. R.R. Co. v. Alexander, 246 U.S. 276, 280 (1918)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
437. See Seinfeld, supra note 14, at 547 48 (explaining the need to ground complete preemption
analysis in the purposes of federal jurisdiction).
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